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Chapter 1
Introduction
Macro economic outcomes have tended to exhibit serious instability from time to time. 
One policy reaction to this has been to suggest interventionist rules for monetary and 
regulatory policy. Examples of these have been the idea that the UK should join the euro 
as a substitute for a domestic monetary policy that has led to macro instability; that 
monetary policy should stabilise rates of growth of nominal variables rather than their 
levels as a way of stabilising unemployment; and that financial markets need regulation 
to avoid inefficiency and ‘bubbles’. These three examples are what are addressed in this 
thesis.
In the first part I look at the proposal to join the euro; plainly such a proposal 
might look attractive if domestic monetary policy is poorly constructed. However equally 
plainly it must be possible for a government to decide on good monetary policy. I examine 
the euro proposal within that context. I use the Liverpool Model of the UK, which is 
a well-known forecasting model that has been reasonably successful in forecasting the 
economy in both the 1980s and 1990s. This model has been influential in developing the 
counter-inflation (demand-side) and anti-unemployment (supply-side) policies of the UK. 
The model also has had a fairly good forecasting record, successfully predicting several 
major UK episodes. So the model not only produces reasonably good forecasts, but also
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gives credible answers to questions about the effects of policy changes. I therefore suggest 
that the Liverpool Model is a suitable vehicle for evaluating the impact on the economy’s 
behaviour in response to a major policy shift, such as joining EMU.
Using the model I compare the effect of shocks on the economy under the floating case 
and under EMU. I first identify the typical shocks hitting the economy and estimate their 
variability. A large number of sets of random drawings from each shock distribution is 
then generated, which are then applied to the model in sequence, to generate a scenario 
for the economy over that period. The variances of the variables are then computed from 
this large sample of observations for the given monetary regime. I can then compare them 
across regimes. The welfare of the representative agent is also calculated to compare the 
effects the differences in variability have. A household utility function that fits well with 
what we know about risk-aversion and inter-temporal substitution is the Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion function with a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and 
leisure. The value shares of consumption and leisure are set at 0.7 and 0.3 respectively, 
and the risk-aversion parameter is set to 1.5. The differences in utility are then estimated 
from the stochastic simulations and then compared under floating and EMU.
I also investigate what the comparison would be if the assumptions about both regimes 
were wrong due to an ‘exogenous’ mistake in the parameter values and applicable in both 
regimes. I examine the effects of i) having greater nominal rigidity in wages (as the 
Liverpool Model has very little nominal wage rigidity); ii) the UK having lower demand 
sensitivity to interest rates (as one of the differences between the UK and the continent 
that exacerbates the asymmetric effect of shocks is the overdraft lending system and the 
variable rate mortgage); iii) the effect of the UK having greater labour market flexibility 
(as greater flexibility of real wages in response to shocks would dampen unemployment 
variability); iv) greater volatility of the pound outside EMU (as it is sometimes asserted 
that floating exchange rates generate high volatility because of the varying risk-premia 
attached to the pound); and finally v) raising the fiscal stabiliser (advocates of EMU say
9
that discretional fiscal policy could largely replace monetary policy as a stabiliser).
In the second part I look more narrowly at domestic monetary policy and ask whether 
one could envisage less emphasis on output stabilisation and move from the existing 
practice of targeting the growth rates of nominal variables to targeting their levels. This 
would bring monetary policy closer to the classical norms of the gold standard and avoid 
the problem of existing practices that the variance of the nominal price level becomes 
infinite as the time horizon of prediction stretches into the future. The monetary regimes 
I consider are:
1. various sorts of targets for expected outcomes. Each is implemented via setting the 
expected money supply for the coming period; the actual money supply is subse­
quently delivered with an independent stochastic error. The targets considered are 
for inflation, money supply growth, the price level and the money supply level
2. a rigorous interest-rate-control regime where an interest rate target is chosen for the 
coming period and then exactly adhered to.
I use two models which can be considered to come from opposite ends of the spectrum. 
On the one hand, there is a representative agent model, calibrated rather than estimated 
and essentially theoretical in construction. On the other hand, I use a forecasting model, 
the Liverpool Model of the UK (described above). The idea of this contrast is to achieve 
some robustness in the assessment of policy.
The models both assume:
1. competitive markets in labour and output.
2. overlapping wage contracts, with a variable indexation parameter chosen optimally 
by workers; however a marginal labour supply is always provided to the auction 
market at an auction supply price.
3. Cobb-Douglas production functions.
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4. Monetary policy is implemented via money supply feedback rules.
The key differences are that the representative agent model does not allow consumers 
to access the credit markets. The Liverpool Model is an open economy model so that it 
embodies efficient international bond markets. The two models differ in detail and in the 
extent of theoretical abstraction rather than in basic approach.
Both models are shocked in order to estimate the effects on each of the different 
monetary regimes. In order to assess the welfare of society from different monetary policy 
rules the average household has the standard Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility 
function with Cobb-Douglas preferences across consumption and leisure.
In the third part I consider the need for financial market intervention or regulation, 
revisiting the question of financial market efficiency to investigate whether a model of 
complete market efficiency could explain the FTSE. This question is highly complicated 
by the possibility of multiple regimes for profits and hence productivity growth — which 
creates a ‘peso problem’ in evaluating the FTSE’s behaviour. To allow for this problem I 
take the Monte Carlo approach of constructing the working or null hypothesis of efficiency 
under multiple regimes and asking whether draws from the error distributions of these 
regimes could account for the joint behaviour of profits (the market ‘fundamental’) and 
the FTSE. I ask the question: is there some latent model of a fundamental in an efficient 
market that can link the data on the fundamental to the data on stock prices, accounting 
for the behaviour of both simultaneously? If so then one cannot reject the ‘null hypothesis’ 
that the market is efficient.
One can think of an economy where the capital stock generates the profits or dividends 
that are valued as equities. The profits are mainly driven by productivity shocks since 
variations in labour inputs mainly change wages while changes in the capital stock mainly 
dilute the equity base. So I assume that the fundamental, profits per share, can be 
identified with productivity.
I suggest that the recognition of several regimes for productivity growth could be a
11
helpful generalisation of the time-series process governing it. Thus for example one might 
identify periods of poor productivity growth, for example during war time or times of 
poorly-adapted institutions (the UK during the 1970s); also periods of rapid productivity 
associated with surges of innovation (the industrial revolution, the computer revolution 
etc.); and finally periods of normal growth, when innovation is being digested undisturbed 
by wars or dysfunctional institutions.
I create a regime switching model with four regimes (where the regimes represent high, 
normal and low growth, as well as a crash) with the probability of each regime constant 
over time: this model generates a profits series. The rational expectation of the future 
profits is used to create the present discounted value which is used as the generated FTSE 
series. There is a constant probability of each future regime and so the variance around 
future returns is fixed, as are any risk-premium terms, so I have an efficient market world 
of rational agents. I then use stochastic simulations to see if the model can statistically 
match the data.
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C hapter 2 
B ritain  and EMU: A ssessing the  
C osts in M acroeconom ic Variability
2.1 L iterature R eview
Robert Mundell (1961) laid the foundations of the theory of optimum currency areas 
in his classic article ‘A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’. In this paper the author 
states that for a system of flexible exchange rates to work effectively and efficiently it 
must be demonstrated that: (1) an international price system is dynamically stable; 
(2) the exchange rate changes necessary to eliminate normal disturbances to dynamic 
equilibrium are not so large as to cause violent and reversible shifts between exports 
and import-competing industries; (3) the risks created by variable exchange rates can be 
covered at reasonable costs in the forward markets; (4) central banks will refrain from 
monopolistic competition; (5) monetary discipline will be maintained by the unfavourable 
political consequences of continuing depreciation; (6) reasonable protection of debtors and 
creditors can be assured; and (7) wages and profits are not tied to a price index in which 
import goods are heavily weighted.
He also states that if the world can be divided into regions within each of which
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there is factor mobility and between which there is factor immobility, then each of these 
regions should have a separate currency which fluctuates relative to all other currencies. 
If labour and capital are not mobile within a country then a flexible exchange rate will 
not be stabilising, and this could lead to varying rates of unemployment or inflation. If 
these factors are mobile across national boundaries then a flexible exchange system would 
become unnecessary.
Mundell’s ideas were extended by Ronald McKinnon (1963) and Peter Kenen (1969). 
McKinnon develops Mundell’s idea of optimality by discussing the influences of the open­
ness of the economy using the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods. As well has the 
factor mobility among regions that Mundell was concerned with McKinnon says that 
factor mobility among industries is also important. Once the problems of factor immo­
bility among industries is considered, the author concludes that it may not be feasible 
to consider splitting the world into currency areas along industrial groups rather than 
geographical groups. Though, an optimal geographical size still exists even when we are 
only concerned with inter-industry factor mobility.
Kenen’s article takes a look at the papers on Mundell and McKinnon, and comes to the 
conclusion that fixed rates are the most appropriate to well-diversified national economies. 
He states that countries with fixed rates have to have potent and sophisticated internal 
policies, as diversified national economies may be particularly vulnerable to monetary 
shocks. So, they need to maintain rather close control over money-wage rates. Also, 
because of the imperfect mobility of labour, fixed rate countries must have a wide array 
of budgetary policies to deal with regional unemployment. In conclusion he states that 
the principle developed countries should adhere to the Bretton Woods regime, whereas 
the less developed countries should make frequent exchange rate changes or resort to full 
flexibility as they are less diversified and less well-equipped with policy instruments.
The empirical literature on optimal currency areas has followed different approaches. 
One approach was pioneered by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). In this paper they
14
use a structural VAR to identify the supply and demand shocks from the observed data 
on output and unemployment. The cross country correlations of these shocks are then 
calculated, so they can group countries according to the cross-country correlations of these 
shocks. They find a distinction between the supply shocks affecting Germany, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark and the very different supply shocks affecting the 
UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Supply shocks to the first set of countries 
were both smaller and more correlated across neighbouring countries. The demand shocks 
experienced by these countries were also smaller and more inter-correlated, though the 
difference wasn’t as large. They also do a similar comparison for the US, and find that 
the US regions adjust to both demand and supply shocks more quickly than EC countries. 
This could reflect the greater factor mobility in the US. The authors conclude that because 
the supply shocks are larger and less correlated across regions in Europe than in the US 
the EC may find it more difficult to operate a monetary union that the US. The large 
idiosyncratic shocks they find strengthen the case for policy autonomy and suggest that 
significant costs may be associated with its sacrifice.
Another approach has been to measure the degree of flexibility of labour markets 
in Europe. Decressin and Fatas (1995) investigate regional labour market dynamics in 
Europe over a 25 year period, and compare the results to those obtained for the US. 
They examine the extent to which labour market shocks are shared by all regions and 
how regional employment, unemployment and labour force participation adjust to labour 
demand shocks which are region-specific. The authors find that in Europe 80% of the 
dynamics in employment growth are region-specific, this is compared to 40% for the 
US. In terms of an optimal currency area, they come to the conclusion that the regions 
in Europe form a less suitable single currency area than the states in the US. Europe 
shocks are distributed less symmetrically across regions and people migrate less rapidly 
in response to them.
The empirical analysis of optimum currency areas has also concentrated on the issue
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of whether the degree of asymmetry of shocks is likely to decline (or to increase) when 
countries integrate further. The EU Commission report ‘One Money, One Market’ (1990) 
stresses the view that trade integration leads to the convergence of economic structures 
and therefore reduces the scope for asymmetric shocks. This paper comes to the con­
clusion that the likely impacts of EMU are microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic 
stability. The main benefits are: (1) a gain in efficiency and a strengthening of the trend 
of investment and growth; (2) price stability; and (3) valuable gains for many countries’ 
national budgets. Whilst the main cost is the loss of monetary and exchange rate policy 
as an instrument of economic adjustment at the national level.
The viewpoint that the degree of asymmetry of shocks is likely to increase when 
countries integrate is defended by Krugman (1993). Krugman looks at the case of regional 
crises in the US to illustrate some of the difficulties that EMU will face at a regional level. 
He points out that during the 1980s and early 1990s several regional economies in the US 
had been subject to large adverse shocks for which they had no policy recourse because 
the US has a common currency. The main focus is on the slump in New England, and 
argues that if New England had been a sovereign country, it might have devalued its 
currency and/or pursued an expansionary monetary policy. The argument of the paper 
is that the New England experience is a bleak illustration of some of the difficulties that 
EMU will face at a regional level. The author concludes that the theory and experience 
of the US suggests that EC regions will become increasingly specialised, and will thus 
become more vulnerable to region-specific shocks.
Building on the above theory Bayoumi (1994) set out a formal model of optimum 
currency areas. His model embodies the criteria for optimum currency areas suggested by 
the papers by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Using this model the 
author calculates the welfare effects of currency unions. He finds that while a currency 
union can raise welfare of the regions within the union, it unambiguously lowers welfare for 
regions outside the union. The reason for this is that the gains from the union (the lower
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costs of transacting business) are limited to the members of the union, while the losses 
from the union (lower output due to the interaction between the common exchange and 
the nominal rigidity) affect everybody. An implication of this result is that the incentives 
for a region to join a currency union are different from the incentives to admit a region 
into the union. The entrant gains from lower transactions costs with the entire existing 
union, while the incumbent regions only gain on their trade with the potential entrant. 
So, a small region will have a greater incentive to join a union than the union will have 
an incentive to admit the new member.
Many papers have concentrated on the formation of the European Monetary Union, 
and attempted to evaluate the effects of EMU. Minford, Rastogi and Hughes Hallett 
(1992) evaluate the alternative policy regimes for EMS and EMU. They use stochastic 
simulation methods on the Liverpool annual global model to evaluate the variability of 
inflation and output under the various exchange rate arrangements. They argue that EMS 
produces instability. They find that the best regime for EC countries would be floating 
with monetary policies either coordinated worldwide or, if this is impossible, coordinated 
within an EC-wide coalition in a world of independent Nash behaviour. Otherwise the 
UK would gain from staying out of EMU, returning to a floating exchange-rate.
This result is in contrast to that of the EC Commission’s One Market, One Money pa­
per, which concluded that EMS reduces average inflation variability. Masson and Syman- 
sky (1992) provide a comparative assessment of the two studies above, and show that the 
resulting differences are because of differences in experimental design rather than differ­
ences between the models. They compare results from the IMF’s MULTIMOD with those 
of the Liverpool model, and since MULTIMOD was used by the EC Commission study 
they are able to illustrate the sensitivity of results to certain key assumptions. One of 
these is the treatment of risk premia and the method by which these are estimated and 
assumed to change under EMU. The authors show that the EC Commission’s method of 
estimating risk premia produces gains from EMU that are far larger than obtained by
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other methods, whereas in the Minford, Rastogi and Hughes Hallett paper, the treatment 
of exchange-rate realignments under EMS is shown to cause most of the instability in their 
results. The authors conclude that EMS is much less of a potential course of instability 
than implied by the Minford, Rastogi and Hughes Hallet paper, but they also find no 
strong evidence to support EMU over the alternative regimes.
Whitley (1992) uses deterministic simulation rather than stochastic simulation to 
analyse the effects of specific single shock under EMS and EMU using various differ­
ent multi-country models. He finds that expansionary fiscal policies are observed to be 
more inflationary under EMU than under independent monetary policy. However, there 
is little evidence of higher inflation under EMU than EMS. For an oil shock the author 
finds that the diversity of the output responses across the models make it difficult to 
draw any general conclusions about the convergence under the different policy regimes, 
and conclude that there is no tendency for EMU to reduce the recessionary effect of higher 
oil prices on European output levels or to moderate inflationary pressures.
In a more recent paper Barrell and Drury (2000) analyse two different regimes, one 
where the UK is inside the monetary union and another where the UK stays outside 
monetary union. They use a large macro model which includes descriptions of all the 
European economies and applied stochastic simulation techniques to evaluate the perfor­
mance of the UK economy under the different regimes. They use data from the period 
1991ql to 1997q4 to draw their shocks. The authors find that the volatility of UK output 
is larger when inside the monetary union, whereas inflation variability is decreased. They 
conclude that if the UK faces a turbulent future then the case for membership of EMU is 
strengthened.
In a review of the five years since the introduction of the Euro Rogoff (2005) says that 
the euro has had some marked successes, but the pain has probably outweighed the gain 
as Europe still remains far from an optimal currency area. The author says the one of 
the successes of the euro has been in maintaining low and stable inflation, but the costs
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of having a common monetary policy are also apparent, and Germany would have been 
better off with its own currency. From the authors viewpoint Europe may be an optimal 
monetary area from a political point of view, but not from an economic one.
2.2 Introduction
The British Chancellor of the Exchequer has proposed ‘five (economic) tests’ for whether 
the UK should join the euro (HMTYeasury, 2003, reports his largely negative assessment). 
The central macroeconomic issue is embodied in the first and second of these tests which 
ask how far the UK will suffer in the form of increased macroeconomic volatility — ‘boom 
and bust’ — from losing its power to set its own independent interest rate through having 
its own currency and exchange rate. This issue (alone) is the focus of this paper; we 
must emphasise that we do not seek to minimise the importance of other issues bearing 
on the choice. These are discussed in Minford (2002). This paper is intended to discuss 
the narrow but important technical question of the effects on macro variability; since 
macro policy loses freedom of action, an efficient government will necessarily face higher 
variability, at least in the absence of helpful structural changes induced by giving up that 
freedom, but the extent of it and the possible effects of such changes is an important 
element in the decision about joining.
One can use indirect evidence on this from a variety of sources — such as the extent 
to which the euro-zone and the UK business cycles have been similar and the degree of 
asymmetry of the two region’s shocks. Such evidence has been assembled for a number 
of countries, including the UK, within the ‘optimal currency area’ literature; the general 
verdict of this literature is that a country such as the UK is exposed to substantially 
‘asymmetrical’ shocks and that this is likely to impose a non-trivial cost on it if it gives 
up monetary autonomy. However this evidence is only indirect in the sense that it does not 
give us a quantitative estimate of what would happen if we joined EMU as compared with
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continuing outside. It indicates the likely direction of effect but cannot tell us its likely 
size and therefore its likely painfulness. The same applies to studies of the experience 
of US states within the US monetary union, with its unique relationships and history. 
To find out the consequences for the UK itself with its own particular characteristics 
we would ideally like to try EMU out. Unfortunately we cannot of course as EMU is 
effectively irreversible; the nearest thing to a try-out was our experience of the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism, which was not entirely encouraging, but it was not EMU, 
since our exchange rate was fixed but adjustable whereas under EMU it is fixed and never 
again adjustable. However, there is one course open to us, indeed essentially the only one: 
we can use a model of the UK economy of the sort used regularly to give answers about 
the effects of other policies and to make forecasts; and we can simulate its behaviour in 
response to typical shocks under our present arrangements and then by contrast under 
EMU. Such stochastic simulation analysis gives us a reading on the difference in the 
volatility of the UK economy under the two monetary regimes.
This question is not to be confused with the question of the likely short-term outlook 
for the economy if it joins or stays out. That is of interest too (and would depend on what 
exchange rate we joined at, whether our interest rates had ‘converged’ or not, and other 
elements in the initial situation when we joined); but this is of little importance for a 
long-lasting, even permanent, decision to join EMU because these short-term differences 
in the forecast would give way, in the absence of further shocks, to a similar outlook. Our 
inflation target is basically the same as the ECB’s; and our growth rate over the long­
term will not be affected by a different monetary regime with a similar inflation target. 
So the serious issue is how the economy behaves in response to shocks once embedded in 
a different monetary regime. That behaviour could be very different and the difference 
long-lasting because the regimes are so different; under one we can react to shocks by 
changing our interest rates, under the other we cannot.
To examine this issue of relative volatility we use a well-known forecasting model
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that has been reasonably successful in forecasting the economy in both the 1980s and 
the 1990s, the Liverpool Model of the UK; it has also been influential in developing the 
counter-inflation (demand-side) and anti-unemployment (supply-side) policies of the UK. 
We first say a few words about the model and describe the methods we are using on it, 
before turning to previous results of such exercises and then the results we get in this one.
2.3 The Liverpool M odel o f the U K  and the Stochas­
tic Sim ulation M ethod U sed
The model (an account can be found in Minford, 1980) has been used in forecasting 
continuously since 1979, and is now one of only two in that category. The other is the 
NIESR model, which however has been frequently changed in that 20-year period: the 
only changes in the Liverpool Model were the introduction in the early 1980s of supply- 
side equations (to estimate underlying or equilibrium values of unemployment, output and 
the exchange rate) and the shift from annual data to a quarterly version in the mid-1980s. 
In an exhaustive comparative test of forecasting ability over the 1980s, Andrews et al. 
(1996) showed that out of three models extant in that decade — Liverpool, NIESR, and 
LBS — the forecasting performance of none of them could dominate that of the others in 
non-nested tests, suggesting that the Liverpool Model during this period was, though a 
newcomer, at least no worse than the major models of that time. For 1990s forecasts no 
formal test is available, but the LBS model stopped forecasting and in annual forecasting 
post-mortem contests the NIESR came top in two years, Liverpool in three. In terms 
of major UK episodes, Liverpool model forecasts successfully predicted the sharp drop 
in inflation and the good growth recovery of the early 1980s. From the mid-1980s they 
rightly predicted that the underlying rate of unemployment was coming down because of 
supply-side reforms and that unemployment would in time fall steadily in consequence. 
Then they identified the weakness of UK membership of the ERM and its likely departure
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because of the clash between the needs of the UK economy and those of Germany at the 
time of German Reunification. After leaving the ERM they forecast that inflation would 
stay low and that unemployment would fall steadily from its ERM-recession peak back 
into line with the low underlying rate — as indeed was the case. Thus we would suggest 
that the Liverpool Model forecasting record is reasonable at the very least.
A model should not only be capable of producing good forecasts; it should also give 
credible answers to questions about the effects of policy changes. In this respect, the 
Liverpool Model has been extensively used in policy analysis bearing on the ‘monetarist’ 
and ‘supply-side’ reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, now generally considered to have been 
broadly successful.
We therefore suggest that the Liverpool Model can be regarded as a suitable vehicle 
for evaluating the impact of a major policy shift — that of joining EMU — on the 
economy’s behaviour in response to shocks. Comparative work on other models would 
also be of interest, though in the past few years resources devoted to such models has been 
drastically reduced as a result of the ESRC’s cut-off of funds for their support. There is 
the NIESR model of the UK and also NIGEM the NIESR’s linked model of the UK and 
other major world economies; we discuss below a comparable study to ours using NIGEM 
carried out by Barrell and Dury (2000). There are also models in the public sector — 
those of the Treasury and the Bank of England — though their theoretical basis and their 
forecasting record are both rather unclear, as is their fitness at this stage for stochastic 
simulation — an exercise which is highly demanding of the model’s structure. It is a 
major undertaking to carry out stochastic simulation on any model. It requires that the 
model have a reliable economic structure so that its behaviour in response to a wide range 
of shocks is reasonable, something that comes from regular use in analysis and forecasting 
over a long period. It also requires a great deal of detailed work on the inputs and a 
considerable familiarity with the model’s workings so that assumptions are made that do 
not conflict with the model’s logic. In practice this can only be done by a team working
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regularly on the model. For our work on the Liverpool Model we obviously have access 
to and have used our own forecasting team in Cardiff Business School — but plainly we 
do not have similar resources for dealing with other models and our understanding is that 
the same may be true of the teams themselves dealing with these models. Fortunately, 
as we have seen the Liverpool Model has strong claims to give relatively authoritative 
assessments.
Lucas (1976) set out a well-known critique of using such models for analysis of such a 
fundamental regime change as joining EMU; his point was that the parameters of models 
that were not totally ‘structural’ (only the parameters of tastes or technology can be 
considered such) would shift under the new regime because of the resulting changes in 
incentives. The Liverpool Model could be vulnerable to such effects in principle, but there 
is no reliable way of measuring their extent or speed. What we have done to assess the 
possible errors in our estimates is to carry out sensitivity analysis on the key parameters.
The method of stochastic simulations involves
1. Identifying the typical shocks hitting the economy and estimating their variability 
on relevant data, usually over the past two decades; this variability is assumed to 
match the chosen sample period.
2. Randomly draw a vector of error terms for period t. These error terms are added 
to the model, and it is solved for period t.
3. Draw another vector or error terms for period t -Hi. These errors and the solution 
values for period t are then used to solve the model for period £ +  1.
4. Repeat step 2 for periods t +  2 to t + N. This is then considered one repetition, 
from which we obtain a prediction of each endogenous variable for periods t through 
t + N.
5. Repeat steps 1 through 3 J  times for J  repetitions.
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We ran a large number of randomly generated sequences of drawings, filtering out those 
generating extreme instability as unrealistic. We retained 183 sets, that is 183 different 
scenarios for a given ‘monetary regime’, either floating as now or EMU. The reason for 
omitting the replications that generated extreme instability is that if the economy reacted 
in such a way to the large shocks the government would respond and there would be a 
policy response to try and curb the instability. Essentially what is happening in these 
variants is that negative supply-side shocks (mainly from policy itself) are driving up 
unemployment and lowering Y*; such a series of bad policies and catastrophic effects would 
seem likely to generate some offsetting response from policy, much as indeed happened in 
the 1980s. In this sense the model would be subject to the Lucas Critique, in that policy 
shocks are treated as exogenous random walks and this would be likely to be overridden 
under these high-variance cases. As an example of the effect of the large shocks Table
2.1 shows the average of the variances of a sample of omitted replications and a sample 
of included replications. It can be seen that the variances of all variables are larger for 
the omitted cases, and very much so for output and unemployment. For this reason we 
decided to exclude these from the analysis.
Table 2.1: Comparison of Variances for Omitted and Included Replications
Y RS INFL U Y* u*
Omitted
Included
Ratio
32722633.68
12949801.03
2.526883124
0.000640
0.000622
1.029394
0.000237
0.000180
1.309518
399657.211
24704.466
16.177528
12275291.222
2199058.531
5.582067
191247.248
6645.064
28.780349
FYom our 183 scenarios over 66 quarters we obtain 12,078 observations on the state 
of the economy, i.e. on each of prices, interest rates short and long, on GDP and other 
variables. We compute their variances from this large sample of observations for the given 
monetary regime. We can then compare them across regimes.
A great many assumptions go into such an analysis and it is only reasonable to question 
them in detail. The fact is we are attempting to see how the future might unfold and 
the future may fail to resemble the past in particular ways. The virtue of the stochastic
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simulation method is that we can investigate such concerns quantitatively by simply 
redoing the analysis under interesting differences of assumption. This can generate a 
range of possible differences in variability between our two regimes. We can look at these 
sensitivity tests in two ways. First, we can assume that the relevant changes would have 
occurred anyway under both regimes; second, that they occur purely as a result of joining 
EMU — this interpretation could be defended for certain parameter changes such as 
enhanced labour market flexibility. We report both types of analysis below; our approach 
is not to attempt any evaluation of the likely extent of parameter changes but merely to 
investigate their effects within a possible range.
2.3.1 A  Short D escription  o f th e  M odel
The Liverpool Model of the UK is a quarterly large non-linear RE model and can be 
regarded as an open economy version of an IS-LM model. The IS curve has as its compo­
nents the fiscal deficit, real interest rates and the real exchange rate. In addition, there 
are wealth effects on consumption and investment. The wealth effects in the Liverpool 
Model are powerful and respond to changes in expectations of real interest rates and in­
flation. These cause unanticipated changes in nominal interest rates that alter financial 
asset values.
The demand for money is given by the standard expression except for the presence of 
real financial assets, included because the holders of money are assumed to be sensitive 
to the proportion of money in their overall financial assets. The supply of money has 
the property that monetary growth can be independent of the fiscal deficit in the short 
run but it must be consistent with it in the long run since, if this were not the case, 
with wealth effects real interest rates would diverge. The growth rate of money supply is 
determined by a long run tendency which is related to the underlying state of the budget 
deficit and by a temporary component generated by open market policy.
The model’s Phillips or supply curve is of the New Classical type and assumes overlap­
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ping wage contracts. A key element is the price surprise term that represents the errors 
in inflation expectations formed over past wage contract dates. The labour demand and 
supply equations are central in determining the supply side response which impacts on 
the natural rates of output and unemployment. Thus, unemployment depends on output, 
a productivity trend, real wage costs, and on product taxes. In turn, real wages depend 
on benefits, union power, unemployment, and the price surprise term. The Phillips curve 
includes a persistence effect from implied capital formation while deviations of output 
from its natural rate are driven by the price surprise term.
Financial markets are assumed to be ‘efficient’ so that the short term rate of interest, 
the long rate, and the exchange rate are linked together by the UIP condition and the 
RE theory of the term structure.
Forward rational expectations are on inflation, output, and the real exchange rate. 
While the expectations of inflation determine interest rates via the Fisher equation, ex­
pectations of output determine real expenditure in the private sector. Expectations of 
the future real exchange rate are used to solve for the real rate of interest in the UIP 
condition.
When solving, the model assumes that all lagged variables are known with certainty. 
Thus, expectations are conditional on the information set, which includes all variables in 
the previous period.
In the fixed exchange rate case the model is changed so that money supply is exogenous 
and prices are set according to European prices and exchange rate, and the nominal 
interest rate is set at the European rate. We have not taken into account the more 
general advantages of EMU. These include transactions costs which should decrease on 
entering EMU. This could yield gains in efficiency, though this would be less for larger 
countries, such as the UK, than smaller, less developed countries. Another advantage is 
that the countries in a union would be working together which could lead to co-operative 
policies which may lead to a more stable economy.
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2.3.2 R esu lts O f P revious S tochastic S im ulation Exercises On 
T he U K  A nd E M U
There has been a variety of previous work on the effects of joining EMU, both for European 
countries generally and for the UK alone. The general conclusion of this work has been 
that there would be a substantial increase in variability under EMU; the variances of 
output and inflation are the principal focus of these studies. The earliest independent 
study was in 1992 by Minford, Rastogi and Hughes Hallett (1993) building on their 
earlier work in the late 1980s using the Liverpool Multi-country Model and also the UK 
model; later Masson and Symansky (1992) used the IMF’s Multi-Mod, a multi-country 
model. The range of findings by these authors for European countries generally was quite 
wide; Masson and Symansky (1992) found rises of inflation variance up to 40% and of 
output variance up to 30%, Minford et al. found very much larger rises, probably because 
they permitted monetary policy to be optimised in respect of these variances. The EU 
Commission (1990, Annex E) also published a study of this type which purported to 
find that EMU actually reduced macro variability; their methods were strongly criticised 
by these other authors on the grounds that they had unrealistically over-estimated the 
variances of the risk-premia on national EU currencies which of course disappear on entry 
into EMU. Hence their comparison is biased heavily in favour of EMU. We discuss the 
far more recent study by Barrell and Dury (2000) below.
For the UK the only previous study was by Minford et al., where they found very large 
rises, of 80% for the output variance and nearly six times for the inflation variance. That 
study was similar in method to the one here. The main difference in this one is that the 
data we are using are more recent, for the late 1980s and 1990s instead of for the 1970s and 
1980s; we have also taken the opportunity to use the method of bootstrapping the actual 
data instead of using estimated variances and covariances within a normal distribution. 
Finally we have carefully overhauled all aspects of the operation and made a number of 
detailed improvements. Nevertheless it is likely that the main difference is from the newer
27
data.
2.3 .3  T he R esu lts O f T his Exercise
The basic result of our exercise is displayed in Figure 2.1 which shows the variances 
for four key variables — output around its potential or ‘trend’, inflation, unemployment 
and real short-term interest rates. There are two diamond-shaped graphs; one shows on 
a logarithmic scale the combination of these variances under floating, the other under 
EMU. For ease of comparison the floating ones are set equal to 0.1 so that the EMU 
diamond shows the EMU variances as a proportion of the corresponding floating ones. 
What we see is that all the implied variances are considerably higher under EMU than 
under floating. The variance is used, as is standard, in our measures of welfare cost. That 
of output around its trend is nearly a quarter higher; that of unemployment nearly a 
fifth higher; real interest rates a multiple of over four times; and that of inflation under 
EMU is approximately twenty times that under floating. The EMU environment is one 
in which ECB nominal interest rates are moving a fair amount for euro-zone-wide reasons 
and yet because they are poorly addressed to UK shocks the UK economy experiences 
considerably worse output, employment and above all inflation swings.
How can such a big difference arise? First, let us be clear about the monetary rule 
we have used under floating. It is one in which interest rates react in a rather standard 
way to the deviations of current output, inflation and also MO from their targets (the 
change in short-term nominal interest rates reacts to all three, in terms of deviations from 
their long-run target, with a coefficient of 1.33). This gives a standard deviation of real 
interest rates of 2.7% (p.a.), of inflation of 1.5% (p.a.), and of output of 2.6% around 
its trend; these values seem to match reasonably with what we would expect from the 
current environment under the Monetary Policy Committee — supporting the use of this 
rule, though different monetary rules could of course be used to change this combination 
of variabilities.
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Figure 2.1: Floating and EMU compared (Basic Case)
Second, consider the factors driving inflation under EMU. UK prices of traded goods 
and services would be set in world markets at euro prices. They would be impacted upon 
therefore by three forces: the movements in the euro exchange rate (principally against 
the dollar), competing euro-zone prices and in UK costs. UK non-traded prices would be 
driven by UK costs and to some degree the pressure from traded prices. This makes up 
a cocktail of shocks. The euro has been notoriously volatile against the dollar. UK costs 
have had a roller-coaster ride from the push and pull of Tory and Labour supply-side 
policies. Finally, euro inflation has had the usual ups and downs.
Meanwhile under EMU euro-interest rates are reacting to their own euro-agenda and 
not targeted on UK inflation or output except as a small part of an overall euro-average. 
Hence these interest rates act not as a reactive stabiliser but as an independent source 
of shocks to the UK economy. We should stress that to the extent there has been any 
correlation of these interest rates with UK shocks over the past decade and a half it is 
wholly picked up in our methods described in the Annex. But because this correlation
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is small, and inflation variance is raised under EMU by the shocks described in the last 
paragraph, the variance of the real short-run interest rate (the nominal interest rates 
minus expected future inflation) also rises sharply.
When we consider the nature of the EMU regime in this way, we should not really 
be too surprised at the greater variability it creates. We can perhaps see an example of 
this at work in recent EMU experience in two ways. First, there is the extraordinary 
case of Ireland, where under the impact of the boom induced by reducing interest rates 
to euro-levels of 3% or so and of the sharp depreciation of the euro, inflation — which 
in spite of Ireland’s rapid growth in the previous decade had been muted — rose to a 
peak of 7% by November 2000 and was still running at 3.9% in mid-2003. Given some 
similarities and close trading relations between the UK and Ireland, it is reasonable to 
expect that had the UK also joined the euro on Jan 1 1999 it too would have experienced 
these problems to at least some degree. Second, we can inspect the range of inflation 
currently (July 2003) in the euro-zone: from 0.8% in Germany to 2.9% in Spain and 3.5% 
in Greece, much like Ireland. The range across countries is 3.1% and has peaked thus far 
at 6%. By contrast in the past five years UK inflation (RPIX) has stayed well within the 
range of 1% either side of the Bank of England’s 2.5% target.
It is natural to ask what these differences in variability imply for ‘welfare’ or the degree 
of painfulness of the EMU option. The usual approach has been to give weights to the 
different variances .that appear to cause political and popular concern, namely the ones 
we have just discussed, and add them up with a negative sign into a measure of welfare 
(or with reversed sign of welfare cost). In line with this, we give the variances of output 
and unemployment each a weight of 1 and those of inflation and real interest rates each a 
weight of 0.1 (the precise numbers are arbitrary but it is usual to give such price variables 
a lower weight in such welfare functions on the grounds that they affect people’s living 
standards more indirectly); plainly then we wind up with a big difference in welfare. EMU 
welfare on this measure is 45% of that under floating — equivalently the EMU welfare
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cost is 2.21 times that of floating. We will use this approach in what follows and refer to 
it as the popular welfare cost of EMU.
This does not measure the average person’s welfare, however one plays with the 
weights, because it is in effect treating political reaction as equivalent to true dissatis­
faction. But of course the extent of politically-expressed displeasure exaggerates the true 
average discomfort, partly because to get results in the cross-currents of debate one’s case 
must be put as strongly as possible but mainly because the costs of volatility fall dis­
proportionately on groups that are different from the average — for example, those who 
lose their jobs or have their houses repossessed or whose businesses fail. We will argue 
that we should pay attention to the popular welfare cost because it is the bitterness and 
displeasure of these groups that gets reflected in the political debate more than the calm 
of the average person.
2.3.4 M easuring T he W elfare O f T he ‘R epresentative A gen t’:
We may nevertheless look at a second approach under which one measures the welfare of 
a representative or average household, bearing in mind that households are the people in 
our economy who own ‘the UK economy’ and to whom governments answer. A household 
utility function that seems to fit rather well with what we know about risk-aversion and 
inter-temporal substitution is the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) function with 
a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. The value shares 
of consumption and leisure would be set at 0.7 and 0.3 respectively if one says that 
leisure time excluding unemployment is roughly equal to working time (sleep hours being 
ignored) and that through unemployment benefits the leisure choice is subsidised so that 
its marginal utility is perhaps just under a half of an hour spent working and getting 
consumption. With the risk-aversion parameter being generally found to be of the order 
of 1.5, we come up with a function:
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Utility = (c0-7(i + f/)(1~15)(l^T5j
where C is consumption and U is the unemployment rate.
To estimate the difference of utility in our stochastic simulations, we take the model­
generated values for consumption and unemployment, compute the resulting average value 
for utility under floating and compare it with that under EMU. Because it is essentially 
only the variability of outcomes that differ across the two regimes, the difference of utility 
will reflect the difference of variances. Households then penalise variance (increased risk) 
through the law of diminishing marginal utility (since a fair bet offering an equal chance 
of 150 and 50 will be worth less utility than keeping 100 for sure).
Plainly extra uncertainty (variance in our income) is something that trades off rather 
weakly against a rise in average living standards (a rise in our mean income). Hence 
we would not expect these increases in the variances of consumption (which behaves 
similarly to income in our model) and of unemployment under EMU (respectively 30% 
and 80%) to generate much of a fall in equivalent living standards, simply because on 
average people can handle extra variance at moderate cost — for example by insurance or 
the use of savings. Thus we find that the fall in utility calculated in this way is equivalent 
to a 0.012% fall in the living standard of the average person. This translates into a 
current price loss of £0.12 billion per year in 2001 prices; if one assumes a real long-term 
interest rate of 3% and a growth rate of 2.5%, then the present discounted value of this is 
£24billion. This is not large relative to the scale of UK wealth; probably about the same 
small 0.012% as for the fall in living standards. This reflects the ease with which most 
people can insure themselves against the sort of variability at stake.
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2.3.5 C hecking T he R esu lts For S ensitiv ity
We begin by investigating what the comparison would be if our assumptions about both 
regimes were wrong due to an ‘exogenous’ mistake in the parameter values and applicable 
to both regimes — in a later section we consider the effects of changes induced, in the 
manner suggested by Lucas (1976), by the change-over to EMU. The results of this first 
analysis are brought together in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: The welfare losses (political cost) produced by EMU compared with floating 
(floating=1.0)________________________________________________________________
Ratio of variances (EMU/floating)+ —
Output Unemployment Interest Rate Inflation
The Central Case 2.21 1.24 1.18 4.32 20.17
No Indexation 2.74 1.63 1.51 5.56 23.27
Low Interest Rate Sensitivity 2.16 1.03 1.04 5.17 21.62
More Labour Market Flexibility 2.72 1.18 1.08 4.04 33.19
High Unemployment 2.23 1.21 1.21 4.80 20.15
More Exchange Rate Instability 2.04 1.23 1.18 3.27 17.48
Enhanced Fiscal Stabilisers* 2.29 1.20 1.12 5.50 21.64
+ The weights used in the political cost are (all divided by the weights total of 2.2):
1 for output and unemployment variance; 0.1 for inflation and real interest rate variances. 
Monetary policy response to inflation under floating raised by a third (to 1.3), to output 
lowered by a third (to 0.7), to counteract greater inflation volatility from greater wage volatility. 
* assumes no enhanced fiscal activism under floating
**under our Montecarlo sampling procedure with the number of draws at 12,078 the standard 
error of the floating regime’s variance, VARF, is 0.013VARF (Wallis, 1995). Hence a ratio in 
excess of 1.026 indicates that the EMU regime’s variance is higher than that of floating at the 
95% confidence level. Thus all the numbers in this table are statistically significant.
Greater nom inal rigidity o f wages (no indexation)
The Liverpool Model in its current version has very little nominal wage rigidity — a 
surprise 1% rise in prices only lowers real wages by 0.3% after one quarter and by 0.1% 
after two quarters, and this dies away altogether in another three quarters. In other words 
there is a great deal of effective indexation of wages to prices. So we check how much effect 
on the results would occur if the effect after one quarter was raised to 1% and thereafter
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dies out linearly in the next four quarters as contracts are renegotiated. Such a rise 
to maximum nominal rigidity (effectively zero indexation) makes the Model’s Aggregate 
Supply or Phillips Curve flatter — that is a given rise in demand has a lesser effect on 
wages and prices but a greater effect on output, giving the model a more Keynesian 
character. This should reduce inflation variance and lower output variance the lower the 
variation of demand relative to that of supply. In the UK supply shocks are important 
and under floating demand can be stabilised by the movement of interest rates so output 
variance should tend to fall under floating. Under EMU the variation of demand becomes 
much larger in the absence of interest rate stabilisation and this should mean that output 
variance would rise, perhaps markedly.
This lessening of indexation under floating does indeed reduce inflation variance sig­
nificantly and also reduces output variance. But under EMU while inflation variance falls 
markedly, those of output and unemployment rise sharply. The gap between EMU and 
floating correspondingly widens; the variance of output is now 1.63 times, of unemploy­
ment 1.51 times, while that of real interest rates is now 5.56 times and inflation 23.27 
times. Our political cost measure of EMU rises to 2.74 times that of floating. We should 
note that the more Keynesian the model (i.e. the more nominal wage rigidity it has) the 
worse the effect of joining EMU on output and unemployment variability.
T he effect o f th e  U K  having lower dem and sen sitiv ity  to  interest rates
One of the differences between the UK and the continent that exacerbates the asymmetric 
effect of shocks is the overdraft lending system and the variable rate mortgage. These 
mean that as short-term interest rates rise they have a big impact on small businesses and 
consumers because they immediately pay more for their existing borrowings, not merely 
on any new borrowings. It has been argued that this might change now that inflation has 
been reduced systematically. If so, we would expect it to narrow the differences between 
floating and EMU since the stabilising variation of interest rates permitted by floating
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would have less beneficial effect while the destabilising variation of euro-interest rates 
would have less damaging effects.
So indeed it proves though the effects on the floating case are essentially negligible. 
We divide the model’s interest rate responses by three. There is a substantial fall in 
output and unemployment variability under EMU as the lower interest rate sensitivity of 
the economy reduces the effect of euro-zone interest rate movements on the UK; inflation 
and real interest rate variability is unaffected. The gap in the variances therefore narrows, 
especially for output (+3%) and unemployment (+4%). The political cost measure falls 
to 2.16 times. It can be seen that much less interest rate sensitivity is helpful to the EMU 
case but only modestly and still leaves substantial disruption due to inflation and real 
interest rate volatility.
T he effect o f th e  U K  having greater labour market flexibility
Much is made in the debate over the euro of labour market (meaning real wage) flexibility. 
It is pointed out that if interest rates are unable to stabilise asymmetric shocks then greater 
flexibility of real wages in response to shocks would dampen unemployment (and so also 
output) variability in a useful alternative way. Our basic case showed that existing UK 
flexibility is inadequate to provide much alternative adjustment; possibly it is rising under 
the influence of labour market reforms over the past two decades. Accordingly we ask 
what the effect would be of a substantial rise in UK flexibility: we multiplied the response 
of real wages to unemployment by 1.52 and reran the exercise.
We find that under both regimes unemployment variance drops substantially; and 
it does so proportionately more under EMU, confirming that enhanced flexibility could 
be indeed an important help in eradicating the greater imbalances produced by EMU. 
Output variance drops by less as the change is focused on the labour market; and again 
output variance drops rather more under EMU. We see that EMU and floating come closer 
together, with the ratio of the unemployment variance down to 1.08 and that of output
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down to 1.18; however, still a big gap remains. Interestingly the greater labour market 
flexibility tends to make inflation more volatile under floating which is a source of general 
instability; to counteract this monetary policy has to respond more fiercely to inflation 
and worry less about output variability — we assume that the response to inflation rises 
by a third while that to output diminishes by a third. As a result inflation variability is 
cut back sharply under floating, with some small cost in higher output variance (of the 
order of under 10% judging from other work). So the comparison of inflation variance 
under EMU is now correspondingly worse; the ratio rises to 33.19. The political cost of 
EMU under labour market flexibility therefore actually rises to 2.72 times; but within 
that the cost of output and unemployment variability falls.
W hat if unem ploym ent is very high?
Our results hitherto have shown the variability of unemployment under EMU relative to 
the benchmark situation under floating. Since this benchmark has quite a small variability 
of unemployment (a standard deviation of about 301,000, only 1.1% of the labour force) 
the difference under EMU, though big proportionally, is small absolutely. However, as 
the floating benchmark’s unemployment rate variability rises, the model exhibits not 
merely a greater absolute variability differential between floating and EMU but also a 
larger proportional differential. The reason for this is that at high rates of unemployment 
the Model’s real wage elasticity to employment falls. There is a constant real wage 
elasticity to unemployment, as widely found empirically — Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994); Minford (1983). Theoretically, the rationale is that as unemployment rises more 
people find themselves on the margins between unemployment benefit and the working 
wage; so when employment falls, real wages drop less as more people opt for benefits.
We checked this for a rise by 2.15 times the benchmark unemployment rate under 
floating. While the relative variability of other elements in our political cost measure 
remains roughly unchanged (and so therefore does the overall political cost measure),
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relative unemployment variance under EMU rises to 1.21 times that of floating. In plain 
terms this means that if due to poor supply-side policies the underlying (non-inflationary) 
unemployment rate were to rise back to the rates of the early 1980s of around three million 
(which would represent roughly a tripling from the average rate in our floating base line) 
then the standard deviation of floating unemployment would rise some 2.7 times to around 
800 thousand but that of EMU would rise three times to around 900 thousand. Of course 
with such high baseline unemployment rates that sort of absolute rise in variability, of 
100,000, would add materially to the unpopularity of a switch to EMU.
Could greater volatility  o f the pound outside EM U  change th e comparison?
It is sometimes asserted (e.g. Britain in Europe, 2000) that floating exchange rates them­
selves generate high volatility because of the varying risk-premium attached to the pound 
(in the manner of a ‘bubble’): by eliminating this sterling bubble EMU would reduce UK 
volatility. We already have in our floating model a varying risk-premium for the pound. 
It is the error in the real interest rate equation (endogenous error 6 in Table Al in Ap­
pendix 1, no. 10 in the model listing) which is governed by Uncovered Interest Parity, 
in other words the speculative market behaviour that forces sterling real interest rates to 
compensate for sterling risks. So our basic comparison already allows for the variability 
present over the past decade. However, we also ask further what would happen to our 
comparison if we were to have a big increase in this variability in the future. So we tripled 
the standard deviation of this error and reran the comparison.
As one would expect there is a narrowing of the difference as this raises the variability 
of both the real exchange rate and the real interest rate. However, the model is rather 
robust to this effect, since monetary policy is able to offset it rather easily. It is as if there 
is an extraneous agent varying real interest rates in ways unwished-for by the Bank of 
England; it reacts by altering the money supply to dampen this effect. This then spreads 
the total effect of the bubble between interest rates and the exchange rate. Consider
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the following example: the risk-premium rises, pushing up the interest rate at a given 
exchange rate. The Bank then increases the money supply to stop interest rates rising 
so much; this drives down the pound. The fall in the pound stimulates output while the 
rise in interest rates reduces it; if output rises under the balance of these forces, then 
the demand for money may rise as much as the supply, leaving prices not much affected. 
Certainly the rises in variability across the board are rather small. The political cost of 
EMU falls somewhat to 2.04 times that of floating.
R aising th e  fiscal stabilisers
Another hope of those who advocate EMU is that discretionary fiscal policy could largely 
replace monetary policy as a stabiliser. Of course the Stability Pact does in fact limit 
this possibility and even limits the automatic stabilisers. In our basic EMU case as for 
floating we permit not only the full operation of the automatic fiscal stabilisers but also 
a certain degree of discretionary fiscal action — public spending reacts to the output 
cycle contemporaneously with the small negative (counter-cyclical) elasticity of -0.125. 
Consider the example where output falls 3% below potential (i.e. actual output fell 0.5%), 
public spending on goods and services would be raised by 0.375%, i.e. approximately 0.1% 
of GDP. Hence our comparison already allows for probably the maximum realistic fiscal 
action envisageable under the Pact, if we remember that the automatic stabilisers worsen 
the budget sharply; the Model implies that the budget deficit would rise by 1.7% of GDP 
in this example. In a recession where this occurred two years running the deficit would 
thus rise by 3.4% of GDP before any discretionary boost; our suggested boost would 
push the rise to 3.6%. But we did look at what could be achieved fiscally by tripling the 
discretionary fiscal response under EMU, leaving floating policy unchanged. The results 
show a slight relative improvement in EMU variability and the cost drops to 2.19 times. 
But what this shows is that realistic fiscal activism cannot solve the variance problems 
created by EMU.
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2.3.6 S en sitiv ity  —  Overall C onclusions
What we see in these sensitivity trials is that some worsen the relative position of EMU 
while some improve it. But in no case does the relative position of EMU become reversed, 
nor does it even come close to that. Whatever one does to the struct me of the British 
economy, it remains the case that EMU makes our economy much more unstable. In 
Appendix 3 we look further at the source of this greater instability by type of shock (on 
the Basic Case assumptions); what we find is that about one quarter of the increase in 
instability is due to the inability of interest rates and the exchange rate to adjust to shocks 
under EMU, the other three quarters is due to the additional shocks (mainly the swings 
of the euro against the dollar) injected into the UK economy by EMU. Thus EMU creates 
‘boom and bust’ for the UK not merely because there is inadequate flexibility provided 
by other mechanisms within EMU to substitute for the stabilising powers of independent 
monetary policy; but also because EMU itself creates important new sources of instability 
for the UK because the euro-zone behaves quite differently from the rest of the world (i.e. 
basically the dollar area) with which the UK has trading relations as important as those 
with the euro-zone.
2.4 U tility  Losses of the R epresentative Agent
As we have seen, the estimates of utility reflect the variances produced. In this section 
we convert these variances into the equivalent percentage loss of consumption for the 
representative agent (Appendix 2 gives details.)
Inspection of Table 2.3 reveals startlingly how little value the representative agent 
attaches to variance, even on a wide range of values for p, the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion. However, one can see that this would be the case by considering the trade-off 
between mean consumption and its variance for an agent experiencing no unemployment. 
In this case the Taylor expansion yields:
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Table 2.3: The welfare losses produced by EMU compared with floating
The Popular Cost+ The representative agent
(Weighted variance) (%) equivalent consumption loss
(%, converted to £bn p.a.)* 
p = 1.0 p = 9.0 
(logarithmic 
utility)
The Central Case 121(5) 0.23(2) 1.3(2)
No Indexation 174(1) 0.36(1) 2.0(1)
Low Interest Rate Sensitivity 116(6) 0.04(7) -(7)
More Labour Market Flexibility 172(2) 0.20(6) 1.1(5)
High Unemployment 123(4) 0.22(4) 1.0(6)
More Exchange Rate Flexibility 104(7) 0.22(4) 1.3(2)
Enhanced Fiscal Stabilisers 129(3) 0.23(2) 1.2(4)
*UK GDP is approximately £1,000 billion p.a. hence these numbers can be read as percentages by one 
point to the left: eg £1.3 billion= 0.13% of GDP.
+Order in brackets
A Ec n ( A var(c)\
—  - 0 . 5 p ( - ? i i )
In our basic case simulations the rise in consumption variance on joining EMU as a 
percentage of base line consumption squared is just 0.0002%. Or put another way the rise 
in the standard deviation of consumption is 0.01% of consumption. (This is non-durable 
consumption; adding in the whole of private investment, as if this non-durable spending 
could be included in consumption would double it to 0.02%.) Even with a p as high as 
9 the implied loss of equivalent consumption only reaches 0.0018%, or £0.018 billion per
annum.
Hence, in summary, though the ordering of the losses by expected utility is very largely 
the same as that by the political cost measure we (and others) have used, the scale of 
effect in terms of percentage change in welfare is massively smaller. Nevertheless, as 
noted earlier, political experience suggests that popular opinion as reflected in polls and 
elections is highly sensitive to macroeconomic volatility; consequently we take it, as do 
other studies, that the relevant measure is what we have termed the political or popular
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cost, the weighted variance measure.
2.5 EM U  and Induced Param eter Change
We also wish to examine sensitivity to the possibility that joining EMU would itself induce 
structural changes in parameters. Plainly, because of the political aspects of the EMU 
relationship, pressures for change will be exerted not merely by the new behavioural 
incentives within monetary union but also by the accompanying institutional changes 
that are part of EMU. Minford (2002) notes that the evaluation of the decision must take 
account of the whole bundle of relationships involved. So it is also with macro variability; 
its behaviour under EMU will alter with any associated parameter changes.
Of the variations we examined, the more active use of fiscal stabilisers is not a struc­
tural change but rather a deliberate act of policy regime adjustment; as such we have in 
any case already evaluated it above where we compared EMU with this adjustment against 
floating without it. Whether the UK has more exchange rate bubbles under floating has 
no connection with EMU and has also already been evaluated.
A higher natural rate of unemployment could be induced by joining EMU through 
the adoption of general tax and regulative changes; Minford (2002) does point to the 
possibility that the greater closeness of the EMU relationship (a ‘club within a club’) 
could make it more difficult for the UK to resist the higher tax levels and more union- 
friendly labour laws of the continent. On the other hand it could be argued that EMU 
would induce greater general labour market deregulation across the EU in the long term 
because of the need to limit large swings in unemployment.
Labour market flexibility is a similar issue. On the one hand, it could be that the 
greater fluctuations of unemployment under the common monetary policy of EMU would 
induce more flexibility of real wages through the incentive to limit unemployment move­
ment. On the other hand if the UK was less able to resist the greater labour market
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distortions just discussed then flexibility would be reduced.
A reduction in indexation (more nominal wage rigidity) could result from joining 
EMU, if for example German-style unionisation and associated long-term nominal wage 
contracts became more widespread in the UK. Again, the pressures under EMU to limit 
unemployment swings could induce even more indexation.
Lesser consumer sensitivity to interest rates (e.g. through longer-term mortgages) 
could occur under EMU. The argument would be that the UK housing market would 
become more like the continental as monetary policy and regulation became shared. How­
ever, financial regulation is specifically not likely to change in the UK, given the special 
position of the City and the UK government’s resistance to proposals such as the EU in­
vestment income withholding tax on the grounds of damage to the City. Also, the progress 
of the Single Market could produce greater deregulation of the housing and financial mar­
kets, both on the continent and in the UK. The UK model’s high interest rate response 
appears to be a reflection of consumer and investor choice within relatively deregulated 
markets (for example, the choice of variable-rate mortgages may well reflect the desire 
of UK investors to avoid the capital-value risk associated with long-term nominal debt). 
Hence it could become higher still if deregulation spread.
Dealing with these possibilities therefore involves a double-sided approach in that 
EMU could induce parameter changes that go both ways in these four dimensions. In the 
interests of avoiding a plethora of further cases, we compare floating and EMU under our 
existing high and low assumptions, first assuming the combination of high and low that 
is the more favourable to EMU and then the alternative. These comparisons — Table 
2.4 — effectively attribute not merely the monetary regime change to joining but also the 
change due to the altered parameter assumption.
What we see from Table 2.4 is that if we treat the parameter changes induced by 
EMU as favourable to stability the comparison becomes most markedly more favourable 
for quantity variables. The key element is enhanced labour market flexibility (or fairly
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Table 2.4: Effects of EMU-induced parameter change — The welfare losses (political 
cost) produced by EMU compared with floating (floating=1.0) assuming EMU induces 
parameter changes___________________________________________________________
Political
WelfareCost* Ratio of variances (EMU/Floating) — 
(utility-based) Output Unemp. Interest Rate Inflation
The Central Case 2.21
(0.23)
1.24 1.18 4.32 20.17
Indexation — EMU low, Float 2.24 1.46 1.44 4.49 15.34
high (0.32)
Indexation — EMU high, Float 2.82 1.38 1.24 5.35 30.56
low (0.27)
Interest Rate Sensitivity — 2.06 1.00 0.99 5.31 20.21
EMU low, Float high (0.04)
Interest Rate Sensitivity — 2.32 1.28 1.25 4.21 21.50
EMU high, Float low (0.23)
Labour Market Flexibility — 1.72 1.12 0.18 4.38 20.53
EMU high, Float low (0.16)
Labour Market Flexibility — 15.44 1.30 7.01 3.99 32.61
EMU low, Float high (0.27)
Unemployment Natural Rate — 1.71 1.23 0.20 3.79 19.60
EMU low, Float high (0.14)
Unemployment Natural Rate — 5.06 1.22 7.29 5.48 20.72
EMU high, Float low (0.31)
Highly Favourable Combination 1.57 0.90 0.16 4.17 19.80
for EMU** (-0.03)
Highly Favourable Combination 5.28 1.45 7.40 4.04 23.20
for Float** (0.29)
+ The table compares welfare under EMU and floating with changed paramters. For each parameter 
the first row takes the assumption more favourable to EMU, assigning the alternative to floating; the 
second row shows the reverse, with the more favourable assumption assigned to floating.
*The weights used in the political cost are (all divided by the weights total of 2.2): 1.0 for output and 
unemployment variances; 0.1 for inflation and real interest rate variances. The utility-based welfare 
cost in parentheses is the extra cost (in £billion p.a.) of EMU for the representative agent, assuming p =  1 
**The favourable combination involved is low-interest-rate sensitivity, high labour-market flexibility, and 
enhanced fiscal stabilisers. The alternative is the central case parameters. In turn the favourable 
combination is applied to the one regime with the alternative applied to the other
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similarly a reduced natural rate of unemployment) which dramatically reduces unemploy­
ment variability. A reduction in interest sensitivity under EMU would also eliminate any 
rise in output variability, though at a large cost in greater real interest rate variance. If 
there were to be a reduction in indexation under EMU, this would cut inflation variability 
compared with floating, but at a cost of roughly 20% more output and unemployment 
variance. None of these has any helpfully stabilising impact on real interest rates or infla­
tion since they do not impinge on the factors (largely the euro’s swings against the dollar) 
that destabilise them.
Switching the assumptions to favour floating implies that EMU dramatically worsens 
unemployment variance, and moderately worsens output variance; in the unemployment 
case real interest rate variance and in the labour flexibility case inflation variance are very 
seriously worse under EMU.
To construct a generally favourable combination for each, we combine the better as­
sumption on interest rate sensitivity and labour market flexibility (to include the unem­
ployment assumption would effectively duplicate the effect of flexibility, while the effect of 
indexation is two-edged, not clearly favouring either regime; we also allow the enhanced 
fiscal stabilisers under EMU and for symmetry we do the same under floating, though 
it has little importance). Under these combinations the same features stand out: EMU 
when generally favoured by structural changes reduces the variances of both output and 
unemployment compared with floating, the latter massively. Vice versa, when floating 
is generally favoured. EMU increases the variances of both, and again massively for un­
employment. Under both sets of assumptions, EMU greatly increases inflation and real 
interest rate variance, much as in the base comparison.
Hence a constant in these comparisons is that EMU destabilises real interest rates and 
inflation very substantially. It is this constant that prevents EMU, even under the most 
favourable assumptions about structural change, generating an overall reduction in macro 
variability. The political welfare cost index still rises 57% compared with floating in this
44
situation. In the case of the representative agent’s welfare cost, in this situation it only 
just turns marginally in favour of EMU; in all other comparisons it remains stubbornly 
against, albeit by small amounts absolutely for reasons we discussed above. Of course if 
EMU were to produce destabilising structural change, then the political cost index would 
rise by 428% with appalling quantity variation aggravating this constant source of loss.
We conclude that though structural change could much affect the quantity comparison, 
turning it potentially in EMU’s favour, overall macro variability would be worsened by 
EMU even under the most optimistic assumptions because of the destabilisation of real 
interest rates and inflation.
2.6 Com parison W ith Barrel and Dury
An earlier study by Barrell and Dury (2000), using the National Institute’s multi-country 
model, found smaller costs than we have. If we translate their findings into the terms of 
our boom and bust index, their index of welfare cost would be 42% worse under the euro 
than under floating. They find that under the euro UK output (and so by implication 
unemployment) would be 51% more volatile as measured by its variance against our 27%; 
this greater effect is probably the result of their model structure being more Keynesian 
(with less price and wage flexibility). However, on inflation they find rather strangely 
that inflation volatility would actually fall 44% under the euro — our finding was that 
it would rise by a massive 1,900%, essentially because the euro’s volatility against the 
dollar would move traded goods prices around sharply, rather as has happened recently 
in Ireland. On inspection we can account for this different finding in terms of three 
major differences in the methods they use. First, they assume that the risk-premium on 
sterling is given by the ‘forecasting error’ between the forward rate and the exchange rate 
outturn. However, these two things are different; the risk-premium is an element included 
in the forward rate as the price of risk, whereas the forecast error is an element occurring
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later after the price has been quoted. Plainly, the price of risk reflects the anticipation 
of possible future errors on average (typically their variance); it cannot be assumed to 
be equal to any and every actual future error. To assume it in a stochastic simulation 
exercise like this one will in practice make the assumed risk-premium excessively volatile 
by a large margin. A similar assumption was used by the EU Commission, 1990, in its 
initial stochastic simulation exercise where it dramatically biased the results in favour of 
EMU; it was strongly criticised by Minford et al. (1993) and also rejected by Masson and 
Symansky (1992).
Second, Barrell and Dury assume that UK monetary policy is set according to some­
what arbitrary rules — they impose a rigid postulated ‘inflation target’ operating rule. 
We assume by contrast that UK interest rates are set according to the rule discussed 
above under which the Monetary Policy Committee reacts to deviations from its objec­
tives using the freedom given it by floating exchange rates. Given that the MPC has 
done a rather good job of stabilising both inflation and output in an essentially pragmatic 
way, and can presumably learn to adjust to changes both in circumstances and the UK’s 
economic behaviour, to assume otherwise as done by Barrell and Dury puts the floating 
regime under an unfair handicap.
Third, the period from which they draw the shocks with which their model is peppered 
is 1991-7 during which the crucial euro-dollar exchange rate happens to have been more 
stable than in the fuller 1986-2000 period we use. One can understand this point more 
clearly by reference to Figure 2.2; there one can see that from 1986 to 1991 the dollar 
fell considerably against the euro (Dm before January, 1999); from 1991-97 it moved 
up and down moderately; before then rising again in the latest period to 2000. Thus by 
omitting both the earlier and the later period the euro-dollar rate’s instability is markedly 
understated. It is likely that were the Barrell-Dury study to be rerun on this basis they 
too would find that inflation volatility would increase under the euro quite substantially. 
If so then their overall boom-and-bust index would be comparable to ours, thus joining a
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series of studies of models indicating this cost would be substantial.
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Figure 2.2: Euro per US dollar (Dm before 1 January, 1999)
In a recent article Barrell (2002) has criticised our own study here on a number of 
grounds. The first is that we drew shocks from the 1980s ‘for a currency that nobody 
then assumed would exist’. However we have to have a sample of shocks for a duration 
long enough to represent the range of experience the UK might face. 1991-97, chosen by 
Barrell and Dury, has the problems we saw above; yet even then the euro did not exist. 
Given the existence of active exchange rate coordination by France (as well as most other 
countries later forming the euro-zone) with the Dm during the 1980s, it seems reasonable 
to assume that, had the euro existed, it would have behaved something like the average 
of the euro currencies. As it happens its behaviour since 1997 has echoed the volatility of 
the late 1980s as explained already; it would seem safer, given that we must factor in the 
euro’s behaviour, to use a longer period rather than focus on an artificially less volatile,
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shorter period.
Secondly, Barrell argues that we neglect the reaction of the ECB through its interest- 
rate setting to the euro’s behaviour and in general to UK shocks which are correlated 
with euro-zone shocks. However, we allowed fully for any correlations between the euro 
interest rate and both the euro and all UK shocks; the drawings of shocks made for our 
stochastic simulation are done by the bootstrap method in which the whole set of shocks 
for a quarter is drawn at once. This means that the correlations between the shocks in 
the data are fully preserved in the simulations. Barrell asserts that this can be done 
better by simulating a multi-country model in which an assumption is made about the 
ECB’s reaction function. But this would be to substitute assumptions for actual historical 
reactions.
On the particular point that UK inflation volatility would be greater inside the euro, 
Barrell counters that the ECB would react to dampen it down (unlike in the case of 
Ireland). Would it do so more than by the average of euro-zone behaviour already captured 
in the historical correlations? One must doubt it given that the UK would be one country 
of 13, with a GDP weight of about a fifth.
Interestingly, when all is said and done Barrell and Dury find a much greater increase 
of UK output volatility on going into EMU than we do. It is over inflation that they 
differ; and there it is hard to resist the conclusion that they have made a variety of 
special assumptions that have the effect of greatly understating the inflationary problems 
the UK would experience, along the lines that Ireland has so dramatically found.
2.7 Conclusions
We can summarise our findings as follows. Joining EMU would more than double the 
variability of the UK economy — the ‘boom-and-bust’ factor. This is also a widely-used 
measure of the cost, as experienced by politicians facing popular pressures. One quarter of
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this extra cost comes from the loss of the stabilising powers of independent UK monetary 
policy; the other three quarters comes from the instability of the euro-zone’s own interest 
rates and exchange rates (which when the UK is floating are absorbed within the general 
world instability to which UK monetary policy reacts but which when the pound is fixed to 
the euro actually become the UK’s own interest rate and exchange rate, hence impacting 
directly on the economy.)
This increased cost is largely insensitive to the sort of ameliorative changes that euro 
advocates have put forward. Greater UK labour market flexibility helps; so does smaller 
UK responsiveness to interest rates. But the extent is limited; the big difference remains. 
Only if the highly optimistic assumption is made that both these parameter changes will 
come about solely as a result of joining EMU does output variability fall under EMU; 
even then variability in inflation and real interest rates is undiminished and the overall 
macro variability compared with floating is only halved. Of course it is at least as likely 
that these parameters could move adversely as a result of joining EMU, in which case 
macro volatility would be much worse.
This is the case even though we freely allow fiscal stabilisers full play, not merely the 
automatic ones but also extra discretionary public spending response to the cycle; tripling 
that discretionary response helps a little more but the major differential volatility under 
EMU remains. Were unemployment to reach the double-digit rates we have seen in the 
early 1980s and early 1990s the difference of variability would be even larger, and it would 
be more serious too, as the absolute variation in unemployment would rise proportionately 
more than this higher baseline unemployment. Euro advocates claim that outside EMU 
the pound would suffer enhanced volatility; our estimates allow for the volatility in the 
pound’s risk-premium experienced in the past decade but we checked what would happen 
to the comparison if we allowed for a tripling of it. Again, the difference is reduced but 
not much, basically because the economy’s built-in monetary shock absorbers work pretty 
well.
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That then remains the key point; running a modern economy with popular consent 
requires efficient shock absorbers and joining EMU not merely removes them but provides 
an additional source of shocks from the euro itself.
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2. A A ppendix 1
2.A .1 M ethods A nd A ssum ptions In T he Stochastic Sim ulations 
O f F loating A nd E M U
The method of stochastic simulation involves applying shocks to a model of the economy. 
The Liverpool Model of the UK has two versions — the currently used one under floating 
exchange rates with an independent monetary committee and an EMU variant in which 
interest rates are set by the ECB. A full listing of each model is appended. An exposition 
of the nature of the modelling differences that have been applied here can be found in 
chapter 8 of Minford (1992)
It is potentially important to allow for the inter-correlations of the shocks. In order 
to do this faithfully we use the method of bootstrapping. The shocks used are the sample 
residuals from the fitted equations over the period 1987(3) to 2000(4), set out in the table 
below. They have been purged within the equations of any serial correlation so that each 
shock is independent of past and future shocks. However, contemporaneously one shock 
can be correlated with another. In bootstrapping one draws all the shock residuals for 
just one randomly chosen period of the sample; this is then applied to the model; one 
then replaces it and repeats the process, applying the new shocks to the model; and so on. 
Hence one obtains a scenario in which all the shocks are repetitions of the actual shocks 
experienced over 1987-2000; any correlations between the shocks are preserved because 
all the different shocks are drawn together. It is as if one repeats the experience of all the 
quarters of actual history but randomly reshuffled.
We filtered out those scenarios that produced very large variability (defined as one 
with a deviation of output from the base run of more than 10%, under floating with 
our default monetary rule). This would have created unrealistic overall variances. The 
source of such extreme drawings are the supply-side shocks in the data; most of these are 
policy shifts and are found to be ‘random walks’, because policy changes of these sorts
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are unpredictable; this means that each random change accumulates permanently in the 
new ‘level’ of policy. When a scenario is formed automatically by picking the policy errors 
in a random order, it is possible that a series of large policy errors could be picked, that 
would together cumulate to a very large policy shift; however, politically such a large shift 
would be very likely to generate a backlash, causing the policy to be rescinded because of 
the large and damaging effect on the economy. One might be tempted to argue that were 
the cumulation to be good for the economy, it would be permitted (indeed welcomed); 
however, again it would be likely that any such very large shift in policy would be opposed 
by vested interests that would lose out, hence delaying or somehow reducing the size of the 
shift. We decided to filter out all scenarios therefore that produced extreme variability. 
Out of 400 randomly drawn scenarios that we tried, this left us with the 183 we used.
Table 2.A.1: The shocks applied under EMU and floating (Exogenous variables)
Shocks Standard
(Exogenous Variables) Error
World short-term real RSUSt = c 4- 0.899RSUSt- i  4- et 0.00396
interest rates, RSUS,
(n.a. EMU) fraction p.a.
Euro nominal short-term EU NRSt = c 4- 0.977EUNRSt-i  4- et 0.00471
interest rates, EUNRS
(n.a. floating) fraction p.a.
World trade, WT A log WTt =  c4- et 0.01196
Employers’ NI ABO t — c -(- €-i 0.00216
contributions, BO (fraction)
VAT (fraction) A VATt = c -  0.286A VATt- X 4- e* 0.0273
Unionisation rate, UNR A UNRt = c 4- 0.809 AU N  Rt-\  4- et 0.00106
(fraction)
Real Unemployment A U Bt — c Gt 0.00266
benefits, UB (fraction of
initial average wages)
Employees’ tax and NI ALOt =  c + et 0.00419
contributions, LO (fraction)
Average rate of tax net of A T A X t = c -  0.365A T A X t-i  4- et 0.01191
transfers, TAX (fraction)
Euro real exchange rate A  log E U R X R t = c 4- 0.235A log E U R X R t- X 4- e* 0.02743
index, EURXR (n.a. floating)
Euro CPI, EUCPI (n.a. floating) A log EUCPIt = c 4- 0.503A log EUCPIt-i  4- et 0.00285
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Table 2.A.2: The shocks applied under EMU and floating (Endogenous variables)
Shocks
(Endogenous variable 
errors)
Shock no. 
in model 
listing
Standard error
1. Net export volume et = c 4- 0.608e*_i 17 0.02234
2. Current account (£m et = c-\- 0.186e*_i 6 1166.2
at constant prices)
3. Real MO demand, log et = c + 0.793e*_i 1 0.01141
(n.a. EMU)
4. Nominal MO supply, log et = c + 0.658e*_i 5 0.00863
(n.a. EMU)
5. Unemployment (000’s) et = c + 0.913et_i 9 0.01844
log
6 . Uncovered interest parity et = c + 0.652e*_i 10 0.00844
(n.a. EMU), fraction p.a. 
7. Stock of all durable et = c -  0.272et_i 2 0.00187
goods, log
8 . Non-durable consumption, et = c + 0.376e*_i 3 0.00628
log
9. Real wages, log et = c + 0.683e*_i 8 0.01495
10. Price-cost equation, log et = c +  0.142e*_i 7 0.03396
Period of estimation: 1987(2)-2000(4); c is the constant (not used) and e* is the equation error whose 
standard deviation is shown in the last column
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M ODEL LISTING
FLOAT
Yt"  = exp((a29-ET* + a27 log WTt 4- 0 4 7 ) / ( —0 2 s))
E ” = ajpog W;"  4- log(1.0 4- BOt) 4- (1.0 + ax) log(1.0 4- VATt) 4- aA1 4- a2T R E N D t -  
0.064UNRt -  0.0525 (T~  N4D0L~108 0) D87t]
Wtm* = exp 043 + aglogUr  + {0.93){UNRt) { -a lo){D83t)
+0.04{(TRENDt -  108.0)/4 .0}(-a iO)(D87t) 4- a7U NRt 4- a8(log UBt 4- log(1.0 4- 
L>Ot)J{—a\o)
U** = exp[a42 4- <2.3 log Y ”  -I- 0 4  log Wf* + log(1.0 4- BOt) 4- l°g(1.0 4- VATt)
— (0.095)(UNRt)(D83t)—0.04{(TRENDt — lQ8.0)/4.0}D87t+a5T R E N D t/(l.Q—
a6)\
EG; = Yt” TAXt  4- (PEQt/4.0)Yr{FINt/ Y r )  -  (RDIt. A 4- RDIt- 5 4- RDIt. % 4- 
RDIt^)/A.Q
EGt =  exp (log EG*t 4- a39 log(yt/y t**))
BDEFt = EGt ~  2-0T A X tYt 4- TAX0(Y0)
AFCt = Yt[0.65883{AFCt-i/Yt-l)Y0.m6A16(AFCt-3/Yt- 3)+0.U500Q(AFCt-4/Yt-4)] 
PSBRt = BDEFt  + RDIt
X V O L t = claqYi*{(X27 log WTt 4- shocks 4- a2s lo g y  4- Q-47 4- cl2q{E;* 4- 0.6[RXRt —
E;•)) 4- a n lX V O L t - i /a u Y Z J )
X V  AL t =  X V A L t-4 + ( X V O L t - X V O L t - 4) + a3l{0.32Yt** (RX Rt-RX Rt-4 -E ;*  + 
E*- 4 )} + a 3 2  error7 4- shock6
error7 =  X V A L t-i  -  [XVAL t- 5 4- (XVOL,_i -  X V O L t- 5)
4-a31{0.32y«1(/LVflt_1 -  +  ££!5)}]
=  (R X R t -  EEXLt/b.Q) +  ^L£/5t 
7VflLt = /?L* 4- PEXLt
M0t = exp[a44 + a 13 log M0t-i  4- «i4 (log y« 4- log(1.0 +  T A X t- 1)) 4- aist/Bt- 2 
-+•016^ RENDt  + &\7NRSt  4- 4 * shocks]
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MONt = exp [log MON t_j +  (1.0 -  a34)(PEQt/ 4.0) +  a34 log (MONt- i /M O N t- 2)
+a52{NRSt ~ N R S t- i )+ a n  (logy* -  log y " )  + a56(/JVFLt -0.025) + M TFM t +
shock5]
D M X R t = [RXRt-RXRt- i -GERXt+GERXt- i - log iP t /P t-J+ logiGEPt/GEPt-!)*  
l.ODMXRt-i]
Pt = exp(log Pt-  4 + I N F L t)
I N F L t = log M ONt — log MONt~4 — log M0t + log M0t- 4
err or 22 = log Ut- \ - [a 42+a3 logyt_i4-a4 (logPWt-i + log(1.0 + BOt-\)  + log(1.0 + V ATt- \ ) ) -  
0.0956WPt-i -  QMiTRENDt-x  -  108.0/4.0)£>87t_i + abT R E N D t_x + a6 log Ut- 2]
Ut = exp[a42+ a3 log Yt-\-a4 (log RWt + log(1.0 + BOt) + log(1.0 + VATt))-0.09bUNRt-  
0.04(TRENDt_i — 108.0/4.0)Z)87t -I- a5T R E N D t + a6 log Ut~i + a^error^  + shock9]
PSt =  (P X P t -  F F X t) + PSPSt + shock10 
N R S t = P E X P t + RSt
Gt = exp[a45+ ai9PLt+a20 (logGt-\ — log FINt-\)+a.2\ (logCt_i — logCt_2)+logGt-\ + 
shock2]
GINVt = Gt — Gt~i + a38Gt_i 
Wt =  F I N t +  Gt
Ct — exp [a46 + a22RLt 4- ci23 log Wt 4- q.24Q E X  Pt + o25 log Gt—i + shock3]
yt = G/TVV; + Ct + PCt + XVOLt -  AFCt
RWt = exp[a43 4" cljUNRt  + (log UBt + log(1.0 + LOt)) 4- 0 9  log Ut 4- 0 3 7  log RWt—1 
+ (0.95)(-a10)f/ATPt 4- D E L T A +  0.04(TRENDt-i  -  108.0/4.0)(£>87t_ i) ( - a lo)
+Q10 log RWt- 2 + cl\ \ETA t 4" ai2E T A t-i  + shockg] 
erroru  = R X  Rt- i - [ a 4i+ai (log RWt-i  + log (1.0 + PO t_i))+a53 (logPt-i - lo g P t_5)
+(1.0 + aj) log(1.0 + VATt- 1) + a2T R E N D t-i -  0.064CiVPt-i 
—0.0525(TRENDt- i  -  108.0/4.0)D87«_i]
PX Pt = [a4i 4- ai (log + log (1.0 + PO t)) + a53 (log Pt -  log Pt- 4)
+(1.0 + 0 1 ) log(1.0 + VATt) + a2T R E N D t -  0.064U NRt
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-0.0525(Ti?£W£>(_i -  108.0/4.0)D87< +  a35error14 +  shock7]
FIN,  =  EG ,-Y ,(TAX,)+XVAL,+aMFIN,^+(1.0  -  aM) (FIN,-i(Pt/Pt- i)OM)((1.0- 
0.155)(JVi?L,/./VfiL,_1)) -  1.0 +  RDI,
RDI, = -Q.S(NRLt-\H.'0)(FINt- i (PiIPt- xf M -1 .0 ) +  PSBR,(0.32(NRS,-i/4.0) + 
0.5(jVflL,_,/4.0))F/Ar,_i -  0.32(NRLt- i/4 .0)FINt- i  + RDI,
UR;  =  u r /P O P ,
DYt = Y,/Y , . 4 -  10 
q , =  iog(y,/y(")
Y  AFCt = Y, + AFC,
RXRN,  = [R X R , -  R X R , - ,  -  \og{P,/P,-j) + W IN F t/4.0 + 1.0]RXRN,- ,
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EM U
Y," = exp((a2g E " +  a27 log WT,  +  a47) / ( —023))
£," =  a, [log W " +  log(1.0 +  BO,) +  (1.0 +  0 ]) log(1.0 +  VAT,) + a41 
+a2TRE ND ,  -  0.064UNR, -  0.0525 ( ™ M 5 )  Z?87t]
W,* =  exp a43 -f ag log U'* +  (0.95)(U NR,)(—aio)(B83,)
+0.04{(TREND,  -  108.0)/4.0}(-a10)(D87,) +  a7UNRt + o8(log UB, + log(1.0 + 
LO,)/(—a\o)
U"’ — exp[a42 + a3 log Yt” + a4 log W "  + log(1.0 +  BO,) +  log(1.0 +  VAT,)
-(0 .095)(UNR,)(D83,)-OM{(TREND,-m.O)/4.0}D87,+a5T R E N D , / ( \ . 0 -
a6)]
EG) =  Y r T A X ,  + (PEQ ,/4 .0 )Y ," (F IN , /Yr) -  {RDI,. ,  + R D I, .b + RD I, .6 + 
RDI,.- ,)/4.0
EG, =  exp(log EG) + a39 \og(Y,/¥ ,"))
BDEF, = EG, -  2.0TAX,Y, + TAX0(YQ)
AFC,  =  y,[0.65883(ylFC(_i/y'1_i)+0.1966416(/l.FC(-3/y'!_3)+0.145006(AFC(.-4/y ',-4)] 
PSBR,  = BDEF, + RDI,
XVOL,  — (imiY,’* (u27 log WTt 4" shock17 +  q28 log Y, +  a47 +  a29{E)* 4- 0.6{RXR,  —
El')) + a 30{XVOL, . , / a mY,",))
X V  AL, =  X V A L t - i + ( X V O L , - X V O L , - t ) + a3i{0.32Y,“ ( R X R , - R X R , - i - E ; '  +
E " 4)} + a32 err or 7 +  shocks
error7 =  X V A L , . ,  -  [XVAL, .3 + (X V O L , . ,  -  X V O L , . s)
+ a31 {0.32Y",(RXR,_, -  R X R , . r> -  E " ,  + £ " 5)}]
RL,  =  (RXR, -  E E X L , / 5.0) + RLUS,
NRL, = RL,  +  P E X L ,
A/0, =  exp[a44+ ai3 log MQ,-,+a,\ (log Y, + log(1.0 +  T A X , . ,  ))+o-,^U B , .2+a,^TRENDt+  
o,7NRS,  4" o,3VAT, + shock,]
P, =  exp (0.00625 + RXR,  -  R X R , . ,  +  DLEUCPI  +  log P,.,  -  DEURXR)
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INFLt  = log Pt -  log Pt-1
MONt = exp (I N F L t +  log MONt_A + log MO* — log M0*_4)
error22 =  log Ut~\ -  [a42 + a3 logyt_i + a4(log RWt-\  + log(1.0 + BOt- 1)
+ log(1.0 + VATt- 1)) -  0.09bUNRt-i ~ 0M {TRENDt-!  -  108.0/4.0)P87*_! + 
a^TRENDt~\  + &§ log Ut-2]
Ut = exp[a42 + 03 logYi + a4 (logPVV* + log(1.0 + BOt) + log(1.0 + VATt))
-0.095t/7VP* -  0.04(TRENDt-i  -  108.0/4.0)D87* + abT R E N D t + a6 log Ut- 1 + 
a36error22 + shockg]
RSt = N R S t -  PEXPt  
N R S t = EUNRSt
Gt = exp[a45+ a 19.ftZ/*+a2o (log Gt-\ — log P/iV*_i)+a2i (logG*_i — logG*_2)+logG*_i + 
shock2]
GINVt = Gt — Gt- 1 + a38G*_i 
Wt = FINt  +  Gt
Ct =  exp [a46 +  a22PL* +  a23 log Wt +  q,2aQEXPt + 0,25 log Gt- 1 + shock3]
Yt =  GINVt +  Ct + EGt + XVOLt -  AFCt
RWt =  exp[a43 +  cl^ UNRt + ol% (log UBt +  log(1.0 + LOt)) + flg log Ut 
+ a37 log W t_! + (0.95)(-a10)t/JVP* + DELTA
+0.04(T/?£’A^A-i —108.0/4.0)(D87*_i)(—a 10)+ai0log M t_2+ an m t+ a12m t_1+
shockg]
error14 =  PX P*_i-[a4i+ai (logPiy*_i + log (1.0 + PO*_i))+a53 (logP*_i -  logP*_5)
+(1.0 + cli) log(1.0 +  VATt-i)  +  a2T R E N D t-i — 0.06AUNRt-i  
—0.0525(TRENDt- i  -  108.0/4.0)JD87*_1]
R X R t = [a4i + a\ (log RWt + log (1.0 + BO t)) +  053 (log P* -  log P*_4)
+(1.0 + ai) log(1.0 + VATt) + a2T R E N D t -  0.064P7VP*
-0.0525(T R E N  Dt-i  — 108.0/4.0)1)87* + a35error14 + shock7]
F I N t = EGt ~ Yt{TAXt) + X V A L t + aMF I N t-i
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2. A .2 G lossary o f m odel variables:
Endogenous Variables
Y GDP at factor cost
P Consumer Price Level
INFL Percentage growth rate of P (year-on-year)
MON Nominal Money Stock (MO)
RW Real wages (Average Earnings/Price)
U Unemployment
Q Output deviation from trend (Y/YSTAR)
AFC Adjustment to factor cost
EG real government spending on goods and services
BDEF interest-exclusive budget deficit (deflated by CPI)
PSBR public sector borrowing requirement (deflated by CPI)
XVAL real current account of balance of payments
XVOL net exports of goods and services
RS(RL) real short term (log term) interest rate
NRS (NRL) nominal short term (long term) interest rate 
MO real money balances (MO)
G real private stock of durable goods, including inventories
W real private stock of wealth
FIN real private stock of financial assets (net)
C real private non-durable consumption
RXR real exchange rate (relative CPI, UK v. ROW)
RDI real debt interest
GINV gross private investment in durables plus stock building
DY percentage growth rate of Y (year-on-year)
RXRN trade-weighted exchange rate
AE average earnings
YAFC GDP at market prices
Y** equilibrium output
E** equilibrium real exchange rate
W** equilibrium real wage
U** equilibrium unemployment
EG* equilibrium government expenditure
UR* equilibrium unemployment rate
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Exogenous Variables
MTEM Temporary growth of money supply
PEQ Growth of money supply
BO Employers national insurance contributions
UNR Trade Unionisation rate
LO Average amount lost in taxes and national insurance
TREND Time trend
WT World Trade
TAX Overall tax rate
UB Unemployment benefit rate (in constant pounds)
EUNRS Euro nominal short-term interest rates
EURXR Euro real exchange rate index
EUCPI Euro CPI
RSUS Foreign real short-term interest rate
RLUS Foreign real long-term interest rate
POP Working population
DMXR German exchange rate
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2.A .3 Listing o f A ll Sim ulation R esults
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Table 2.A.3: FLOAT Simulation Results
nrl nrs w mO
0.000119 0.000801 2.2E40 3711885
0.010903 0.028303 148194.6 1926.625 
0.001094 0.003192 -15492.8 -259.554
bdef xvol rl rs
7043237 9231424 0.000116 0.000737 
2653.91 3038.326 0.010756 0.027149 
-115.571 166.4819 0.000614 0.002044
rw y* e* w*
0.007196 10014349 0.003753 0.005278 
0.08483 3164.546 0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00373 313.4304 -0.0055 -0.00271
q psbr rdi yafc
0.000681 7987661 603860.5 29863112
0.026099 2826.245 777.0846 5464.715 
-0.002 18.48419 132.8041 34.0699
mon p dmxr leurxr
13849894 0.010107 0.061549 0.00082
3721.545 0.100534 0.24809 0.028637
-141.349 0.018659 -0.02706 0.000123
g fin xval y
1.32E40 1.94E09 15161133 22465389
115027.7 44084.1 3893.73 4739.767
-10218.4 -5266.72 67.48218 29.72129
infl rxr c eg
0.000217 0.011352 9283989 78794638
0.014719 0.106548 3046.964 8876.634 
0.001274 -0.00391 -586.704 935.9343
u* u dy afc
41239.3 109285.2 0.000741 525687.3
203.0746 330.5831 0.027226 725.0429
18.07004 39.33082 0.000235 4.28844
eg* ur* rxm ginv
65627005 4.92E-05 96.75649 53345089
8101.05 0.007017 9.836488 7303.772 
843.6342 0.000623 -1.22841 -481.596
leucpi pop
2.79E-05 0
0.005278 0
2.62E-05 0
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Table 2.A.4: EMU Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.59E-05 0.000313 
0.008711 0.017694 
8.2E-05 0.000385
bdef xvol
8456395 9253813
2907.988 3042.008
96.01488 295.2198
rw y*
0.007245 10014418 
0.085117 3164.556 
-0.00498 313.3906
q psbr
0.000844 8496701
0.029044 2914.91
-0.00315 55.84001
mon p
69623715 0.26401
8344.083 0.513819
786.6501 0.074803
w mO
3.01E+10 3113029
173351.3 1764.378 
-23979.5 -168.966
rl rs
0.000211 0.003186 
0.01452 0.056442 
0.000342 0.000937
e* w*
0.003753 0.005278 
0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00549 -0.00271
rdi yafc
571961.8 35828415
756.2815 5985.684 
-41.0225 -153.989
dmxr leurxr
0 0.000941 
0 0.030679 
0 0.000164
g fin
1.67E+10 3.7E+09
129122.3 60802.83 
-17257.1 -6713.64
infl rxr
0.00437 0.012774 
0.066103 0.11302
0.000462 -0.0046
u* u
41239.63 129069.2
203.0754 359.262
18.07132 55.49672
eg* ur*
68513919 4.92E-05
8277.314 0.007017
985.1326 0.000624
leucpi pop
8.38E-06 0
0.002894 0
2E-05 0
xval y
15663411 26948245
3957.703 5191.17
194.9503 -132.729
c eg
12855035 82060947
3585.392 9058.75
-764.584 1102.209
dy afc
0.000871 631476.2 
0.029515 794.6548 
0.000188 -21.1339
rxm ginv
696.134 65912374
26.38435 8118.644
1.669791 -786.538
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Table 2.A.5: FLOAT (No Indexation Case) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs w mO
0.000108 0.000673 2.16E+10 3529134 
0.010383 0.025937 147011.3 1878.599 
0.001086 0.0026 -15926.8 -221.922
bdef xvol rl rs
6713032 9111974 0.000102 0.000596
2590.952 3018.605 0.010102 0.024403 
-113.981 167.869 0.00049 0.001245
rw y* e* w*
0.007571 10014364 0.003753 0.005278 
0.087009 3164.548 0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00377 313.4258 -0.0055 -0.00271
q psbr rdi yafc
0.000611 7276068 495505.9 28014733
0.024715 2697.419 703.9218 5292.895 
-0.00186 27.89942 140.0931 42.30291
mon p dmxr leurxr
13325538 0.009056 0.061097 0.00082
3650.416 0.095166 0.247179 0.028637 
-157.084 0.015332 -0.02855 0.000123
g fin xval y
1.3E+10 1.82E+09 14882124 21076143
114218.6 42704.56 3857.736 4590.876 
-10329.4 -5586.35 68.13982 37.97551
infl rxr c eg
0.000143 0.011131 8612954 78381230
0.01196 0.105503 2934.784 8853.317 
0.001283 -0.00469 -574.408 935.9653
u* u dy afc
41239.39 104229.4 0.000691 492721
203.0748 322.8458 0.026284 701.9409 
18.07032 27.92679 0.000139 4.474015
eg* ur* rxm ginv
65260161 4.92E-05 95.55489 51772503 
8078.376 0.007017 9.775218 7195.311 
844.062 0.000623 -1.22743 -486.773
leucpi pop
2.79E-05 0
0.005278 0
2.62E-05 0
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Table 2.A.6: EMU (No Indexation Case) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.43E-05 0.000313 
0.00862 0.017694 
9.89E-05 0.000385
w mO
3.11E+10 3080573
176440.2 1755.156 
-23166.1 -170.045
g fin
1.71E+10 4.1E+09
130794.4 64049
-17159.4 -5997.32
xval y
16282436 30256578 
4035.15 5500.598 
191.2512 -113.158
bdef xvol
8976660 9656258
2996.107 3107.452 
62.08679 293.8766
rw y*
0.008679 10014425 
0.09316 3164.558 
-0.00496 313.3814
q psbr
0.000994 9021913
0.031534 3003.65
-0.00312 47.69694
rl rs
0.000298 0.003313 
0.017272 0.057559 
0.000295 0.000898
e* w*
0.003753 0.005278 
0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00549 -0.00271
rdi yafc
611078.1 40226927 
781.7149 6342.47
-15.1748 -130.266
infl rxr
0.003329 0.014388 
0.057694 0.119948 
0.000437 -0.00477
u* u
41239.68 157147.9 
203.0756 396.4188 
18.07168 68.46458
eg* ur*
68561450 4.92E-05
8280.184 0.007017 
967.9593 0.000624
c eg
14502424 82038541 
3808.205 9057.513 
-737.022 1082.177
dy afc
0.000964 709175.3 
0.031043 842.1255 
0.000246 -17.1527
rxrn ginv
696.1015 68678046 
26.38374 8287.222 
1.671111 -769.323
mon p dmxr
65375059 0.243166 0
8085.484 0.493119 0
716.4067 0.0692 0
leurxr leucpi pop
0.000941 8.38E-06 0
0.030679 0.002894 0
0.000164 2E-05 0
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Table 2.A.7: FLOAT (Low Interest Rate Sensitivity Case) Simulation Results
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs w mO
0.000128 0.000809 2.21E+10 3722559
0.01132 0.028449 148697.7 1929.393 
0.001117 0.003416 -15286.1 -272.913
bdef xvol rl rs
7029317 9425131 0.000126 0.000757
2651.286 3070.038 0.01122 0.02751
-118.323 174.1411 0.000614 0.002203
rw y* e* w*
0.007195 10014368 0.003753 0.005278 
0.084825 3164.549 0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00376 313.4268 -0.0055 -0.00271
q psbr rdi yafc
0.000658 7832349 557387.4 29135731
0.025643 2798.633 746.5838 5397.752 
-0.00205 22.25022 139.0152 24.40087
mon p dmxr leurxr
13384160 0.009258 0.064477 0.00082
3658.437 0.096217 0.253924 0.028637 
-152.457 0.018899 -0.03226 0.000123
g fin xval y
1.35E+10 1.8E+09 15065889 21919577
116236.9 42397.02 3881.48 4681.835
-10262.8 -5021.52 74.81998 21.22236
infl rxr c eg
0.000203 0.011589 9265095 78782254 
0.014242 0.107651 3043.862 8875.937 
0.00129 -0.00404 -602.906 932.1926
u* u dy afc
41239.37 103652.9 0.000735 512685.5
203.0748 321.9518 0.027103 716.0206
18.07004 38.7173 0.000248 3.097489
eg* ur* rxrn ginv
65615207 4.92E-05 101.3529 54023283 
8100.321 0.007017 10.06742 7350.053
840.0265 0.000623 -1.39166 -479.055
leucpi pop
2.79E-05 0
0.005278 0
2.62E-05 0
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Table 2.A.8: EMU (Low Interest Sensitivity Case) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.64E-05 0.000313 
0.008743 0.017694 
0.000101 0.000385
w mO
2.76E40 3262479
166023.1 1806.233 
-28837.8 -197.229
g fin
1.69E40 2.3E09
130179.5 47952.49 
-21653.7 -7175.86
xval y
14725280 22820666 
3837.353 4777.098 
329.2213 -326.474
bdef xvol
7715249 9078435
2777.634 3013.044 
127.7196 435.9078
rw y*
0.007131 10014453 
0.084445 3164.562 
-0.00608 313.3502
q psbr
0.00068 7753428
0.026076 2784.498 
-0.00433 99.23999
rl rs
0.000401 0.003914 
0.020029 0.062566 
0.000303 0.000896
e* w*
0.003753 0.005278 
0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00549 -0.00271
rdi yafc
354203.1 30333679 
595.1497 5507.602 
-29.1264 -373.834
infl rxr
0.004385 0.01292
0.066219 0.113668 
0.000395 -0.00555
u* u
41239.44 107999.7 
203.075 328.633
18.07301 58.07401
eg* ur*
67806514 4.92E-05 
8234.471 0.007017 
971.2885 0.000624
c eg
9106476 81364495 
3017.694 9020.227 
-952.599 1090.269
dy afc
0.000768 533869.6 
0.027713 730.6638 
9.65E-05 -47.6621
rxrn ginv
695.7647 61836510 
26.37735 7863.619 
1.667883 -947.937
mon p dmxr
73835088 0.265371 0
8592.735 0.515142 0
749.9794 0.073521 0
leurxr leucpi pop
0.000941 8.38E-06 0
0.030679 0.002894 0
0.000164 2E-05 0
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Table 2.A.9: FLOAT (More Flexibility Case) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs w mO
0.000101 0.000765 2.2E+10 3783285
0.010033 0.02766 148420 1945.067
0.000876 0.002926 -14295.8 -244.514
bdef xvol rl rs
7133512 8768359 0.000114 0.000799
2670.863 2961.142 0.010686 0.028258 
-102.682 113.8582 0.000643 0.002273
rw y* e* w*
0.004052 10014370 0.003753 0.005278 
0.063659 3164.549 0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00256 313.4271 -0.0055 -0.00271
q psbr rdi yafc
0.000651 8168151 558549.6 27496267
0.025517 2857.998 747.3618 5243.688 
-0.00177 16.94148 118.0449 71.87897
mon p dmxr leurxr
10615827 0.003531 0.049582 0.00082
3258.194 0.059423 0.222671 0.028637 
-234.495 0.011509 -0.02897 0.000123
g fin xval y
1.33E+10 1.91E+09 14774325 20684881
115246.5 43758.27 3843.738 4548.063 
-9292.26 -4994.84 21.51018 61.16389
infl rxr c eg
0.000134 0.01005 8826429 78083309
0.011587 0.100249 2970.931 8836.476 
0.000807 -0.00266 -557.514 952.4644
u* u dy afc
41239.36 18414.23 0.000752 483931.8
203.0748 135.6991 0.02742 695.6521
18.07022 13.40907 0.000239 10.53728
eg* ur* rxrn ginv
65004832 4.92E-05 76.77895 53273823 
8062.557 0.007017 8.76236 7298.892
858.8327 0.000624 -1.21698 -437.111
leucpi pop
2.79E-05 0
0.005278 0
2.62E-05 0
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Table 2.A. 10: EMU (More Flexibility Case) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.55E-05 0.000313 
0.008687 0.017694 
8.41 E-05 0.000385
bdef xvol
8163214 8830758
2857.134 2971.659 
126.9666 443.3866
rw y*
0.004051 10014392 
0.063646 3164.552 
-0.00559 313.4164
q psbr
0.000766 8202092
0.027676 2863.929 
-0.00434 96.78676
mon p
72398707 0.258841 
8508.743 0.508764 
721.6583 0.071596
w mO
2.77E+10 3285892 
166362 1812.703 
-30118.1 -195.141
rl rs
0.000186 0.003225 
0.013631 0.056788 
6.99E-05 0.001078
e* w*
0.003753 0.005278 
0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00549 -0.00271
rdi yafc
415374.8 31493786 
644.4958 5611.933 
-30.9798 -379.958
dmxr leurxr
0 0.000941 
0 0.030679 
0 0.000164
g fin
1.63E+10 2.85E+09
127553.1 53403.14 
-21629 -8481.07
infl rxr
0.004456 0.011482 
0.066753 0.107154 
0.000368 -0.00585
u* u
41239.48 19817.78
203.0751 140.7756 
18.06982 22.3
eg* ur*
67890681 4.92E-05 
8239.58 0.007017 
964.8155 0.000623
leucpi pop
8.38E-06 0
0.002894 0
2E-05 0
xval y
15055832 23690510
3880.185 4867.29
337.5624 -329.833
c eg
11447527 81454064 
3383.419 9025.191 
-919.745 1084.207
dy afc
0.000856 554737.2 
0.02925 744.8068 
8.79E-05 -50.219
rxm ginv
696.1387 62368918 
26.38444 7897.399 
1.669424 -987.924
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Table 2.A.11: FLOAT (High Natural Rate of Unemployment Case) Simulation Results
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs w mO
0.00012 0.000817 2.02E40 3289274
0.010943 0.028592 142243.9 1813.636 
0.001114 0.003237 -13862.1 -244.082
bdef xvol rl rs
6445440 8453984 0.000125 0.000841
2538.787 2907.574 0.011181 0.029007 
-83.7987 127.8644 0.000605 0.002263
rw y* e* w*
0.008798 9086758 0.003754 0.006475
0.093799 3014.425 0.061267 0.080466 
-0.00349 298.5368 -0.0055 -0.00301
q psbr rdi yafc
0.000687 7278343 520563.1 27470066
0.026207 2697.84 721.5006 5241.189
-0.00184 17.82237 101.2386 67.46296
mon p dmxr leurxr
11894342 0.010085 0.080829 0.00082
3448.817 0.100422 0.284304 0.028638 
-131.071 0.018004 -0.0385 0.000124
g fin xval y
1.25E40 1.63E09 14424169 20664849
111896.3 40324.01 3797.916 4545.861 
-9623.02 -4244.47 31.1103 56.83806
infl rxr c eg
0.000223 0.011392 8955699 71841505
0.014936 0.106733 2992.607 8475.937 
0.001183 -0.00323 -545.506 923.2775
u* u dy afc
252142.3 660670 0.000764 483596.4
502.1377 812.8161 0.027637 695.4109 
44.68703 103.6397 0.000266 10.24626
eg* ur* rxm ginv
59828483 0.000301 126.6546 49402093
7734.887 0.017351 11.25409 7028.662 
832.2004 0.001543 -1.63744 -438.575
leucpi pop
2.79E-05 0
0.005278 0
2.64E-05 0
74
Table 2. A.12: EMU (High Natural Rate of Unemployment Case) Simulation Results
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.74E-05 0.000313 
0.0088 0.017694 
4.99E-05 0.000385
bdef xvol
7578992 8376967
2752.997 2894.299 
92.86697 270.2905
rw y*
0.008824 9086044
0.093936 3014.307 
-0.00588 298.4719
q psbr
0.000832 7637029
0.028853 2763.518 
-0.00293 50.87913
mon p
84191197 0.358106 
9175.576 0.59842
862.4056 0.086437
w mO
2.66E40 2775992
163161 1666.131 
-22311.8 -155.681
rl rs
0.000385 0.004038 
0.019616 0.063543 
0.00019 0.000334
e* w*
0.003753 0.006474 
0.061265 0.080463 
-0.00549 -0.00301
rdi yafc
445791.6 32175449 
667.6762 5672.341 
-42.4649 -107.819
dmxr leurxr
0 0.000941 
0 0.030679 
0 0.000164
g fin
1.53E40 2.95E®9
123596.7 54278.52 
-16534.9 -5772.85
infl rxr
0.004496 0.012607 
0.067056 0.112282 
0.000482 -0.00523
u* u
252123 796754.2 
502.1185 892.6109 
44.68753 127.1993
eg* ur*
62011229 0.000301 
7874.721 0.01735
945.2377 0.001543
leucpi pop
8.38E-06 0
0.002894 0
2E-05 0
xval y
14816164 24201706 
3849.177 4919.523
167.0887 -94.939
c eg
11959684 74334609 
3458.278 8621.752 
-697.141 1056.682
dy afc
0.00088 566925.9 
0.029658 752.9448 
0.000215 -13.0145
rxm ginv
695.8867 59263199 
26.37966 7698.26
1.672693 -737.874
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Table 2.A. 13: FLOAT (Bubble Case) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs w mO
0.00012 0.000991 2.18E40 3769653
0.010973 0.031484 147724.1 1941.559 
0.001087 0.003288 -17246.3 -269.433
bdef xvol rl rs
7080474 9300847 0.000117 0.000973
2660.916 3049.729 0.010795 0.031201 
-104.362 210.5855 0.000553 0.002038
rw y* e* w*
0.007208 10014350 0.003753 0.005278 
0.084902 3164.546 0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00408 313.4291 -0.0055 -0.00271
q psbr rdi yafc
0.000687 7927149 689637.3 29884452
0.026214 2815.519 830.4441 5466.667 
-0.00233 26.38922 129.4102 -25.5935
mon p dmxr leurxr
14035632 0.010274 0.061761 0.00082
3746.416 0.101359 0.248518 0.028637 
-125.588 0.020673 -0.03569 0.000123
g fin xval y
1.32E40 1.93E89 15218153 22480513
114755.9 43949.16 3901.045 4741.362 
-11430.2 -5808.25 109.4965 -21.9859
infl rxr c eg
0.00025 0.011404 9219571 78810677
0.01581 0.106788 3036.375 8877.538 
0.001422 -0.00436 -630.173 935.3464
u* u dy afc
41239.32 109795.2 0.000758 526095.2 
203.0747 331.3536 0.027526 725.3242 
18.07009 41.2462 0.000224 -3.66595
eg* ur* rxrn ginv
65656569 4.92E-05 97.11308 53206726 
8102.874 0.007017 9.854597 7294.294 
841.6953 0.000623 -1.56715 -541.309
leucpi pop
2.79E-05 0
0.005278 0
2.62E-05 0
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Table 2.A. 14: EMU (Bubble Case) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.59E-05 0.000313 
0.008711 0.017694 
8.2E-05 0.000385
w mO
3.01E+10 3113029
173351.3 1764.378 
-23979.5 -168.966
g fin
1.67E+10 3.7E+09
129122.3 60802.83 
-17257.1 -6713.64
xval y
15663411 26948245
3957.703 5191.17
194.9503 -132.729
bdef xvol
8456395 9253813
2907.988 3042.008
96.01488 295.2198
rw y*
0.007245 10014418 
0.085117 3164.556 
-0.00498 313.3906
q psbr
0.000844 8496701
0.029044 2914.91
-0.00315 55.84001
rl rs
0.000211 0.003186 
0.01452 0.056442 
0.000342 0.000937
e* w*
0.003753 0.005278 
0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00549 -0.00271
rdi yafc
571961.8 35828415
756.2815 5985.684 
-41.0225 -153.989
infl rxr
0.00437 0.012774 
0.066103 0.11302
0.000462 -0.0046
u* u
41239.63 129069.2
203.0754 359.262
18.07132 55.49672
eg* ur*
68513919 4.92E-05
8277.314 0.007017
985.1326 0.000624
c eg
12855035 82060947
3585.392 9058.75
-764.584 1102.209
dy afc
0.000871 631476.2 
0.029515 794.6548 
0.000188 -21.1339
rxrn ginv
696.134 65912374
26.38435 8118.644
1.669791 -786.538
mon p dmxr
69623715 0.26401 0
8344.083 0.513819 0
786.6501 0.074803 0
leurxr leucpi pop
0.000941 8.38E-06 0
0.030679 0.002894 0
0.000164 2E-05 0
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Table 2.A.15: FLOAT (Enhanced Fiscal Case) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs w mO
0.000116 0.000782 2.23E+10 3700787
0.01079 0.027967 149341.4 1923.743 
0.001087 0.003184 -15458.2 -259.934
bdef xvol rl rs
7547732 8692059 0.000116 0.000731
2747.314 2948.23 0.010773 0.027031
-109.187 161.6981 0.000603 0.002046
rw y* e* w*
0.007141 10014344 0.003753 0.005278 
0.084505 3164.545 0.061264 0.072647 
-0.00371 313.448 -0.0055 -0.00271
q psbr rdi yafc
0.000631 8577043 620443.1 28552874
0.025124 2928.659 787.6821 5343.489 
-0.00197 21.57854 129.4694 36.26904
mon p dmxr leurxr
13358059 0.009104 0.060066 0.00082
3654.868 0.095416 0.245084 0.028637 
-145.777 0.018173 -0.02724 0.000123
g fin xval y
1.34E+10 2E+09 14818082 21480892
115753.4 44687.53 3849.426 4634.748 
-10266.8 -5187.36 62.60193 31.57903
infl rxr c eg
0.000207 0.011303 9103156 77643513
0.014389 0.106313 3017.144 8811.556 
0.001255 -0.00386 -582.058 939.1866
u* u dy afc
41239.28 106216.5 0.000692 502489.4
203.0746 325.9088 0.026309 708.8649 
18.06946 38.54779 0.000217 4.586779
eg* ur* rxm ginv
65789196 4.92E-05 94.32542 53914930 
8111.054 0.007017 9.712128 7342.679 
847.8806 0.000623 -1.23827 -482.547
leucpi pop
2.79E-05 0
0.005278 0
2.62E-05 0
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Table 2.A. 16: EMU (Enhanced Fiscal Case) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.69E-05 0.000313 
0.008769 0.017694 
9.73E-05 0.000385
bdef xvol
8946990 8505949
2991.152 2916.496 
151.854 447.7225
rw y*
0.007159 10014420 
0.084613 3164.557 
-0.00617 313.3707
q psbr
0.000755 9016597
0.027482 3002.765 
-0.00442 127.7888
mon p
73824731 0.265087 
8592.132 0.514866 
748.2067 0.073445
w mO
2.88E+10 3291492
169673.1 1814.247 
-30152.9 -197.115
rl rs
0.000385 0.004017 
0.019628 0.063379 
0.000282 0.000923
e* w*
0.003753 0.005278 
0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00549 -0.00271
rdi yafc
440830.5 33142983 
663.9507 5756.994 
-24.8119 -385.139
dmxr leurxr
0 0.000941 
0 0.030679 
0 0.000164
g fin
1.68E+10 3.12E+09
129597.4 55834.03 
-22220.8 -7922.82
infl rxr
0.00448 0.012587 
0.066931 0.112191 
0.000383 -0.00564
u* u
41239.53 119382.5
203.0752 345.5177 
18.07219 61.81407
eg* ur*
68071421 4.92E-05
8250.541 0.007017 
963.5026 0.000624
leucpi pop
8.38E-06 0
0.002894 0
2E-05 0
xval y
15048583 24927897 
3879.25 4992.784 
340.7361 -335.67
c eg
12404528 80486586
3522.006 8971.432 
-942.124 1105.934
dy afc
0.000796 584197.6 
0.028218 764.3282 
8.07E-05 -49.642
rxm ginv
695.7989 64571082 
26.378 8035.613 
1.666171 -996.903
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Table 2.A.17: FLOAT (Highly Favourable Combination) Simulation Results
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs w mO
0.000118 0.000813 2.19E+10 3748608 
0.010857 0.028516 147839.6 1936.132 
0.001084 0.003426 -14890.3 -269.653
bdef xvol rl rs
7498625 8802909 0.000122 0.000787 
2738.362 2966.97 0.01104 0.028056
-110.898 143.8706 0.000595 0.002336
rw y* e* w*
0.004009 10014363 0.003753 0.005278 
0.063317 3164.548 0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00281 313.4202 -0.0055 -0.00271
q psbr rdi yafc
0.000583 8425515 565594.4 25473109
0.02414 2902.674 752.0601 5047.089 
-0.00192 25.63089 135.0704 39.79293
mon p dmxr leurxr
12900087 0.007964 0.058042 0.00082
3591.669 0.089239 0.24092 0.028637
-165.664 0.01734 -0.03413 0.000123
g fin xval y
1.34E+10 1.75E+09 14549397 19166221 
115618 41875.45 3814.367 4377.924 
-9908.76 -4980.35 49.14953 31.91144
infl rxr c eg
0.000188 0.010337 8458082 77468979 
0.013715 0.101669 2908.278 8801.646 
0.001224 -0.00331 -580.497 937.1269
u* u dy afc
41239.32 17322.89 0.000681 447949.9
203.0747 131.6164 0.026095 669.2906 
18.0705 12.72227 0.000229 7.528129
eg* ur* rxm ginv
65587852 4.92E-05 91.18965 53464708 
8098.633 0.007017 9.549327 7311.957 
845.5359 0.000623 -1.41126 -461.27
leucpi pop
2.79E-05 0
0.005278 0
2.62E-05 0
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Table 2.A. 18: EMU (Highly Favourable Combination) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.48E-05 0.000313 
0.008646 0.017694 
8.46E-05 0.000385
bdef xvol
8392247 8737852
2896.937 2955.986 
106.5758 260.3643
rw y*
0.003907 10014405 
0.062503 3164.554 
-0.00405 313.351
q psbr
0.000614 8505281
0.024778 2916.381 
-0.00293 67.32179
mon p
68865574 0.259593 
8298.528 0.509503
786.0265 0.074195
w mO
2.86E+10 3121666
169037.5 1766.824 
-23374.6 -166.399
rl rs
0.000209 0.003075 
0.014444 0.05545
0.000246 0.00094
e* w*
0.003753 0.005278 
0.061265 0.072647 
-0.00549 -0.00271
rdi yafc
466270.6 27054674 
682.8401 5201.411 
-39.9156 -131.197
dmxr leurxr
0 0.000941 
0 0.030679 
0 0.000164
g fin
1.72E+10 2.5E+09
131327.3 50003.73 
-17300.6 -6064
infl rxr
0.004301 0.011852 
0.065581 0.108868 
0.000541 -0.00421
LI u
41239.35 17351.79
203.0747 131.7262 
18.07262 16.96652
eg* ur*
68675077 4.92E-05 
8287.043 0.007017 
988.3913 0.000624
leucpi pop
8.38E-06 0
0.002894 0
2E-05 0
xval y
14368210 20354974
3790.542 4511.649 
161.3881 -116.956
c eg
8562396 81181843 
2926.157 9010.097 
-744.411 1113.837
dy afc
0.000721 476057.1 
0.026842 689.9689 
0.000173 -14.6157
rxm ginv
696.1543 63218694 
26.38474 7951.018 
1.669978 -761.673
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2.B A ppendix 2
2.B .1 Taylor Series Expansion o f E xpected  U tility
It might seem that we can take the percentage change in utility between EMU and floating 
as the percentage changes in UK welfare. However, the utility unit is not invariable to 
units. For example take logarithmic utility: U = a  In c + (l — a) ln(l 4- u). If we double the 
unit of consumption we add a ln(2) to U; thus cutting the percentage differences produced 
by the changes.
What we would like to know is the equivalent percentage change in expected con­
sumption (‘living standard’) of our changes in expected utility. To discover this we take 
a second-order Taylor-series expansion of expected utility around its value at some fixed 
point (given by c and u, for example) and set the total differential to zero.
AEU _  SU A (Ec -  c) SU A (Eu -  u)
~ N  1c N  + du N
( 0 )  var(c) + ( 0 )  var(u) +  ( 0 ©  cov(c,u)
+A0.5 N
where N is the number of observations we have (in this case all our 12, 078 stochastic 
periods). It follows that in order to hold expected utility constant,
-SU  A (Ec -  c) A UA (Eu—u) = AO.5
[ ( ! ? )  v a r (c) +  ( 0 )  +  ( t t S  c o v ( c , u )
Sc N  Su N
Since the move to the euro involves no change in mean, it follows that the term on 
the right-hand side of the equation due to changing variances is the effect we are picking 
up in our simulations and there is no change in E(c) or E{u)\ hence the left-hand side 
of the equation is zero. If we want to know what percentage consumption change would
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be equivalent (i.e. would just offset the simulated change in variances), we solve this 
equation for:
E c—c
N d SU C Sc
A0.5
_(0) var(°) + (0) var(u) + (0S cov(c,u)
N
This is what we report in the text: the expected percentage consumption fall that is 
the equivalent of the losses created by the higher variances and covariances.
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2.C Appendix 3
2.C.1 D ecom posing the R esu lts by T ypes o f Shock:
In the work reported above we lump all shocks together. This makes sense because shocks 
are correlated with one another; to run one and then another separately when the two 
are connected, distorts the effect of each. Nevertheless it can shed some light on the main 
sources of our results to run groups of shocks separately, provided one bears this in mind.
We first separated out the demand shocks: Tables 2.C.1-2.C.2. The ratios of variances 
(EMU/floating) are 1.21 for output, 1.28 for unemployment, 8.33 for real interest rates, 
and 19.56 for inflation. The political cost would be 2.40. Supply shocks alone would 
therefore produce about a quarter of the total political cost (three quarters of the output 
variance).
Tables 2.C.3-2.C.4 show the supply shocks on their own. It can readily be seen that 
floating and EMU are rather similar in dealing with these, with the ratios of inflation, 
unemployment and the real interest rates falling.
In Tables 2.C.5-2.C.6 we examine the external shocks on their own. It can be seen that 
under EMU the effect of external shocks is many multiples of their effect under floating, 
reflecting two things; that floating insulates the economy from external shocks whereas 
EMU does not, and secondly that EMU introduces new external, EMU-specific, shocks. 
One can see that external shocks are thus by far the most important source of the gap 
between floating and EMU variability.
It is more informative to break the external shocks from EMU down further. In Tables 
2.C.7-2.C.9 we include all the external shocks present in both EMU and floating — world 
real interest rates and world trade — but only enter in turn and alone the three external 
shocks from EMU: those from the euro real exchange rate, from euro prices, and from 
euro interest rates. We can see that the last is the least important in destabilising the UK 
under EMU. However the other two each on their own heavily destabilise the UK under
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EMU; clearly they must be negatively correlated since the two together have less effect 
than separately.
The matter in which we are most interested is how far the problem created by EMU 
stems from the fact that interest rates and the exchange rate cannot react to shocks, how 
much from the fact that the movement in euro interest rates, prices and the euro real 
exchange rate injects additional shocks into the UK economy. Table 2.C.10 shows what 
happens under EMU if all shocks enter it except these last three sets of euro shocks — 
this is ‘EMU Passive case’.
It can be seen that the ratio of EMU (Passive) to floating variances are: 1.10 for output,
1.07 for unemployment; 0.89 for real interest rates; 5.66 for inflation. The political cost 
would be 1.29 times. As we can see above, these figures are not too dissimilar to the 
effect of the supply shocks on their own; so we could say that supply shocks provoke 
a helpful response from domestic monetary policy that is of course absent under EMU 
because it is a passive monetary system from the UK’s viewpoint. Compare these with 
the ratios to floating for the total EMU case (1.24, 1.18, 4.32 and 20.17) and one can by 
subtraction see that how important is also the active part of EMU, the additional shocks. 
Specifically they contribute the following percentages of the extra EMU variances: output 
52%, unemployment 61%, real interest rates 103%, and inflation 76%, with an additional 
political cost of 0.92. We can summarise this as saying that EMU, in so far as it does not 
permit interest rates and exchange rates to react to UK shocks, would increase political 
costs by about 33%; in so far as it injects additional shocks into the UK, it raises costs 
by a further 60%.
In sum, about a quarter of the political cost of EMU is due to its passive inability to 
stabilise the economy in the face of shocks, mainly supply shocks; about three quarters is 
due to its active injection into the UK economy of EMU-specific shocks.
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Table 2.C.1: FLOAT (Demand Shocks) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs w mO
5.01 E-05 0.000238 2.02E+10 2837077
0.007079 0.015423 142019.6 1684.362 
0.000454 0.00087 -19128.5 -191.353
bdef xvol rl rs
6563946 7141045 2.28E-05 0.00018
2562.02 2672.273 0.004771 0.013433 
-73.2003 121.467 0.000118 0.000296
rw y* e* w*
0.006606 10536737 0.003893 0.005431 
0.081278 3246.034 0.06239 0.073695
0.000854 121.3708 -0.00183 0.001596
q psbr rdi yafc
0.000484 7218099 280024.6 23287255
0.021999 2686.652 529.1735 4825.687 
-0.00101 -55.9123 16.54879 -27.7736
mon p dmxr leurxr
13531975 0.012073 0.054325 0
3678.583 0.109878 0.233078 0
-108.805 0.011946 -0.00058 0
g fin xval y
1.09E+10 1.95E+09 13264378 17514303
104430.5 44197.3 3642.029 4185.009
-14998.8 -4124.94 8.569552 -24.8891
infl rxr c eg
0.000127 0.0055 5428423 79340865
0.011251 0.074165 2329.898 8907.349 
0.000715 -0.00306 -366.063 1003.871
u* u dy afc
44492.55 97633.73 0.000249 410792.1
210.9326 312.464 0.015784 640.9307
29.29421 40.83319 -3.3E-05 -3.13038
eg* ur* rxrn ginv
66182490 5.29E-05 89.17622 30678197 
8135.262 0.00727 9.443316 5538.79
913.0939 0.001008 -0.18441 -787.323
leucpi pop
0 0 
0 0 
0 0
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Table 2.C.2: EMU (Demand Shocks) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
2.8E-05 0
0.005289 0
-1.6E-05 0
bdef xvol
7307967 6640926
2703.325 2576.999 
26.26927 242.3235
rw y*
0.006634 10536757 
0.081448 3246.037 
-0.00073 121.4127
q psbr
0.000587 7549230
0.024229 2747.586 
-0.00184 -16.0416
mon p
51538193 0.175081 
7179.011 0.418427 
437.7312 0.049922
w mO
2.52E+10 2635790
158732.6 1623.512 
-25283.2 -171.468
rl rs
9.51 E-05 0.001504 
0.009754 0.03878
-0.00039 -0.00098
e* w*
0.003893 0.005431 
0.062391 0.073694 
-0.00183 0.001597
rdi yafc
133868.9 27399922 
365.8809 5234.493 
-43.1953 -166.194
dmxr leurxr
0 0.00082 
0 0.028637 
0 0.000123
g fin
1.35E+10 2.86E+09
116396.2 53500.4
-20221.7 -5053.48
infl rxr
0.002476 0.006339 
0.04976 0.079621 
0.000461 -0.005
u* u
44492.56 125242
210.9326 353.8954 
29.29226 47.77753
eg* ur*
66707474 5.29E-05 
8167.464 0.00727
960.5971 0.001008
leucpi pop
0 0
0 0
0 0
xval y
13346263 20613728 
3653.254 4540.234 
122.6759 -146.01
c eg
7715131 80077733 
2777.612 8948.616 
-468.32 1062.939
dy afc
0.000349 483465.9 
0.018676 695.3171 
-5.9E-05 -20.5315
rxrn ginv
424.3341 39079308 
20.59937 6251.344 
0.585625 -1003.72
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Table 2.C.3: FLOAT (Supply Shocks) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
1.42E-05 0.000155 
0.00377 0.012469 
-6.9E-05 1.72E-05
w mO
2.77E+09 1570912
52646.94 1253.36
3879.979 -11.7318
g fin
1.53E+09 3.21 E+08
39110.99 17920.33 
2239.953 1655.507
xval y
641274.8 9377968
800.7964 3062.347 
49.52094 248.0063
bdef xvol
86925.23 707054.3 
294.8309 840.8652
11.50661 53.17621
rw y*
0.005667 10016344 
0.075279 3164.861 
-0.00312 313.2092
q psbr
5.01 E-05 248168.3 
0.007078 498.1649 
-0.00042 35.67462
rl rs
1.59E-05 0.000143 
0.003985 0.011968 
8.64E-06 1.47E-05
e* w*
0.003753 0.005276 
0.061263 0.072636 
-0.00549 -0.00271
rdi yafc
88305.42 12483098 
297.1623 3533.143 
23.34106 285.3374
infl rxr
3.47E-05 0.00436
0.005887 0.066034 
0.00025 -0.006
u* u
41249.99 78819.6
203.1009 280.7483 
18.0806 20.34024
eg* ur*
616760.5 4.92E-05 
785.341 0.007018 
64.24479 0.000624
c eg
1097995 758661.9 
1047.853 871.012
18.42378 72.78777
dy afc
2.83E-05 221703.6 
0.005315 470.8541 
0.000166 37.44382
rxm ginv
38.47177 4652439 
6.202562 2156.951 
-0.32224 141.2993
mon p dmxr leurxr leucpi pop
3471708 0.000825 0.024103 0 0 0
1863.252 0.028729 0.15525 0 0 0
32.65722 0.004205 -0.00359 0 0 0
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Table 2.C.4: EMU (Supply Shocks) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
3.72E-08 0
0.000193 0
2.14E-06 0
w mO
3.75E+09 1465602
61219.98 1210.62
5290.637 -10.0467
g fin
2.09E+09 4.9E+08
45766.82 22126.72 
2952.549 2336.073
xval y
589653.7 10777795 
767.8891 3282.955 
7.359717 296.1657
bdef xvol
135699.7 549896.1 
368.3745 741.5498 
9.573781 7.134156
rw y*
0.005591 10015433 
0.074775 3164.717 
-0.00275 312.9922
q psbr
7.49E-05 160542.8 
0.008654 400.6779 
-0.00016 24.67583
rl rs
3.15E-05 0.000205 
0.005612 0.014334 
-7.7E-06 0.000235
e* w*
0.003753 0.005276 
0.061263 0.072638 
-0.00549 -0.00271
rdi yafc
15367.43 14353848 
123.9654 3788.647 
14.5679 344.1407
infl rxr
0.000263 0.003616 
0.016208 0.060133 
-0.0005 -0.00529
u* u
41250.54 79836.35 
203.1023 282.5533 
18.0812 22.79485
eg* ur*
580733.6 4.93E-05 
762.0588 0.007018 
74.75653 0.000623
c eg
1793551 721783.6 
1339.235 849.5785 
63.35065 83.43586
dy afc
3.26E-05 256090.4 
0.005706 506.0538 
0.00021 47.59241
rxm ginv
5.36E-06 6452755
0.002315 2540.227 
-0.00052 189.4806
mon p dmxr leurxr leucpi pop
6957779 0.009936 0 0 0 0
2637.76 0.099679 0 0 0 0
-122.022 -0.00574 0 0 0 0
89
Table 2.C.5: FLOAT (External Shocks) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs w mO
4.46E-08 1.02E-06 140687.6 310.7505 
0.000211 0.001008 375.0835 17.62812 
2.54E-05 -0.00022 276.5811 11.2383
bdef xvol rl rs
394.5767 146.6754 6.44E-08 1.53E-06 
19.86396 12.11096 0.000254 0.001237 
-4.32776 5.520371 -2.2E-05 -0.00047
rw y* e* w*
2.07E-06 414.9802 1.77E-08 2.18E-08 
0.001439 20.37106 0.000133 0.000148
I.23E-05 0.111623 -2.1E-07 2.57E-07
q psbr rdi yafc
5.39E-08 1082.877 360.4444 1708.381 
0.000232 32.9071 18.98537 41.33257
-2.6E-05 4.422435 7.511033 -6.86594
mon p dmxr leurxr
430.7441 1.01E-06 2.49E-05 0.00082
20.75438 0.001003 0.004993 0.028631
II.65511 0.000188 0.004477 0.000123
g fin xval y
93227.37 50690.92 111.1419 1302.926 
305.3316 225.1464 10.54239 36.09607 
262.9516 16.60434 4.106694 -4.15069
infl rxr c eg
2.52E-07 1.96E-06 338.4212 257.546
0.000502 0.001401 18.39623 16.04824 
1.01E-05 -0.00014 -13.2445 -5.91947
u* u dy afc
0.266149 36.21963 7.51 E-08 32.28405 
0.515896 6.018274 0.000274 5.681906 
-0.00382 -1.22991 -1.4E-05 -2.34875
eg* ur* rxrn ginv
213.9023 9.04E-11 0.017839 678.4217 
14.6254 9.51 E-06 0.133563 26.04653 
-5.47615 8.45E-07 0.085666 7.514958
leucpi pop
2.78E-05 0
0.005273 0
2.59E-05 0
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Table 2.C.6: EMU (External Shocks) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.33E-05 0.000313 
0.008564 0.017694 
8.05E-05 0.000385
bdef xvol
525649.1 872148
725.0166 933.8886 
113.9311 448.258
rw y*
0.000203 415.1834 
0.014247 20.37605 
-0.00349 0.103513
q psbr
7.96E-05 309810
0.008921 556.6058 
-0.00359 121.3529
mon p
82070214 0.26535
9059.261 0.515122 
1200.45 0.075903
w mO
1.57E+09 537346.2
39684.67 733.039
-17397.7 -65.3963
rl rs
8.5E-05 0.002467 
0.009218 0.049668 
-0.00041 7.79E-05
e* w*
1.77E-08 2.18E-08 
0.000133 0.000148
6.71 E-07 9.19E-07
rdi yafc
282427.7 2628084
531.4392 1621.137 
6.806195 -640.798
dmxr leurxr
0 0.000941 
0 0.030679 
0 0.000164
g fin
8.55E+08 4.1E+08
29244.47 20244.7
-12899.8 -4493.55
infl rxr
0.003514 0.002598 
0.059276 0.050968 
0.000493 -0.00364
u* u
0.266401 4673.95
0.516141 68.3663
-0.00385 25.5051
eg* ur*
211670.1 8.87E-11 
460.0762 9.42E-06 
-34.1807 8.28E-07
leucpi pop
8.37E-06 0
0.002894 0
2.02E-05 0
xval y
711007.4 1977007
843.2125 1406.061 
430.4356 -557.058
c eg
1346723 265624.6 
1160.484 515.3879 
-480.151 -21.8347
dy afc
5.77E-05 46159.31 
0.007598 214.8472 
-0.00028 -84.1285
rxm ginv
696.1801 2888415
26.38523 1699.534 
1.670289 -587.756
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Table 2.C.7: EMU (EUCPI Shock only) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.01 E-05 0
0.008374 0
8.7E-05 0
w mO
1.58E+09 14266.4
39806.41 119.4421 
-16692.3 -60.864
g fin
8.55E+08 4.07E+08
29236.99 20166.43 
-12414.3 -4270.69
xval y
688698 1914463
829.8783 1383.641 
404.0875 -521.26
bdef xvol
335759.7 844617.6 
579.4477 919.0308 
121.7545 420.9525
rw y*
0.000196 415.1823 
0.014001 20.37602 
-0.00329 0.10416
q psbr
7.7E-05 265448.2 
0.008776 515.2167 
-0.00337 111.3816
rl rs
8.23E-05 0.00219
0.009074 0.046793 
-0.0004 -0.00035
e* w*
1.77E-08 2.18E-08 
0.000133 0.000148 
6.38E-07 9.36E-07
rdi yafc
59422.79 2545162
243.7679 1595.356 
-10.9792 -599.753
infl rxr
0.00341 0.002519 
0.058397 0.050188 
0.000529 -0.00348
u* u
0.266399 4515.465 
0.516138 67.19721 
-0.00388 23.99538
eg* ur*
32725.33 8.87E-11 
180.9014 9.42E-06 
-18.1431 8.28E-07
c eg
1312970 51057.35 
1145.849 225.9587 
-454.579 -5.07392
dy afc
5.56E-05 44720.13 
0.007455 211.4714 
-0.00025 -78.8438
rxm ginv
680.837 2862710
26.09285 1691.954 
1.589686 -561.664
mon p dmxr leurxr leucpi pop
80283689 0.257735 0 0.000941 0 0
8960.117 0.507676 0 0.030679 0 0
1235.448 0.075337 0 0.000164 0 0
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Table 2.C.8: EMU (Eurxr Shock only) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
7.33E-05 0
0.008561 0
8.19E-05 0
w mO
1.63E+09 14719.96 
40326.19 121.3258 
-17656.9 -64.5858
g fin
8.79E+08 4.16E+08
29648.67 20384.13 
-13091.8 -4558.31
xval y
706685.7 1971459
840.646 1404.087 
428.9591 -554.891
bdef xvol
344432.2 867184.6 
586.8834 931.2275 
128.0611 446.6804
rw y*
0.000203 415.1857 
0.014245 20.37611 
-0.00348 0.103564
q psbr
7.93E-05 273698.9 
0.008906 523.1624 
-0.00358 118.8219
rl rs
8.5E-05 0.002266 
0.009217 0.047603 
-0.00041 -0.00031
e* w*
1.77E-08 2.18E-08 
0.000133 0.000148
6.71 E-07 9.36E-07
rdi yafc
60572.79 2620878
246.1154 1618.913 
-9.8538 -638.429
infl rxr
0.003514 0.002597 
0.059275 0.050959 
0.000496 -0.00363
u* u
0.266404 4663.273 
0.516144 68.28816 
-0.00386 25.4233
eg* ur*
33330.47 8.87E-11 
182.5663 9.42E-06 
-20.9075 8.28E-07
c eg
1355005 52003.45
1164.047 228.0427 
-482.004 -7.17046
dy afc
5.74E-05 46046.71 
0.007578 214.585
-0.00028 -83.9062
rxm ginv
696.1832 2927557
26.38528 1711.011 
1.670444 -596.58
mon p dmxr
82582682 0.265365 0
9087.501 0.515136 0
1238.541 0.075919 0
leurxr leucpi pop
0.000941 8.37E-06 0
0.030679 0.002894 0
0.000164 2.02E-05 0
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Table 2.C.9: EMU (EUNRS Shock Only) Simulation Results
Variance
St. Dev
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl
4.81 E-07 
0.000694
2.91 E-06
nrs
0.000313
0.017694
0.000385
w
83977322
9163.914
229.7489
mO
512644.2
715.9917
-1.66185
46510558
6819.865
166.1807
fin
10228635
3198.224
62.96409
xval
5301.52
72.81153
3.636187
15476.71
124.4054
-6.44124
bdef xvol
224242.3 6146.294 
473.5422 78.39831 
-12.4496 3.401766
rw y*
4.91 E-06 415.0326 
0.002217 20.37235 
-1.8E-05 0.117063
q psbr
6.35E-07 49327.97 
0.000797 222.099
-4.4E-05 4.602288
rl rs
5.64E-07 0.000331 
0.000751 0.018195 
1.12E-05 0.000442
e* w*
1.77E-08 2.18E-08 
0.000133 0.000148 
3.06E-07 8.45E-07
rdi yafc
249514.6 20563.86 
499.5143 143.4011 
16.40307 -8.12419
infl rxr
1.9E-05 1.54E-05 
0.004362 0.003918 
-3.5E-05 5.35E-05
u* u
0.266184 46.21423 
0.51593 6.798105 
-0.00404 1.063876
eg* ur*
187287.4 8.96E-11 
432.7671 9.46E-06 
-13.1227 8.36E-07
c eg
20221.16 227493.5 
142.2011 476.9628 
-0.74573 -14.3342
dy afc
6.02E-07 363.8425 
0.000776 19.07466 
-1.7E-05 -1.5871
rxm ginv
3.143414 128400.8 
1.772968 358.3305 
0.058557 3.704819
mon p dmxr leurxr leucpi pop
1637379 0.001049 0 0 8.36E-06 0
1279.601 0.032387 0 0 0.002891 0
-12.8585 -0.00048 0 0 2.07E-05 0
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Table 2.C.10: EMU (Passive Case - All Shocks Except EUNRS, EUCPI and EURXR)
Simulation Results
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
Variance 
St. Dev 
Average
nrl nrs
1.04E-07 0
0.000322 0
2.65E-05 0
bdef xvol
7654582 8335883
2766.691 2887.193 
-3.52837 -28.397
rw y*
0.007223 10014380 
0.084988 3164.551 
-0.00248 313.3714
q psbr
0.000749 7918037
0.027363 2813.901 
-0.0006 -34.0762
mon p
11229038 0.023659 
3350.976 0.153815 
-188.68 0.004118
w mO
2.6E+10 2747912
161093.9 1657.683 
-10997.1 -120.718
rl rs
0.000106 0.000657 
0.010303 0.02564
0.000704 0.000898
e* w*
0.003753 0.005278 
0.061265 0.072647 
-0.0055 -0.00271
rdi yafc
134378.4 33350585 
366.5766 5774.997 
-31.5361 295.7191
dmxr leurxr
0 0 
0 0 
0 0
g fin
1.47E+10 2.81E+09
121338.8 53038.57 
-7110.29 -3887.6
infl rxr
0.001229 0.00898
0.035061 0.094762 
-0.00014 -0.00179
u* u
41239.2 117071.2 
203.0744 342.1567 
18.07201 35.63409
eg* ur*
66534643 4.92E-05 
8156.877 0.007017 
995.1724 0.000624
leucpi pop
0 0 
0 0 
0 0
xval y
15318834 25085820 
3913.928 5008.575 
-114.794 259.4484
c eg
11253067 79912608 
3354.559 8939.385 
-434.69 1098.707
dy afc
0.000794 587976
0.028183 766.7959 
0.000351 36.69232
rxrn ginv
1.96E-06 60233900
0.0014 7761.05
0.000261 -339.095
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Chapter 3
H eterogeneity and M onetary 
Regim es
3.1 Literature Review
Analytical investigation of the effects and importance of the stochastic nature of large 
non-linear econometric models is impossible. Using stochastic simulation bypasses this 
problem by performing a large number of replication of the model simulation. The method 
of stochastic simulation involves adding shocks to the equations, parameters, or the exoge­
nous variables and simulating the model. After a number of replications the simulations 
are collated so that it is possible to calculate a range of statistics from the simulated data. 
Using a large number of replications ensures that the estimates provide a good guide to 
the performance of the model.
The method of stochastic simulation has a long history in macroeconomics. One of the 
earliest studies is the study of cyclical behaviour by Fisher (1952). Using a simple three- 
equation macroeconomic model of the Samuelson type, the paper shows the possibility 
of generating cycles in income by subjecting the two behavioural equations to exogenous 
random shocks.
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The method has also been applied to large macroeconomic models. The seminal paper 
in this area is Adelman and Adelman (1959), which introduced the idea of drawing errors 
to analyse the properties of econometric models. The authors use the annual forecasting 
model of Klein and Goldberger (1955) and then added shocks the equations to see if 
the model could reproduce the cyclical behaviour of the US economy. They find that 
the shocked model produces oscillatory movements with periods of 3 to 4 years with 
similar magnitude to those experienced by the US economy after World War II. The paper 
concludes by saying that the model cannot explain the cyclical process in the absence of 
shocks. When the random shocks are added to the model the cyclical fluctuations that 
result are similar to those described by the NBER as characterising the US economy.
In the Adelman and Adelman (1959) paper they run just one stochastic simulation. 
Nagar (1969) uses a condensed version of the Brooking econometric model with 112 be­
havioural equations and runs 20 stochastic simulations. The author finds that the model 
reflects cyclical behaviour extremely well early on in the simulation period and less well 
as the prediction period is lengthened.
In the Adelman and Adelman (1959) paper it was assumed that the disturbances in 
individual equations were independent across equations and over time. Papers by Green, 
Liebenberg and Hirsch (1972), Evans, Klein and Saito (1972) and Fromm, Klein and 
Schink (1972) use a more realistic method which involves allowing for intercorrelation of 
the errors in different equations and, in some applications, for serial correlation in the 
errors of individual equations. These simulation experiments are much more ambitious 
and underline the practical significance of stochastic simulation, especially in longer term 
simulations.
Green, Liebenberg and Hirsch (1972) apply stochastic simulations to the Office of 
Business Economics (OBE) Model. This is a quarterly model of the US economy with 56 
stochastic equations and the authors ran fifty simulations with stochastic shocks applied 
to the endogenous behavioural variables. Twenty five of the simulations used serially
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correlated random shocks, while the other twenty five used non-serially correlated shocks. 
They find that both sets of shocks reveal cyclical movements, though the serially corre­
lated shocks produce series with less ragged time paths than the non-serially correlated 
shocks, which is more typical of real-world data. They also find that GNP series from 
the simulations with random shocks applied to endogenous behavioural equations rarely 
show downturns, though when measured as deviation from the control solution values, 
real GNP shows definite cycles.
Evans, Klein and Saito (1972) apply similar techniques to the Wharton Model, which 
contains 47 stochastic equations and again ran 100 replications. These authors also find 
that the stochastic solution with serially correlated shocks present results in outcomes 
that are much smoother than those with serially uncorrelated errors, and as a result their 
cyclical patterns are more distinct. The serially correlated shock results are also more 
consistent with the historical facts on business cycles.
Fromm, Klein and Schink (1972) perform 50 replications on the Brookings Model 
which is a quarterly model and has 230 equations of which 118 are stochastic. They find 
that while some of the stochastic simulations drift, the majority fluctuated about the 
control path.
Stochastic simulations have also been applied to models for other countries. Sowey 
(1973) applies 20 replications to a quarterly nonlinear model for Australia with 55 simul­
taneous equations, which includes 24 behavioural equations. The paper aims to assess 
the model’s goodness of fit, the differential behaviour under dynamic and one-step sim­
ulations, and to compare the mean stochastic simulation path with the deterministic 
simulation path. The paper concludes that deterministic simulation is much cheaper in 
terms of computer time, but the use of stochastic simulation can yield results which are 
not only more detailed but are also fully assessable in terms of statistic reliability.
In another early application of stochastic simulation Cooper and Fischer (1972) use 
stochastic simulation to study the effects of different monetary rules on the rates of in­
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flation and unemployment. They compare two models, the Federal Reserve Board-MIT- 
Pennsylvania (FMP) Model which is Keynesian in nature, and the St. Louis (SL) Model 
which represents a strict monetarist view. The FMP Model is larger having 66 stochastic 
equations compared to the five stochastic equations of the SL Model. The authors find 
that simple feedback control rules reduce the variability of the target variables (infla­
tion and unemployment) relative to the rule in which the money supply is increased at a 
constant r
3.2 Introduction
In this paper we ask whether heterogeneous labour market experience matters for the 
choice of monetary regimes. The usual procedure in choosing between regimes is to evalu­
ate the welfare function of a representative agent. Implicitly this procedure assumes that 
shocks affect all agents in a similar way, in other words it assumes away heterogeneity. To 
build up the fiction of this representative agent, it is usually assumed that there is perfect 
pooling across agents of all shock effects (Lewis, 2003a,b). In particular, ‘unemployment’ 
is achieved by a lottery, so that some people are allocated leisure but perfect compensation 
across agents ensures that they are no better or worse off than the others who work. Yet 
this contradicts the basic facts of the labour market and the impact of business cycles on 
households.
We would argue that the key heterogeneity perhaps of a macro economy is the one 
between the unemployed and the employed. In a highly flexible labour market, unemploy­
ment will purely consist of people spending short amounts of search time between jobs; in 
such a case it seems reasonable to assume that those unemployed are essentially no differ­
ent from the employed — unemployment is an occasional state all, or most, experience. 
Here the pooling assumption is quite appropriate.
However most, maybe all, economies have not so flexible a labour market: various
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forms of social intervention ensure that a significant number of unemployed remain so 
for a long period because the jobs they can find are less rewarding than their unemploy­
ment package. Such unemployed will be on the margin of unemployment benefits and 
employment and hence will tend to be relatively unskilled (in benefit systems, the ma­
jority, where benefit/earnings replacement ratios rise markedly as one moves down the 
wage distribution). It is natural in such economies therefore to group the adult working 
population into those relatively unskilled for whom the risk of long-term unemployment 
is substantial and the rest. The labour economics literature has adopted the terms ‘out­
sider’ and ‘insider’ respectively for these two groups: we will generally use ‘unskilled’ and 
‘skilled’ instead, indicating the overlap with income distribution differences.
It follows that unemployment variation will impact most heavily on the former groups, 
whereas consumption variation will impact most heavily on the latter. Thus the typical 
representative agent welfare function will tend to undersetimate the costs of the business 
cycle to the former group. We treat the welfare of the second group as dependent only on 
consumption, that of the first only on unemployment. (We will also show averages of the 
two groups’ welfare; but these have no status as welfare measures unless we are willing 
to give the two groups weights based on some political or other ranking). In terms of 
modelling behaviour both of our models are aggregative and thus implicitly assume, as is 
usual with macro models, that any effects of heterogeneity are picked up by the model’s 
coefficients; a full treatment of heterogeneity would involve separating households into two 
diverse sets of agents with different constraints and behaviour but such a treatment lies 
beyond the scope of this paper (for examples of models where heterogeneity is embedded 
in the structure, see Storesletten et al, 2004 and Heathcote, 2005) and we conjecture 
that our results would not be sensitive to the disaggregation of behaviour as opposed to 
welfare. That conjecture would be interesting to test in later work. Thus we stay within 
the usual aggregative macroeconomic framework used for monetary policy evaluation; we 
extend it only by considering the implications for the welfare of two separate groups of
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agents.
We will be evaluating monetary regimes on the assumption that they produce the same 
mean behaviour in response to shocks; hence differences between them purely concern 
higher moments, of which we only examine the variance (using 2nd order Taylor series 
expansions). Our method will be to compare welfare rankings of monetary regimes for 
the unskilled and the skilled. If rankings are different, we will conclude that heterogeneity 
matters and attempt some assessment of how much.
Much analysis of monetary policy assumes either a lack of indexation altogether or a 
fixed indexation scheme such as lagged indexing. Yet Minford et al (2003) showed that 
the reaction of indexation to monetary policy is important in determining what type is 
optimal. In particular it argued that monetary policy targeting nominal levels of variables 
(such as prices or money) could be superior to those targeting rates of change of those 
variables (inflation or money supply growth). For analysing this issue they developed a 
model in which indexation was endogenous, chosen to optimise their welfare by skilled 
agents who were assumed to be continuously employed. This model is well suited to 
considering the issue here; in that paper the welfare measure used was a weighted average 
of the two groups’ welfare — here we use the heterogeneous measures.
That model can be considered as a calibrated macro model with a moderate degree 
of nominal rigidity (from overlapping contracts) related to the extent of indexation. The 
resulting model is close to the ‘New Classical’ end of the modelling spectrum. However, 
to test the robustness of this stylisation, we also look at an estimated forecasting model 
of the same general type, the Liverpool Model of the UK (Minford, 1980). It would be 
interesting to know how far the results we obtain would generalise to other models with 
nominal rigidity and endogenous indexation; but we (and as far as we know others) have 
been unanble so far to do this work and so it must await future research.
The monetary regimes we consider are:
1. various sorts of (exact) targets for expected (one-period-ahead) outcomes. Each
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is implemented via setting the expected money supply for the coming period; the 
actual money supply is subsequently delivered with an independent stochastic error 
(a ‘trembling hand’ which can be interpreted in various ways — e.g. a banking 
system supply error or an error in current-period setting of a supply instrument 
such as bank reserves). The targets we consider are for: inflation, money supply 
growth, the price level and the money supply level. A burgeoning literature has 
grown up (a partial list is: Bank of Canada, 1994; Berg and Jonung, 1999; Casares, 
2002; Duguay, 1994; Fischer, 1994; Hall, 1984; Kiley, 1998; Nessen and Vestin, 2000; 
Smets, 2000; Svensson, 1999a and b; Vestin, 2000; and Williams, 1999) around the 
issue of whether prices or inflation (money or its growth rate) should be targeted; 
under level targeting the level is stationary, under rate of change targeting the level 
is non-stationary.
2. alternative ways of organising current-period responses to shocks. Specifically, we 
consider a rigorous interest-rate-control regime where an interest rate target is cho­
sen for the coming period and then exactly adhered to; against a money-supply- 
control regime as above where the money error is random. This is often referred to 
as the issue of ‘operating procedure’; in a quarterly model this is not quite exact but 
it is helpful. The issue was first addressed by Poole; and since then there have been 
a large number of papers assuming that it is interest rates that are controlled by 
central banks, for example in the manner of the Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rules 
(Henderson and McKibbin, 1993; Taylor, 1993). Our reason for reopening this old 
issue is simply that it acquires a new dimension when indexation is endogenous and 
also when there are two sets of agents.
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3.3 The M odels Used
Our two models both assume:
1. competitive markets in labour and output.
2. overlapping wage contracts, with a variable indexation parameter chosen optimally 
by workers; however, marginal labour supply is always provided to the auction 
market at an auction supply price.
3. Cobb-Douglas production functions.
4. Monetary policy is implemented via money supply feedback rules (i.e. with the 
expected money supply being set for the next period in response to current infor­
mation; actual money supply is then determined by the impact of shocks under the 
assumed operating procedure, initially taken to be that of money-supply-control). 
However this assumption is a convenience only; the same rules could be expressed 
as a feedback from current information to expected future interest rates, with ac­
tual interest rates being determined by shocks, again under the assumed operating 
procedure.
Therefore both models share the familiar labour supply curve (based on a combination 
of contracted and free labour) and labour demand curve (based on marginal labour pro­
ductivity); and the aggregate supply curve (from production function and employment) 
interacts with an aggregate demand curve (from the interplay of money markets, LM 
curve, and an IS curve).
Two key differences should be mentioned. The calibrated model (henceforth CM) does 
not allow consumers to access the credit markets; the reason is to create a strong incentive 
to smooth consumption via the wage contract. The Liverpool Model (henceforth LPM) is 
an open economy model — here using floating exchange rates — so that, in addition to the 
relationships already mentioned, it embodies efficient international bond markets (which
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imply the Uncovered Interest Parity condition, forcing the real interest rate differential 
into equality with expected real exchange rate change — a constant can also be added 
for the risk-premium arising from model covariances but this does not affect simulation 
properties) and a current account equation related to home and world output and the 
real exchange rate. LPM also assumes that inflows of foreign capital occur flexibly in 
response to investment needs so that the production function treats the capital stock as 
endogenous. Hence it can be seen that the two models differ in detail and in the extent 
of theoretical abstraction rather than in basic approach.
LPM is in essence a less restricted, open economy, version of CM. It is a rational 
expectations IS-LM model, such as can be derived from a micro-founded model by suitable 
approximations (McCallum and Nelson, 1999) — thus for example in LPM the IS curve 
has the expectation of future output in it, the hallmark of this approximation. The model’s 
Phillips or Supply curve assumes overlapping wage contracts as in CM. The labour market 
underpinning it is explicit and the model solves for equilibrium or natural rates of output, 
unemployment and relative prices. Thus from a theoretical viewpoint the model could 
be considered reasonably protected against Lucas’ (1976) critique. Prom the empirical 
viewpoint, we have found the model’s parameters to be rather stable. In recent work a 
new FIML algorithm developed in Cardiff University (Minford and Webb, 2005) has been 
used to re-estimate the model parameters: it turns out that the new estimates are little 
different from the model’s original ones, based partly on single-equation estimates, partly 
on calibration from simulation properties. In terms of forecasting tests, as we discuss 
next, the model has performed fairly well across a variety of regime changes, not merely 
on the monetary but also on the supply side of the economy.
LPM has been used in forecasting continuously since 1979, and is now one of only two in 
that category. The other is the NIESR model, which however has been frequently changed 
in that 20-year period: the only changes in LPM were the introduction of the explicit 
natural rate supply-side equations in the early 1980s and the shift from annual data to
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a quarterly version in the mid-1980s. In an exhaustive comparative test of forecasting 
ability over the 1980s, Andrews et al (1996) showed that out of three models extant in 
that decade — LPM, NIESR, and LBS — the forecasting performance of none of them 
could ‘reject’ that of the others in non-nested tests, suggesting that LPM during this 
period was, though a newcomer, at least no worse than the major models of that time. 
For 1990s forecasts no formal test is available, but forecasting with the LBS model stopped 
and in annual forecasting post-mortem contests the NIESR came top in two years, LPM 
in three. Thus we would suggest that LPM has a respectable forecasting record, at least 
on a par with the only other model available of the general type we seek — viz. micro­
founded and suitably estimated. Comparative work on the NIESR model would also be 
of interest; so far it has not been possible. There are also models in the public sector — 
those of the Treasury and the Bank of England — but they are not easily accessible as 
yet with the required back-up of micro-foundations and forecasting record.
Lastly, in respect of simulation properties and use of these for policy analysis, we note 
that LPM has been extensively used in policy analysis in support of the ‘monetarist’ and 
‘supply-side’ reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, which are generally considered to have been 
broadly successful. We therefore suggest that the LPM could be regarded as a suitable 
vehicle for checking the ‘realism’ of the policy conclusions we will initially derive from 
CM.
In order to clarify the two models’ structures we list each of them below opposite the 
categories already used:
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Table 3.1: Structures of Both Models
"R A A/T o n i i a f  m n  n n o ^  T~Equation category R M  equation nos1 LPM  equation nos2
Labour supply/w age contract A l, A4, A5 B8
Labour demand A7 B5
Production function, cost equations A3 B9
IS curve A6 B14
Investment A2 B22, B6
Consumption
(= M t_ i / p t via  
no-credit constraint)
B7
Other none B l, B19
Money Demand and supply A10, A9, A8
B4, exog money 
supply eq, B l l ,  B12, B13
Open economy: n.a.
Capital Account (UIP) BIO
Current account B2, B3
2Full listing in 3.B
3.4 Targeting W ithin a Calibrated M odel (CM):
The CM model can be organised most simply in terms of aggregate supply (shifted by the 
productivity shock, <p) and aggregate demand (shifted by the money supply shock, m). 
Monetary targeting then moves planned next period’s m  so as to produce the target price 
or money in that period; however the actual m  is then delivered with a random error. 
To do this one solves out for the money supply (equation A10) needed next period to hit 
the target in the absence of a shock and fixes it to that level. Then a shock is added to 
the resulting money supply and the model is solved with that shock and the shock from 
productivity. For the interest-rate-control regime the money supply shock is implicitly 
forced to be whatever reaction of money would keep interest rates at their planned setting. 
The planned setting is worked out in a similar way as with the targeting regimes, so the 
interest rate is solved to give the target value next period. The model’s behaviour in 
response to the two shocks is standard. The key innovation in the model is the finding 
that from society’s viewpoint reducing indexation improves the economy’s stability in
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the face of supply shocks because it both flattens the AS (Phillips Curve) and steepens 
the AD curve, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. The indexation response depends in 
turn on the persistence of the two shocks (Minford et al, 2003): this is in contrast to 
the usual Fischer-Gray result which depends on the size of the shock variances. The 
reason persistence matters is that indexation is spent with a delay (from the cash-in- 
advance lag); hence in the presence of temporary shocks to prices it does not pay to index 
wages because the shock effect on consumption only lasts one period and indexation will 
produce extra consumption in the following period, which adds to the overall variance of 
consumption. On the other hand if shocks persist, the indexation payment will offset the 
effects on consumption that persist beyond the first period; hence indexation becomes 
desirable. Rising indexation steepens the Phillips Curve in a well-known way, in that 
price surprises now clearly will induce (after period 1) less of an effect on real wages and 
hence on employment and output. It also flattens the Aggregate Demand curve because 
the greater responsiveness of wages to prices implies that, given the fixed available money 
supply (which is required by employers and the government to pay the bill for wages and 
unemployment benefits), rising prices induces a greater reduction in employment.
The resulting intersections for a supply shock as shown at A (high indexation) and 
B (low indexation). Thus the drop in indexation is stabilising to both employment and 
prices in the face of a supply shock. Of course for a money (demand) shock the result is 
greater employment instability, though probably less price instability; however money is 
a policy-controlled variable and if the policy error in setting it can be kept within limits 
then supply shocks will matter most.
Though the focus in this paper is on the separate welfares of our two groups, it is useful 
in the discussion to refer also to aggregate measures; for example when both groups gain 
it is helpful to measure by how much on average — arbitrary as that average of course 
must be, it is like an index. For this purpose we use two measures. The first, Welfare #1, 
is the standard measure used in representative agent models, the Constant Relative Risk
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AS  (High Indexation)
X  AD (High 
Indexation)
A S  (Low 
Indexation)
AD (Low Indexation) [m,]
 ►
Employment
Figure 3.1: The effect of reduced indexation on slopes of AS  and AD curves [<pt = 
productivity shock; m t = monetary shock]
Aversion utility function with Cobb-Douglas preferences across consumption and leisure:
v = 0.7, based on the marginal valuation of leisure at wages net of unemployment benefit. 
Because households get unemployment benefit on their spells of eligible unemployment,
set at unity, is the ineligible part of leisure) in response to the differential between wages 
and benefits. But then of course they must pay for the benefit burden via taxes; the 
present discounted value of this tax burden is the same as this benefit bill and so we 
deduct this from their consumption to obtain total private utility.
The second measure, Welfare #2, is simply the inverse of a weighted average of the two
where
Ct = -------(1 -  a*_i); A = 1
Pt
implying that leisure time is equal to working time when unemployment at is zero. We set
at, this implies that their choice is distorted; they choose leisure (I, which we in practice
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variances, of consumption and unemployment, with similar weights, 0.7 for consumption 
and 0.3 for unemployment.
We examine the relative merits of various forms of monetary targeting. The main 
current targeting choice of central banks is inflation targeting; we therefore make this 
the benchmark regime against which to measure alternatives. The first with which we 
compare it is price-level targeting. A target rule chooses a money supply for next period 
that forces the expected inflation, or price-level respectively, to be on target in this next 
period; this money supply plan is however executed with an error, the model’s ‘monetary 
shock’ (which can in practice be interpreted as a shock on either the supply or demand side 
of the money market; it is the model’s demand shock). There is thus no current response 
of money supply to shocks; nor any implied interest rate smoothing in the current period 
— we defer such issues to the next section.
Our results can be summarised simply. Inflation-targeting generates a high degree of 
indexation. When price-level targeting is undertaken but indexation is assumed constant, 
welfare falls, because the variability of unemployment rises sharply. But when indexation 
is allowed to change endogenously, it drops to nil and the result is a rise in welfare, with the 
variance of consumption down markedly and that of unemployment down substantially.
What we notice in Table 3.2 comparing inflation and price-level targeting is that 
both variances fall as we move to price-level targeting, once allowance is made for the 
endogenous response of indexation. This response eliminates indexation which means 
that the Phillips Curve flattens causing unemployment to respond little to the current 
productivity shock.
However, it is worth noticing that if indexation for some reason does not respond, 
then there is a marked difference in the two variances: unemployment variance shoots up 
while consumption variance falls on the move to price targeting (naturally as real wages 
are smoother with the price level being held to its expected trajectory). Hence what 
we see from Table 3.2 that CM’s properties are very much in line with the usual views
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Table 3.2: Price-level and inflation targeting in CM
standard error in parenthesis+
Inflat ion-target = 100 Indexation
(%)
Welfare 
#1 #2
Var
(cons.)
Var
(unemp.)
Inflation-targeting 71 100 100 100 100
(3) (3) (3)
Price-level targeting 71 98 96 99 119**
(holding indexation fixed)
Price-level targeting 0 102 125 96 69**
(indexation endogenous)
+standard error of Montecarlo sample variance =  est. variance X y  (^ )  where n  
is the number of replications (here 2000) — source Wallis, 1995
Definition: #1  is the standard CRRA formula in the text; # 2  is the weighted average 
(weight on consumption, of employed = 0.7, on unemployment =  1.0;the latter weight includes . 
the effect of unemployment on consumption) of the two (inverted) variances 
* significant at 10% level;** significant at 1% level
of macroeconomists under the usual assumption that indexation is constant: viz. that 
targeting the price level would destabilise employment and output, even if the stability 
of prices would indeed yield benefits to those with long term, nominal, or partly nominal, 
contracts, as here exemplified by workers with wage contracts that are not fully indexed. 
(The details of how CM generates this result are unravelled to a reasonable extent in 3.C, 
using a simplified linear version of CM).
Of course the endogenous response of indexation should occur; but it could take some 
time to occur (especially if the shift of regime is not at all clearly communicated). What 
we are seeing here therefore is a potential conflict of interest between the skilled and 
unskilled groups. The skilled welcome price targeting because it smooths consumption; 
the unskilled do not because it worsens employment variability.
Money targeting is not helpful to real wage smoothing; the reason is that unlike price 
level targeting it does not remove the persistent effect on prices (and so on real wages) 
of the productivity shock (in fact when indexation remains fixed it slightly increases the 
effect of productivity persistence on the real wage). But it does reduce the variance of 
unemployment even when there is no response of indexation, as can be see in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Money-level and Money-growth targeting in CM
standard error in parenthesis"*"
Inflat ion-target = 100 Indexation
(%)
Welfare
#1 #2
Var
(cons.)
Var
(unemp.)
Money-growth-targeting 
(=inflation targeting 
in this model)
71 100 100
(3)
100
(3)
100
(3)
Money-level targeting 
(holding indexation fixed)
71 100.6 102.8 102 94**
Money-level targeting 
(indexation endogenous)
37 104 135** 100 56**
"'’standard error of Montecarlo sample variance =  est. variance X y  (^ )  where n 
is the number of replications (here 2000) — source Wallis, 1995
Definition: #1  is the standard CRRA formula in the text; # 2  is the weighted average 
(weight on consumption, of employed =  0.7, on unemployment =  1.0;the latter weight includes . 
the effect of unemployment on consumption) of the two (inverted) variances 
* significant at 5% level;** significant at 1% level
The reason is that the persistence in the money supply shock is eliminated and hence the 
aggregate demand curve is less variable. As indexation falls and the Phillips Curve flattens 
this effect becomes more important. Also the effect of productivity shocks is dampened 
on both employment and prices. Hence the additional move to lower indexation makes 
the money-level rule more stabilising, just as it did with the price-level rule.
If we look at the two policies from the viewpoint of average welfare, then we find that 
money targeting is superior before indexation has adjusted — confirming the majority 
macroeconomist viewpoint that price targeting is too rigid in driving prices back to their 
target track. Money targeting however is flexible enough to deliver some benefit over­
all compared with inflation targeting; it slightly destabilises consumption but markedly 
stabilises employment. After indexation has adjusted, it turns out that the two policies 
deliver rather similar improvements in general welfare.
But we also need to compare money with price level targeting from the viewpoint 
of different agents. First, we see that under conditions where indexation has not yet 
changed, money targeting is preferred by unskilled workers, whereas price targeting is
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preferred by skilled workers. Second, even once indexation has changed, money targeting 
is still preferred by the unskilled, while price targeting is still preferred by the skilled. The 
fact that money targeting is better liked by those most vulnerable to the economic cycle 
underlines its ‘compromise status’ between pure price stabilisation and pure employment 
stabilisation; in line with this it induces the elimination of only half the indexation we 
start off with under inflation targeting.
3.5 Targeting W ithin the Liverpool Forecasting Model 
of the UK (LPM)
As part of our robustness check, we now turn to LPM. Our method is as with CM to 
run our monetary rules in LPM under stochastic simulation. We shock the full range 
of endogenous and exogenous errors, exactly as in the model specification. We adopt 
the same expressions to evaluate welfare, the only difference being that in LPM we use 
non-durable consumption in place of total consumption, since LPM has no measure of 
the latter (in it durable consumption is included with other investment). The model’s 
wage equation is written in terms of the real wage reacting to the real benefit rate and 
to unemployment, which are the auction wage components (implicitly the auction wage 
element has a weight of 0.2), and negatively to the difference of the price level from the 
average forecast of it at the times of wage contracting, then positively to this difference 
lagged.
For our purposes here we adapt it as follows:
W t  =  v P t + w E t - j P t  + & ( P t )  + v u * . ..  = (a + v ) ( P t  ~  P t - j P t )  + E t - j P t  + w*...
Now we lag the auction and indexed elements two periods because of a delay due to the 
firm’s internal checking procedures in adjusting pay to the unexpected change in the price
112
level and obtain the real wage as:
W t — P t  — ~ { P t  ~  E t - j P t ) + + v ) ( P t ~ 2  — E t - j - 2 P t - 2 ) + «/*...
Hence the two-period-lagged term carries the extent of real wage protection. It is this 
part that is adjusted endogenously by the employed to minimise the variance of their real 
wage.
The results within LPM are about as favourable to price-level targeting as in the 
calibrated model. Again, they show that under inflation-targeting there is a high degree 
of indexation and that this would drop to nil under price-level targeting. Similarly, too, 
they show that if indexation is assumed endogenous, welfare will rise significantly if price- 
level targeting is introduced; in LPM the variance of consumption falls more and that of 
unemployment falls less than in the calibrated model but both fall significantly.
However there is a crucial difference: when indexation is held fixed, the variances 
behave very much the same in LPM as when indexation is endogenous. There is still a 
substantial gain over inflation targeting, revealing that the mechanisms at work cannot be 
the ones in CM, whereby the Aggregate Demand and Supply curves’ slopes are changed 
by indexation.
The first reason appears to be that the great improvement in stability both for con­
sumption and unemployment between rows 1 and 2 comes about because price-level tar­
geting greatly reduces the variability of private wealth (it reduces the variance of wealth 
by 8%, regardless of the degree of indexation): price-level targeting makes the real price of 
bonds more stable because it makes the variability of the price level so much smaller (thus 
future bond prices are set in nominal terms by the nominal rate of interest which in turn 
depends on the real rate plus the expected rate of inflation; but future real bond prices 
are additionally dependent on the future price level). In LPM private wealth has strong 
demand effects on private consumption and investment; thus dampening its variability
113
Table 3.4: Inflation and price-level targeting in LPM
standard error in parenthesis"1- 
Inflat ion-target =  100 Indexation
(%)
Welfare
#1 #2
Var
(cons.)
Var
(unemp.)
Inflation-targeting 80 100 100 100 100
(1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
Price-level targeting 80 102.3 119** 81** 90**
(holding indexation fixed)
Price-level targeting 0 102.4 120** 81** 89**
(indexation endogenous)
+ standard error of Montecarlo sample variance =  est. variance X •» /  (^ )  where n
is the number of replications (here 183) — source Wallis, 1995
Definition: # 1  is the standard CRRA formula in the text; # 2  is the weighted average 
(weight on consumption, inch unemployed’s = 0.7, on unemployment = 0.3) 
of the two (inverted) variances.
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level
dampens an important demand shock. We can demonstrate this by redoing the stochastic 
simulations without wealth effects; we find that under price level targeting with the same 
80% indexation as inflation targeting the variance of consumption is 10.2% higher than 
under inflation targeting and the variance of unemployment 6.2% higher, very much in 
line with the familiar macroeconomists’ intuition that having to reverse inflation shocks 
subsequently to hit a price level target is destabilising to the economy. In LPM this intu­
ition is overridden by the destabilising wealth effects of prices, which price level targeting 
reduces.
Second, the indexation mechanism in LPM does indeed work (a little) to dampen the 
effects of supply shocks which are the main source of shocks in LPM; thus if we simulate 
the price-level target regime with 80% indexation and then again with zero indexation for 
supply shocks only, we find that the zero indexation reduces the variance of consumption 
by 2% and that of unemployment by 1%. But this plainly is not a powerful effect. (For 
demand shocks too the move to indexation is slightly favourable — comparing zero with 
80% indexation there is no difference for consumption variance and a 2.5% reduction in
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unemployment variance. But within LPM, demand shocks also have a ‘supply’ element 
because via the exchange rate effect they enter the Phillips Curve so the sharp distinction 
of CM is not present). Thus in effect indexation as such (the difference between rows 2 
and 3 for Table 3.4) has very little effect within LPM — confirming that LPM is a model 
very much at the ‘New Classical’ end of the spectrum, that is with little effect of nominal 
rigidity. It does however have powerful wealth effects (notably of government bonds), 
thus it is highly ‘non-Ricardian’, that is it does not exhibit Ricardian equivalence under 
which a bond-financed tax cut would raise savings by the tax cut, leaving consumption 
unchanged.
In sum what the Liverpool Model shows pre-eminently is the importance of wealth 
shocks to demand and the way in which price-level targeting helps to make the economy 
more stable by dampening these.
When we turn to a comparison of money targeting with price targeting, we find that 
money targeting relatively stabilises nominal and real interest rates, real investment and 
total wealth, but it relatively destabilises prices and inflation and hence the real value 
of financial wealth (nominal bonds). From Table 3.5 we see that the variance of un­
employment and output rise as we switch from price- to money-targeting while that of 
consumption falls. The key to these differences lies in the behaviour of the expected future 
price level which in an IS/LM framework enters the IS curve in terms of its percentage 
difference from the current price level. Under price-level targeting expected future prices 
do not move whereas under money-level targeting they are positively correlated with cur­
rent prices because any permanent supply shock will continue to affect prices in the same 
direction in the next period. Hence under money-targeting expected inflation varies less 
which disturbs the IS curve less. This reduced IS variability under money-targeting im­
plies less interest rate variability, real and nominal too; and also less variability in the 
real capital stock. However, this also leads to a reduction in real exchange rate variability 
via uncovered interest parity; this means less dampening of net trade volume variabil­
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ity (consider a rise in world trade, the main such source of variance; under money-level 
targeting, it shifts IS less rightwards, generating less of a rise in real interest rates and 
so in the real exchange rate which would counteract the rise in net trade). Thus of the 
three exogenous sources of output demand variability, consumption’s and investment’s 
fall because of reduced interest rate and wealth volatility but net trade’s goes up by more, 
as does thus also output and employment volatility rise.
Aggregate welfare under price- and money-targeting are roughly the same. However 
when we turn to the welfare of the two groups, we find that under LPM the preference 
ordering of both between price and money level targeting is reversed compared with CM: 
now the employed/skilled prefer money targeting while the unemployed/unskilled prefer 
price targeting.
Table 3.5: Inflation-, price- and money-targeting in LPM
standard error in parenthesis*
Inflation-target = 100 Indexation Welfare Var Var
(%) # 1  # 2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Price-level-targeting 0 102.4 120** 00
 h—4 * * 89**
(indexation endogenous)
Money-level-targeting 40 102.7  122** 68** 97*
(indexation endogenous)
+ standard error of Montecarlo sample variance =  est. variance X y  (^ ) where n 
is the number of replications (here 183) — source Wallis, 1995
Definition: # 1  is the standard CRRA formula in the text; # 2  is the weighted average 
(weight on consumption, inch unemployed’s =  0.7, on unemployment =  0.3) 
of the two (inverted) variances.
* significant at 5% level ** significant at 1% level
Contrasting LPM with CM, we find that the major role of wealth effects in LPM, 
entirely absent in CM, gives a rather different perspective on monetary rules. In LPM 
the endogeneity of wage contracting is of little importance; even if it does change one 
transmission mechanism, it is minor in its overall impact on variances. Instead we find 
that the key source of macro variability is the variability in nominal variables, themselves 
primarily controlled by monetary policy; when monetary policy increases the stability of
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these nominal variables, the macro economy too is less variable.
3.6 Should Interest Rates or the M oney Supply be 
Controlled as the Operating Instrument?
We come last to a well-worn issue of monetary policy — whether monetary policy should 
control (i.e. keep fixed) interest rates in the very short run, operating, period (of say a 
month ahead) or should control the money supply. The seminal work of Poole (1970) 
noted that the answer depended, within the IS/LM model, on the relative variances of 
the IS and LM shock. The issue is how stable the Aggregate Demand curve can be kept 
in response to the ‘nuisance’ shocks in the IS and LM curves. Instability in the AD curve 
will spill over into prices and output and so into the welfare function used here.
We can analyse both CM and LPM in these terms. Notice that because the IS curve 
responds to (Etpt+1 —pt) it potentially matters which targeting regime is being followed: 
thus under inflation targeting (Etpt+i — Pt) will not move whereas under price-level tar­
geting Etpt+1 will not move so that (Etpt+i —pt) moves by the full amount of —pt. Under 
money-level targeting (Etpt+i —pt) moves by less than this amount because Etpt+i will vary 
directly with but less than pt. So each targeting regime must be considered separately.
3.6.1 Interest-R ate-C ontrol W ithin  CM
Within CM, an important feature is a very flat IS curve. This can be seen from the large 
size of the parameter on the real interest rate in equation A2 (for the capital stock). In 
linearised form this equation (see 3.C) is:
K t = 1.11 {
k( 1 -  fi)(l -  T0)
ro
(dt - n
To
(A2)
The relevant parameter is therefore —1.11 j T°^  j | [ ^ ] |  Notice the denomina-
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tor is ( ^ )2 which is a very large number owing to the small size of r, the real interest 
rate, whose units are fractions per period. Now note that rt = Rt — (Etpt+i — Pt)-
Rt
R IRC
IS  (E*p*+i -  pt)
Pt
AS
AD  under MSC
AD  under IRC
Figure 3.2: The Poole set-up illustrated for CM under inflation-targeting; MSC= money 
supply control, IRC= interest rate control.
Under the inflation targeting regime, which we consider first, (Etpt+i — Pt) is kept at 
the target level by the monetary rule. This implies that fixing nominal interest rates, R t, 
will also fix real interest rates, rt. Also movements in the price level will not shift the 
IS curve. Thus the Aggregate Demand Curve will slope vertically under inflation target­
ing and interest-rate control (IRC). Figure 3.2 illustrates CM under inflation targeting. 
However under money supply control (MSC) the AD curve will slope normally because 
the LM curve will react to prices. Finally we note that the IS curve is shifted in CM by 
productivity shocks in a real business cycle manner, since investment reacts sharply to
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productivity prospects.
IRC implies that IS curve shocks are unaffected by movements in prices because these 
are offset by equal movements in future prices; nevertheless the IS curve is so flat that 
only a very small interest rate change is produced and thus effectively the IS barely shifts 
at given interest rates; thus shifts in the AD curve are very small. By contrast with MSC 
the LM curve shifts with random movements in money supply which introduces larger 
shocks to the economy. In Poolean terms, here shocks to the money supply dominate IS 
shocks in their impact on the economy. Table 3.6 below shows IRC or MSC under CM 
with inflation targeting.
Table 3.6: IRC or MSC under CMwith inflation targeting
standard error in parenthesis4- 
Index: Money =  100 Indxtn Welfare
#1 #2
Var
(cons.)
Var
(unemp.)
Money Supply Control, MSC 71 100 100 100 100
(3) (3) (3)
Interest Rate Control, IRC 71 101.5 107.4* 96 91
+ standard error of Montecarlo sample variance =  est. variance X i  /  where n
is the number of replications (here 2000) — source Wallis, 1995
Definition: # 1  is the standard CRRA formula in the text; # 2  is the weighted average 
(weight on consumption, of employed =  0.7, on unemployment =  1.0;the latter weight includes . 
the effect of unemployment on consumption) of the two (inverted) variances 
* significant at 5% level;** significant at 1% level
When the monetary rule is a price-level one, Etpt+i is now fixed; thus any movement 
in pt represents an equal movement in the real interest rate with a very large effect shifting 
the IS curve. Thus the AD curve here is very flat mirroring this effect of prices on the IS 
curve. Now IS curve shocks, combined with a flat AS curve because of zero indexation, 
will produce large swings in output but prices will be heavily stabilised (as they must be 
to keep the real, and so the nominal, interest rate constant). Hence IS shocks dominate in 
the Poole sense. Table 3 .7  below reveals that the variance of unemployment rises markedly 
while price variability falls, stabilising the real wage and so consumption. Overall welfare 
is reduced, as is that of the unskilled while that of the skilled rises.
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Table 3.7: IRC or MSC under CMwith price-level targeting
standard error in parenthesis'*"
Index: Money =  100 Indxtn Welfare Var Var
#1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Money Supply Control, MSC 92 100 100 100 100
(3) (3) (3)
Interest Rate Control, IRC 92 100.1 97 98 107**
* significant at 5% level;** significant at 1% level
Essentially the same occurs under money-level targeting — Table 3.8. The main 
difference from price-level targeting is that now expected future prices only change with 
productivity shocks; under IRC money shocks have no effect and so only productivity 
shocks matter. These, being entirely permanent, induce far greater persistence in prices 
and so far greater indexation, which in turn sharply increases the effect of productivity 
shocks on output and employment.
Table 3.8: IRC or MSC under CMwith money-level targeting
standard error in parenthesis"*" 
Index: Money =  100 Indxtn Welfare
#1 #2
Var
(cons.)
Var
(unemp.)
Money Supply Control, MSC 37 100 100 100 100
(3) (3) (3)
Interest Rate Control, IRC 78 99.3 68** 95 b-± 00 to « *
+ standard error of Montecarlo sample variance =  est. variance X y  (^) where n 
is the number of replications (here 2000) — source Wallis, 1995
Definition: # 1  is the standard CRRA formula in the text; # 2  is the weighted average 
(weight on consumption, of employed = 0.7, on unemployment =  l.Ojthe latter weight includes . 
the effect of unemployment on consumption) of the two (inverted) variances 
* significant at 5% level;** significant at 1% level
Summarising, we could say that interest rate control also controls prices more. This 
is good for the skilled, smoothing their real wages. But it destabilises employment and 
output, which is bad for the unskilled on the margins of the labour market.
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3.6.2 Interest-R ate-C ontrol in LPM
The interpretation of LPM results in Poolean terms is similar, except that it has a more 
standard IS curve with a much more modest interest-rate elasticity, simply because it 
does not have the fierce real business cycle reaction of CM but rather a looser stock- 
adjustment reaction of the investment to demand and monetary conditions. Hence LPM 
is less sensitive to whether the monetary rule is for inflation or price-level targeting. 
Within LPM IS shocks have a higher variance than LM shocks (remembering the model 
uses the monetary base rather than any wider definition of money, because of the concern 
with financial deregulation). It follows in the standard manner of Poole that there will 
be greater AD instability which will also show up in greater instability of output and 
prices (and so of both real wages and financial wealth). However the model tends to 
stabilise consumption since price and output rises are positively correlated; thus a rise in 
output lowers financial wealth, with the effects of the latter on consumption more than 
offsetting those of output. This is the pattern that shows up in the simulations of Interest 
Rate Control below; unemployment, output and price variability all rise but consumption 
variability falls.
Table 3.9: IRC or MSC under LPM with inflation targeting
standard error in parenthesis+ 
Index: MSSetting =  100 Index Welfare
#1 #2
Var
(cons.)
Var
(unemp.)
Money Supply Setting 80 100 100 100 100
(1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
Interest Rate setting 80 100.8 100.3 97' 106**
+ standard error of Montecarlo sample variance =  est. variance X v ( I ) where n  
is the number of replications (here 164; note lesser number because some runs 
would not solve under both MSC and IRC) — source Wallis, 1995 Definition: # 1  is 
the standard CRRA formula in the text; # 2  is the weighted average(weight on consumption, 
inch unemployed’s =  0.7, on unemployment =  0.3) of the two (inverted) variances.
* significant at 5% level** significant at 1% level
The one exception to this is the case of money-supply-targeting, where LM shocks
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Table 3.10: IRC or MSC under LPM with price-level targeting
standard error in parenthesis'1"
Index: MSSetting =  100 Index Welfare Var Var
#1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Money Supply Setting 0 100 100 100 100
(1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
Interest Rate setting 0 99.8 98.8 100 104**
+ standard error of Montecarlo sample variance =  est. variance X W (^ ) where n
is the number of replications (here 164; note lesser number because some runs 
would not solve under both MSC and IRC) — source Wallis, 1995 Definition: #1  is 
the standard CRRA formula in the text; # 2  is the weighted aver age (weight on consumption, 
inch unemployed’s =  0.7, on unemployment =  0.3) of the two (inverted) variances.
* significant at 5% level** significant at 1% level
have a higher variance than IS shocks. In this case when the money supply is ‘controlled’ 
any independent growth rate of the money supply above its target rate is immediately 
followed by a growth rate below the target by an equal amount; this variability appears 
to dominate that from the IS shocks. Hence here output and unemployment are more 
variable under Money Supply Control, while consumption is less variable because of the 
same mechanism as above.
Table 3.11: IRC or MSC under LPM with money-level targeting
standard error in parenthesis* 
Index: MSSetting =  100 Index Welfare
#1 #2
Var
(cons.)
Var
(unemp.)
Money Supply Setting 40 100 100 100 100
(1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
Interest Rate setting 40 95.4** 93.0** 112** 97*
+ standard error of Montecarlo sample variance =  est. variance X  y  (^ ) where n 
is the number of sample observations (here 10824; note lesser number because some runs 
would not solve under both MSC and IRC) — source Wallis, 1995 Definition: #1  is 
the standard CRRA formula in the text; # 2  is the weighted average (weight on consumption, 
inch unemployed’s =  0.7, on unemployment =  0.3) of the two (inverted) variances.
* significant at 5% level** significant at 1% level
When we review the effects on different groups we find that the effect on each group 
depends on whether the target regime is price/inflation or money-level. The employed
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prefer IRC under the first but MSC under the second, and vice versa for the unemployed. 
This leads finally into a discussion of how we might use these results to guide the choice 
of regime.
3.6.3 R egim e Choices U nder R obustness Criteria:
In robustness studies it is often suggested that one should avoid policies that produce 
extreme bad results in any model (Kilponen and Salmon, 2004). The principle — a 
descendant of Roy’s ‘safety first principle’ — is a way of knocking out a ‘potentially 
dangerous’ policy. In this context we are concerned about heterogeneity both of models 
and of social groups. One can think of this in political terms, from the viewpoint of a 
policy-maker: the two groups represent the two main sets of voters on whom the macro 
economy has effects; while the two models represent the possible spectrum of model 
uncertainties. One can also think of it in welfare terms as a way of seeking to satisfy 
a practical version of the Pareto principle — that there should be no (serious) losers. 
This indicates we should look for regimes that badly affect either group under either 
model, using the existing regime (inflation-targeting under interest-rate-control) as the 
benchmark. Table 3.12 shows all regime/model combinations relative to this benchmark.
It is clear that if we take the safety principle literally, we must rule out all changes 
of regime except one. The price-level regime would raise the variance of unemployment 
sharply under CM if indexation did not adjust or did so very slowly. Similarly money- 
targeting would raise it sharply under CM under interest rate control. Inflation targeting 
if it shifted to money supply control would do the same under CM. This only leaves 
money-targeting under money supply control.
If one is willing to assume that indexation will adjust in the manner predicted by the 
models then one reaches a similar result but by a different argument. Price-level targeting 
would then be disaster-free under both MSC and IRC, while money targeting would 
be disaster-free under MSC. Deciding between these two turns out to depend on which
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Table 3.12: Comparing welfare and variances for various combinations (figures taken from 
sample of 2000 for CMand 10824 for LPM)
Inflation-targeting under interest-rate-control=100
RAM(se=3) LPM(se=1.3)
Inflation P-level M-level Inflation P-level M-level
optim. fix optim. fix
indxn indexn indxn indexn.
Total welfare:
MSC 93 117 83 125 96 100 110 124
IRC 100 114 83 93 93 100 106 115
Var Unem p
MSC 110+ 75 131+ 62 103 94 84 90
IRC 100 81 137+ 113+ 113+ 100 87 88
Var Cons:
MSC 105 100 104 105 107 103 94 77
IRC 100 98 96 99 99 100 97 86
+ denotes extreme bad variance, interpreted as 10% or more over the benchmark.
model one uses: under CM the employed prefer price-targeting with IRC the unemployed 
money-targeting (with MSC) but under LPM the unemployed prefer price-level targeting 
with MSC, the employed money-targeting (with MSC). Hence neither group has a clear 
preference for either regime. One might in these circumstances take the disaster-free 
regime which produces the best average welfare across both models: this (again) is money- 
targeting with MSC.
This regime represents in this context a compromise between price-level targeting and 
inflation targeting, in that price targeting produces too stark a contrast with the existing 
benchmark. It also represents a shift away from interest-rate control to money supply 
control; this occurs because of the switch in targeting regime, in the sense that MSC is 
dangerous under inflation targeting whereas IRC is dangerous under money-targeting for 
reasons discussed earlier to do with the different ways expected inflation is formed. Thus 
we find a ‘back to the future’ result here: monetary policy should revert to money supply 
control under a regime of targeting the path of the money supply.
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3.7 Conclusions
We looked at the operation of monetary rules both within a calibrated model and within 
a ‘live’ forecasting model of the UK, and in both models we distinguished between two 
groups of agents, the (usually) employed and the (often) unemployed, whom we identified 
respectively with skilled and unskilled workers. Our aim was to see how allowing for 
such heterogeneity both in models and in groups could matter for the choice of monetary 
regime. We found that heterogeneity did matter, in the sense that certain model-policy 
combinations could cause harm particularly to the unskilled group and therefore would 
prudently be avoided either from a welfare or a political viewpoint. We concluded that 
targeting the level of the money supply within an operating system of money-supply- 
control is the dominant monetary regime. It is both the only regime that strictly avoids 
a disaster to any group and it is also the one that delivers the highest average welfare 
across both models and groups.
One possible limitation of our results is that we have tackled the modelling issue by 
retaining aggregate functions in the models while identifying group welfare recursively — 
thus the groups may be differently affected, but aggregate behaviour is unaffected by this 
difference.
There are of course other limitations: we have not investigated possible variations in 
policy (for example our targeting has all been assumed to be strict, that is no temporary 
deviations are allowed for in future plans) or in modelling issues (for example money 
velocity is stable, apart from the current random error) or in models (many other models 
can be considered). Thus our results should be considered as preliminary in content and 
methodologically illustrative.
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3.A T he Calibrated M odel (CM )
The model has two exogenous shocks driving it, a monetary (demand) shock, m*, to 
the money supply presumed to originate from monetary policy, and a supply (produc­
tivity) shock, 4>t. The productivity shock is (rather naturally) modelled as a random 
walk throughout. Of course whether the money supply shock is transitory or permanent 
depends on the monetary rule; if it targets for example the level of money it will be 
transitory, if it targets the money supply growth rate, it will be turned into a random 
walk. The authors then asked whether the monetary regime should target the growth 
rate or the level of the money supply; or of prices? They suggested that these choices 
appear in an unfamiliar light when indexation is endogenous. When the monetary regime 
moves to a price level rule with exogenous stationary money supply shocks, the aggregate 
supply curve flattens (as we have seen already above in our Phillips Curve set-up) and 
the aggregate demand curve steepens, generating a high degree of macro stability (i.e. in 
the face of supply shocks) provided that money supply shocks themselves are low-variance 
and stationary.
The representative household is assumed to be entirely liquidity-constrained; this as­
sumption emphasises the importance of the contract choice, since a choice that minimises 
the variance of the spendable real wage is therefore identical with one minimising the vari­
ance of the employed agent’s consumption. In a more realistic model with consumption 
smoothing this motive would have been implemented by including some transactions cost 
on smoothing, thus providing a motive for smoothing the real wage itself; however, this 
involves greater complexity than the stark assumption made that the transactions costs 
are in effect insuperable.
The household is embedded in an environment of profit-maximizing competitive firms 
which on a large proportion of their capital stock face a long lag before installation (a 
simple time-to-build set-up) and a government that levies taxes and pays unemployment 
benefits (which distort households’ leisure decisions and introduce a ‘social welfare’ ele­
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ment into monetary policy). Firms and governments use the financial markets costlessly 
and settle mutual cash demands through index-linked loans; since there is no binding cash 
constraint on these agents, these loans are assumed to be unaffected by the imperfections 
of the price index which are short term in nature. This model is too simplified in many 
ways to match the data of a modern economy whether in trend or dynamics; however its 
focus is purely on the wage contract decision and its simplicity is justified in terms of its 
ability to match the OECD facts about wage contracts.
In calibrating the model the authors chose parameters perceived as plausible for mod­
ern OECD economies. The contract length is set at 4 quarters; the elasticity of leisure 
supply (a) at 3; the share of stocks and other ‘short-term’ capital (k) at 0.3; the average 
life of other capital at 20 quarters; the share of labour income in value-added (//) at 0.7 
(the production function is Cobb-Douglas); the elasticity of the official price index to 
unanticipated inflation (c) at 0.2 (implying that a 1% unexpected rise in inflation would 
result in a 0.2% temporary overstatement of the price level faced by the representative 
consumer). The initial values assume 10% unemployment; a capital-output ratio of 6; an 
average (=marginal) tax rate of 0.10; a real interest rate of 5%.
The government is assumed to smooth both the tax rate and the growth rate of the 
money supply by borrowing (from firms). Nevertheless it cannot avoid noise in its money 
supply setting — the source of this could be its inability to monitor the money supply 
quickly or even at all (for example in the USA the use of dollars by foreigners around the 
world makes it impossible to know what the domestic issue of dollars is).
Money supply raises prices in the long run, and in the short run also raises output, 
with persistence extending up to 15 quarters but with most effect over after 10. In the 
high-indexed case there is less real effect and less persistence than in the high-nominal 
case.
These fairly standard properties stem from the model’s deliberate drawing on elements 
that have been shown by past work to be useful in explaining the business cycle and also
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natural rates as discussed for example by Parkin (1998), though he notes we are still 
some way from building dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that can fully 
explain the business cycle. The elements here include: time-to-build investment, cash-in- 
advance, nominal contracting (as noted above), household liquidity constraints, and (on 
the natural rate side) the influence of unemployment benefits on labour supply. With 
suitable country-by-country calibration one would expect to be able to model OECD 
countries’ business cycle and natural rate experience with at least some modest success.
Minford et al (2003) found that in the face of stationary productivity and money 
supply shocks indexation would be minimal with only a slight tendency to rise as the 
variance of money shocks rose dramatically. However when shocks to either became 
highly persistent indexation to prices or to their close competitor, auction wages, (which 
together we term ‘real wage protection’) become large, becoming largest when both shocks 
are persistent. The reason was that productivity shocks would disturb prices and so the 
real worth of nominal wage contracts; indexation was of little use in remedying this 
disturbance if it was temporary because by the time the indexation element had been 
spent the shock would have disappeared, but with a permanent disturbance indexation 
can help offset it with a lag. If into this already-indexed world of persistent productivity 
shocks, monetary persistence is also injected, indexation rises further, to help alleviate 
the increased disturbance to real wages. This higher indexation also helps to alleviate the 
instability in unemployment which accompanies the greater shock persistence of money 
— the point being that this persistence induces persistence in the economy’s departure 
from its baseline and so disturbs unemployment too for longer.
The authors looked at experience in the OECD in the 1970s where it is well-known that 
real wage protection was substantial; their calibrated model, when estimated variances and 
persistence of money and productivity shocks were fed into it, predicted high protection in 
all countries they could cover, apparently in line with the facts. They also found, contrary 
to much casual comment, that there was little evidence of any diminution of real wage
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protection in the 1990s; the model also predicted as much, for even though the variance 
of money supply shocks fell by then, their persistence remained essentially unchanged.
Al Supply of work
a* = ae - (W tl (b fP t- A))-0 -et
A2 Demand for capital goods
K t = (1 -  *) • (1 -  fjL) • Et- 20 [dt • (1 /R t) • (1 -  Tt)] +
k - ( l - r i - d f ( l - T t) - ( l / r t)
A3 Output function
dt = (j>t • K tl~^ ■ {(1 — at) • N}^
A4 Wage rate, solved for Wt
Wt = (1 -  v -  w) • Wt + v - Et- 4 [Wt/Pt] • Pt + w • Et- 4 [Wt]
A5 Official price index
In(-Pt) =  In (pt) + c • (\n (pt) -  In (Et- i \pt]))
A6 Goods market clearing, solved for rt after substituting for Kt from Eqn.2
dt = M t-i/pt + Kt — Kt~ i
A7 Labour market clearing, solved for pt
N - ( l - a t) = ( p , - d f ( l - T t ) - p t ) / W t
A8 Money market clearing, solved for Wt
Mt = N{Wt • (1 — at) + bt • Pt-4 ■ at}
A9 Efficiency
Rt = Et [/(r)]1/2° -  1 ; f (r)  = I lg , (l +
A10 Money supply
Mt = Mt + mt
A ll Government budget constraint
= (Mt-1 — Mt +  N  • Bt • Pt-A • at — d f  Pt - Tt) /pt + (l +  “y 1) • bf_2
A12 Firm’s budget constraint
d f ( l -  Tt) = K t -  K t-i + (Wt • (1 -  at) ■ N) /pt + ^  ■ (1 +  V )  -  %
Notes: 1. By Walras’s Law the bond market clearing equation, +  bf =  0, is redundant.
2. To normalise the variables d t, K t, rt, Pt and Wt to their base run values constant factors were 
applied to the right-hand sides of the following equations in their solved form: A2 1.11 (multiplicative); 
A3 0.629 (multiplicative); A6 +0.0135 (additive); A7 0.7 (multiplicative); A8 0.9574 (multiplicative).
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3.A .1 Variables and Coefficients for CM  
Endogenous Variables : Base Run Values
at Supply of work 0.10
Kt Demand for capital goods 6.00
dt Output function 1.00
Wt Wage rate 1.00
Pt Official price index 1.00
rt Real interest rate (fraction per annum) 0.05
Pt Price level 1.00
Wt Average wage 1.00
Rt Long term real interest rate (fraction per annum) 0.05
Mt Money supply 1.00
bf Government bonds outstanding 0.00
Firms’ bonds outstanding 0.00
Exogenous Variables : Base Run Values
Bt Benefits 0.60
£t 7V(1.0,0.01) 1.00
4>t N(1.0,0.1) 1.00
W t Money supply target 1.00
m t Money shock 0.00
Tt Tax rate 0.10
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Coefficients 
ac = 0.46
a = 3.00
k = 0.30
/i = 0.70
N = 1.00
c = 0.20
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3.B The Liverpool M odel — Listing of Equations
3.B .1 Behavioural E quations
log(£Gi) =  log (EGSTARt) + >139 log (Y J Y S T A R ,) (Bl)
XVO L, = Am YSTAR,{A27\og(W T,) + .4281og(y() + .447+
>129 {ESTAR, + 0.6 { R X R t -  E ST A R t}} +
A39{XVO L, -  1/ {AiOYSTAR, -  1}}} (B2)
X V A L , = X V A L ,., + {XVOL,  -  X V O L ,_4} +  >131
{0.32YSTAR,{RXR, -  R X R ,.,  -  E STA R, + E ST A R , . 4}}+ 
>t32XVAZ,res,_, (B3)
log(MOi) =  >144 +  A131og(M0(_i) + >114{log(y()+
log(1 -  T A X ,.,)}  + AW TREN D , + A17NRS, + >118lMTt (B4)
log (Ut) — A42 +  >13 log(yt) +  A4{\og(RW,) +  log{1.0 + BOt)A
log(1.0 +  VAT,)} + A5TREN D , + A61og(U,.,) + A 3 6 U r e s (B5) 
log(Gi) =  A45 + A19RL, + >120{log(G1_1) -  log(F/jVt_,)}+
>121{log(G(_i) — log(Gf — 2)} +  log(Gt_i) (B6)
log(CCWt) = A m  + A22RL, +  i4231og(Wt) +  A24QEXP,+
A25log(CONt-i)  (B7)
log (RW,) =  >143 +  A7UNR, + A8{log(UB,) + log(1.0 + LO,)}+
A9\og(U,) + A37\og(RW,-,) + {.095}<7jVfl({->110}+
A101og(W,_2) +  A ll  ETA, + A12ETA,., (B8)
R X R , =  A41 + 0.000 +  >ll{log(iJiyt) +  log(1.0 +  BO,)}+
/453{log(Pt) -  log(P,_4)} + {1. + >11} log(l. +  VAT,)+
A2TREND , + A33RX Rres,., (B9)
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3.B .2  Identities and C alibrated R elationships
R S ,  = { R X R t -  E , R X R , + 1 }  + R S U S t 
N R S t =  E , I N F L , + ,  +  R S t  
R L t = { R X R t -  E , R X R t + 2 o } / 5.0 + R L U S , )
NRL, =  RLt + Et f J 2  IV F L t+i/5
Y, = GINVt + CONt + EG, + X V O L, -  AFC,
I N F L ,  = log(MCWi) -  log(MCW,_4) -  log(MOj)
+ log(M0t_4) 
log(Pt) =  log(P,_4) +  I NFLt  
Wt = FIN,  + G,
BDEF, = EG, -  2.0 x TAX,  x Y , +  T A X 0 x Y0 
AFC, =  y({0.6588318{^PCt_i/y ,_ ,} +  0.1966416{4PCt_3/y 1-3}+ 
0.1454006{^PC(_4/y ,_ 4}+ }
P S B R ,  = B D E F ,  +  R D I ,
RDI, =  —.5{N R L ,.,/4 .0] F I N ,. ,{ { { P t /Pj-j}0'66} -  1.0}+ 
PSBR,{.32{NRS,/4.0} + .5{NRL,/4.0}}+
0.32[ N R S , / A . } F I N t - i  -  . 3 2 { N R S , - , / 4 . } F I N , . ,  +  R D I , . ,  
G I N V ,  =  G , ~  G ,.j + A38G,_i 
F I N ,  = E G ,  - Y ,*  { T A X , }  + X V A L ,  +  454 *  F I N , . , +
{1. -  454} * { F I N , . ,  *  { { P , - , / P , } o m } }
{1.0 -  0.155 * { {N R L ,/N R L ,.,)  -  1.0}} + res_F IN , + RDI,
(BIO)
(BH)
(B12)
(B13)
(B14)
(B15)
(B16)
(B17)
(B18)
(B19)
(B20)
(B21)
(B22)
(B23)
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3.B .3 Equilibrium  Variables (-star):
The -star variables YSTAR, USTAR, ESTAR and WSTAR are the equilibrium values 
of Y, U, RXR and RW respectively, found by solving equations 2,5,8 and 9 under the 
conditions that XVOL=0 and exogenous variables maintain their current values; EGSTAR 
is the value of EG that would produce a constant debt/GDP ratio with Y—YSTAR.
3.B .4  Coefficient Values in Order A l—56:
1.528 -0.003 -2.150 0.792 0.010 0.804 0.470 0.210 -0.018 -0.224 
-0.290 0.189 0.870 0.150 0.000 -0.002 -0.349 0.839 -0.016 -0.004
0.640 -0.215 0.056 0.153 0.870 0.000 0.529 -1.205 -0.388 0.429
0.103 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.931 0.271 1.000 0.012 -0.125 0.320 
0.170 25.262 0.102 -0.337 0.013 0.666 11.503 -0.016 -0.011 0.017
0.011 0.750 -0.750 0.300 -1.000 -1.000
(Exogenous variables — e = error term)
RSUSt = c + O.S99RSUSt-i  + et 
EUNRSt = c +  0.977EUNRSt-i  + et 
A log WTt = c + et 
ABOt — c &i
AVATt = c -  0.286AVATt-i  +  e*
A UNRt = c + 0.869 AU N Rt-i  + et 
A U Bt = c &t 
ALOt — c &t
AT A X t = c -  0.365ATAYt_i + et 
A log E U R X R t = c +  0.235A log E U R X R t-\  + et 
A log EUCPIt = c + 0.503A log EUCPI t_ i  + et
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A log M ONt = P E Q t + M TE M ,  +  e,
3.B .5 M odel N ota tion :
Endogenous V ariab les
Y GDP at factor cost
P Consumer Price Level
INFL Percentage growth rate of P (year-on-year)
MON Nominal Money Stock (MO)
RW Real wages (Average Earnings/Price)
U Unemployment
Q Output deviation from trend (Y/YSTAR)
AFC Adjustment to factor cost
EG real government spending on goods and services
BDEF interest-exclusive budget deficit (deflated by CPI)
PSBR public sector borrowing requirement (deflated by CPI)
XVAL real current account of balance of payments
XVOL same, at constant terms of trade
RS(RL) real short term (log term) interest rate
NRS (NRL) nominal short term (long term) interest rate
MO real money balances (MO)
G real private stock of durable goods, including inventories
W real private stock of wealth
FIN real private stock of financial assets (net)
CON real private non-durable consumption
RXR real exchange rate (relative CPI, UK v. ROW)
RDI real debt interest
GINV gross private investment in durables plus stock building
Exogenous V ariab les
MTEM Temporary growth of money supply
PEQ Growth of money supply
BO Employers national insurance contributions
UNR Trade Unionisation rate
LO Average amount lost in taxes and national insurance
TREND Time trend
WT World Trade
TAX Overall tax rate
UB Unemployment benefit rate (in constant pounds)
EUNRS Euro nominal short-term interest rates
EURXR Euro real exchange rate index
EUCPI Euro CPI
RSUS US real short-term interest rate
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3.C Targeting Rules and Their Effects W ithin CM
To examine how targeting works within the CM which though small is nevertheless non­
linear and not analysable therefore in its original form (hence our use of stochastic sim­
ulations to discover its properties), it is necessary to linearise the model and simplify it 
into a form where we can derive its key analytical properties. The following lists the 
linearised equations (the numbering corresponds to that of the full model of 3.A). The 
numbers shown are the effect of the normalising constants referred to in 3.A. In order 
the equations are: (1) marginal labour supply which reacts to the auction wage; (2) the 
demand for capital; (3) the production function; (4) the actual nominal wage, a weighted 
average of auction (weight of a), indexed (weight of v), and nominal.; (5) the over-reaction 
of the official price index to the true price index; (6) goods market-clearing; (7) labour 
market-clearing; (8) money market-clearing.; and (9) the real spendable wage (wages are 
paid with a 1-period lag so the real spendable wage is the lagged one, deflated by the 
current price level).
at = —a0aWt (3.C.1)
K, =  1.111k{1 ~ ~ ^ 1} {(rf, -  [ft j (3.C.2)
+ (3.C.3)
Wt = aW, + vPt (3.C.4)
Pt = ( 1 + c)pt (3.C.5)
dt =  «»,_! —pt + Kt — K t-1 (3.C.6)
at =  ~ 1/X(p ~ r,,)l (d, + P t - W t) (3.C.7)
mt =  {lr l o)Wt -  ~ B0)  at (3.C.8)
0.96 V0-96
Wt-i — Pt = otWt-\  +  v (1 + c)pt- 1 -  Pt (3.C.9)
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where a = (1 — v — w) ; equation numbers correspond to 3.A.
For simplicity we have omitted all price and wage expectations from the wage-setting 
equation, (5); these are all dated at t-4. Similarly from the labour supply equation, (1), 
we omit the 4-quarter lagged price level which indexes unemployment benefits. Hence in 
effect the model solves in terms of the news occurring between t-4 and t, and in the case 
of (9), the real wage available for spending, because wages are paid with a 1-period lag, 
news between t-5 and t. The very long lag (20 quarters) terms determining the demand 
for capital are similarly omitted. We now explain the model’s structure in terms of supply 
and demand.
Equation (3.C.9) is the implied behaviour of the employed consumer’s living standard, 
whose uncertainty is being minimised by the contract structure. We can progressively 
reduce the simultaneous block of equations (3.C.1)-(3.C.8) to three as follows. We can 
use equation (3.C.3), the production function, and (3.C.6), the supply of savings from 
goods market clearing, while also using (3.C.1) to eliminate au to obtain:
A dt = Z(dt — rrit-i + Pt) +  A (j)t -I- y —~—rA Wt (3.C.10)
(1 ®o)
where Z =
t \ o
This is the output supply made available by savings (and so capital) and by labour 
supply; the first terms in Z  emerge from equation (3.C.6) as the amount of savings (i.e. 
the output not devoted to consumption which is mt —pt) • Note in passing that we can solve 
equation (3.C.2) for rt conditional on dt, mt- 1, and pt: since the latter determine available 
savings, the interest rate has to force the demand for capital to equal this availability. 
Hence equation (3.C.2) and the interest rate are in a second, recursive block, and can 
therefore be ignored.
Equations (3.C.1) and (3.C.7), labour supply and demand, yield with (3.C.4) and
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(3.C.5), defining wages and the price index,
Wt =  K  + (1 -  v')pt] (3.C.11)i o)/0.7J cLq<j
(3.C.11) therefore specifies the free wages that would clear the labour market, given 
output and the price level. (3.C.10) and (3.C.11) between them constitute the supply-side 
of the model, augmented to include the market for savings (which depend on last period’s 
money supply).
Finally, using the money market equation (3.C.8) together with labour supply (3.C.1) 
(which defines the split between benefits and wage payments) we obtain:
Wt = Q[mt -  (v'(l -  ao)/0.96)pt] (3.C.12)
where
Q= 1a (l — ao)/0.96 -I- (W0/ 0.96 — B0)a0a 
(3.C.12) is reminiscent of Robertson’s ‘wages fund’; there is a certain stock of money 
available to pay wages and benefits and given the structure of contracts, it determines 
free (auction) wages.
The full solution is complex. However, we can represent the model’s main workings by 
reducing equations (3.C.10) and (3.C.11) to a ‘supply curve’ between free wages and the 
price level; and juxtapose it with the ‘demand curve’ given by (3.C.12), the wages fund 
equation. We neglect terms in Z  as of small magnitude, which conveniently allows us to 
rewrite (3.C.10) in levels form as
dt =  (fit +  n  °——?Wt +  Co
(1 -  a0)
where Cq is a constant, ignored in what follows, reflecting the initial values of dt, (J)t and
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Wt. In this case the supply curve from (3.C.10) and (3.C.11) becomes:
W, = V[4>t +  (1 -  t/)p(] where V = a 7a\  —  (3.C.13)
a  ^  M(1 - T o) l - a „
It follows that:
*  =  ir(Qmt -  V4>t) where * =  [Ql/(1 _  ao)/0,96] +  y , {x _  yl) (3-C.14)
and
l3C16>
and the spendable real wage is
W t- 1 — Pt = otWt- 1 + v'pt-1 — Pt where a = 1 — v — w (3.C.16)
For 0 < v' < 1 the resulting demand and supply picture is familiar. Figure 3.2 shows 
the model in pt, Wt space; since labour supply (1 — at) varies directly with the auction 
wage, this is also price level, employment space (output depends also on the capital stock, 
but is closely related to employment, and so this is also effectively familiar price, output 
space.) As i/ tends to 0, DD (eq. 3.C.12) steepens and the SS (eq. 3.C.13) flattens.
We begin by considering within this model the nature of various basic monetary rules 
to which our discussion of optimality will be related; we then show a monetary rule may 
be optimised within that model; this discussion is conducted entirely in terms of the 
simplified linear model. We then consider the performance of various forms of targeting 
rules within the model in terms of the same model. Finally we use stochastic simulations 
of the full non-linear model to derive the accurately-calibrated optimality results. We
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conclude with some policy implications.
3.D Targeting inflation and the level of money or 
prices —  som e mechanics of M onetary rules
If we take the linearised version of our model, we find the following solutions in general:
Pt = n(Qmt-V<j)t) (3.D.17)
where
and
where
17T Qv'( 1 -  a0) + V(l -  v')
Wt = lV<f>t +  (1 -  l)Qmt (3.D.18)
l _ Qv'(l -  ao)
Qv’( 1 -  ao) + V’(\ -  v')
Both V and Q vary inversely with the share of auction contracts,a:
Q =  1a ( l — ao)/0.96 +  (Wo/0.96 — B0)a0(j 
1
^  rv 4- Q-7a°a  _  Q0M<7
“  ^  / x ( l - T o )  l - a 0
Recall that Wt (the auction wage, and the shadow price of labour supply) also directly 
determines employment through the labour supply function. Thus we can take it and 
employment as the same subject to some linear transformation.
Real (consumed) wages are:
W t-i ~Pt = aWt-i + v'pt-i -  pt (3.D.19)
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Suppose that
4>t =  4>t- i  +  Vt (3.D.20)
that is productivity follows a random walk. As we have seen, households raise their real 
wage protection (of their real consumed wage), the more persistent are price level shocks.
of pt. The more persistent the price shocks, the higher that variability, because the shocks 
would cumulate.
If we now compare a money supply rule that eliminates money shock persistence with 
one that eliminates price shock persistence, the first plainly eliminates one independent 
source of persistence in price shocks. Thus we would expect to find, and do, that pro­
tection falls. The second takes the process one stage further, eliminating all price shock 
persistence. Thus we should find that protection falls further still. (In the full non-linear 
model there are other sources of persistence, and these keep some incentive to protection 
alive; hence it does not disappear altogether). An inflation targeting rule by contrast with 
both the money and price level targeting rules ensures that prices are expected to be a 
random walk, entirely persistent; and therefore in this regime indexation is high.
A price level rule is one that sets
Thus if there was zero protection (a = v' = 0) they would be wide open to the variability
0 =  E,pt+1 =  7T{QEtmt+1 -  VEt<f>t+l) (3.D.21)
and hence
Etm t+j (3.D.22)
whence the ‘price level rule’ is
(3.D.23)
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whereas the (‘pure money’) rule that eliminates money shock persistence is simply
m t — et (3.D.24)
Notice that under the price level rule money supply accommodates known past produc­
tivity shifts; this removes persistence from price shocks, though at the cost of persistence 
in money shocks.
An inflation-targeting rule sets
Etpt+l = 7T(QEtm t+1 -  V E t(f)t+1) = pt =  t t (Qmt -  V<f>t)
and hence (remembering that Et(f)t+1 = 4>t): Etm t+i = m t so that the behaviour of the 
money supply becomes:
m t = m t- \  +  et 
When these are substituted into (3.D.18) we obtain
(price level rule) Wt =  (1 — l)Qet +  V(l<f>t +  [1 — l]<f>t-i) (3.D.25)
(pure money rule) Wt = (1 — l)Qet + V(l<f>t) (3.D.26)
(inflation rule) Wt = (1 — l)Q[tt +  m t- i] +  V(l<j>t) (3.D.27)
and when into (3.D.19) we obtain:
(price level rule) W t-\ — Pt = nV[T]t — — ttQ[et — v'et- 1]
+  acV[lrjt_i 4- 4>t-2] "I- otQ{\ — V)€t—1 (3.D.28)
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and
(money level rule) W t_j -  pt = 7rV[<f>t -  v'<f>t_ \^ -  irQ[et -  v'et-\\
+ aV’[/0t_1] +  aQ( 1 — l)et-\
(inflation rule) W t~ 1 -  Pt = V^[<f>t ~ v'<t>t-1] “  7rQ[mt ~ v'mt_i]
+  + &Q{ 1 — 0[et-i + Trit-2] (3.D.29)
For the nominal wage, Wt , which is directly related to employment (supply) and 
hence to output, the stability ranking is, with indexation at a high level as optimal under 
inflation-targeting, (from the most stable down), money rule>inflation rule> price-level 
rule; with indexation endogenous, money>price>inflation. For the spendable real wage 
(consumption), the stability ranking is, with indexation high as for inflation targeting, 
price>inflation>money; and for endogenous indexation, price>inflation=money. But in 
fact for spendable real wages all regimes deliver very similar stability; only for price-level 
targeting with endogenous indexation is the stability gain statistically significant.
Using the relevant equations above, and assuming that the wage contract length is 4 
periods, then under the price rule we have:
VarVF* (3.D.30)
and
’ V~\
Var(Wt-i - p t) = [ t t 2  + ( t t v '  -  al)2 + 2a2]a% + {[o(l -  Z) 4-7rz/]2 + 7T2}of (3.D.31) 
L Q J
whereas under the money rule, mt = et, we have the following variances (all divided for 
presentational convenience by Q2):
Var Wt = 4 I (3.D.32)
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and
Var(iy,_, -  p,) =  | t t 2 +  [W  + a ( l  -  /)]2}<r2 +  {tt2 +  3[7rt/ -  a/]2} ^ \  (3.D.33)
and under the inflation rule we have:
V a r = <t2 + 4 [ (1 - / ) ]V 2 (3.D.34)
and
Var(Ty(_i — pt) =  CQ { ( t t )2 + 3[tt(1 -  v') -  al]2} ^  + (3.D.35)
{ ( t t ) 2  + [7r(l — v ' )  — a(l — /)]2 + 2[7iV — c*(l — /)]2}cr2
Table 3.D.1: Variances with CM as calibrated in this linearised and simplified version*:
Var 147
Indexation as for inflation target Indexation endogenous 
(Indexation parameters: v' = 0.5;/ =  0.7)
Inflation rule 100 100 (v' = 0.5; I = 0.7)
Money rule 93 35 (v' =  0..26;/ =  0.36)
Price rule 163 165 (v' = 1 = 0)
Var ( W ^ - p t ) l (Indexation parameters: v' II o II o
Inflation rule 100 100 (i/ =  0.5; / =  0.7)
Money rule 102 96 (v‘ =  0..26;/ =  0.36)
Price rule 126
o'IIII<N00
*calibration: 7T = 0.2  (for v' =  0 .5 ) ;=  0.15(for v' =  0) and =  0 .175  
(for v' = 0 .26); a  =  0.1; §  =  1.3; a 2 =  cr2 =  0.0001
While these calculations show that the simplified linear model in our calibrations 
is somewhat adrift of the full model (especially with respect to the price-level rule for 
employment), they do show that if indexation is fixed at high inflation-targeting levels 
the money rule is good for employment stability, while the price rule is bad for it; and 
that with endogenous indexation the money rule is good for employment stability while 
the price rule is good for consumption stability.
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Chapter 4
Testing W hether the FTSE is 
Produced by an Efficient M arket
4.1 Literature Review
4.1.1 M arket Efficiency
The origins of the Efficient Market Hypothesis can be traced back as far as the pioneering 
theoretical contributions of Bachelier (1900) and the empirical research of Cowles (1933). 
The work by Bachelier (1900) was the first effort ever to employ theory, including math­
ematical techniques, to explain why the stock market behaves as it does. Cowles (1933) 
examined the records of selected financial services and professional investors. He failed to 
find any evidence of performance superior to that which could be achieved by investing 
in the market as a whole. Kendall (1953) calculated the first 29 lagged serial correlations 
of the first differences of 22 time series representing speculative prices. He found that, 
with two or three exceptions, that knowledge of past prices changes yields substantially 
no information about future price changes. Also, that essentially, the estimate of the next 
period’s price change could have been drawn at random from a specified distribution with 
results as satisfactory as the best formula that could be fitted to past data.
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The modern literature in economics begins with Samuelson (1965). He proved that if 
the flow of information is unimpeded and if there are no transactions costs, then tomor­
row’s price change in speculative markets will reflect only tomorrow’s ‘news’ and will be 
independent of the price change today. Since ‘news’ is unpredictable the resulting price 
changes must also be unpredictable and random.
In an informationally efficient market prices fully incorporate the expectations and 
information of all market participants; this implies that current price changes should 
be independent of past known data. Fama (1970) summarised this idea in his classic 
survey by writing: “A market in which prices ‘fully reflect’ available information is called 
‘efficient’.” Fama goes on to discuss tests of efficiency. Dividing the work into three 
categories depending on the nature of the information subset. The information sets due 
to Roberts (1967) are used:
• Weak-Form Efficiency: The information set includes only the history of prices.
• Semistrong-Form Efficiency: The information set includes publicly available infor­
mation.
• Strong-Form Efficiency: The information set includes all information known to any 
market participation (private information).
Fama concludes that the results are strongly in support of the weak form tests, and 
semi-strong form tests also support the efficient market hypothesis. For the strong from 
tests he says that one would not expect such an extreme model to be an exact description 
of the world, and it should be viewed as a benchmark.
More recently the dominance of the efficient market hypothesis has become far less 
universal. Many financial economists have begun to believe that stock prices are at least 
partially predictable. They emphasize psychological and behavioural elements of stock- 
price determination, and believe that future stock prices are to some extent predictable 
on the basis of past stock price patterns as well as certain fundamental valuation metrics.
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Lo and MacKinlay (1988) use weekly US data for the 1962-1985 period and use a 
variance ratio test to test for serial correlation. They find that short-run serial correlations 
between successive stock price changes are not zero, and that the existence of too many 
successive moves in the same direction enable them to reject the hypothesis that stock 
prices behave as true random walks at all the usual significance levels. They also find 
that using a base interval of four weeks results in not rejecting the random walk model. 
The results for weekly returns are also independent of the size effect. Evidence against 
the random walk hypothesis is strong for small firms, and the test statistic becomes 
smaller as the size of the firm increases, but even for large-firms portfolios the evidence 
against the null hypothesis is strong. The portfolio for the smallest quintile has a 42% 
weekly autocorrelation, whereas the serial correlation for the portfolio returns of the 
largest quintile is much smaller at 15%, though it is still statistically significant. They 
conclude by saying that they have rejected the random walk hypothesis for weekly stock 
market returns, though the rejection of the random walk model does not necessarily imply 
the inefficiency of the stock-price formation.
Many studies have shown evidence of negative serial correlation over longer holding 
periods. So over longer periods there is return reversal. Fama and French (1988) regress 
the return on a stock market index over some period of length T, on returns over the 
prior period of equal length, and found that for the 1926-1985 period between 25-40% 
of the variation in long holding period returns can be predicted in terms of the negative 
correlation with past returns. The slopes of the regressions are generally negative for 
horizons from 18 months to 5 years, and both the R2 and the slope increase with the 
length of the horizon up to 5 years, and then decrease. They report that returns are more 
predictable for portfolios of small firms (40% predictability) compared with portfolios of 
large firms (25% predictability). Poterba and Summers (1988) used the same data and 
also found substantial mean reversion in stock market returns at longer horizons, using 
a variance ratio test. They also investigate whether mean reversion can be found on
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the stock exchanges of other countries. Using data for Britain since 1939, and Canada 
since 1919 they find mean reversion at long horizons similar to the US data. Also, for 
fifteen other countries for shorter postwar periods twelve display mean reversion. From 
the international evidence Poterba and Summers conclude that mean reversion is more 
pronounced in less broad-based and less sophisticated (foreign) equity markets.
There is also evidence of seasonal and day-of-the-week patterns. Rozeff and Kinney 
(1976) found seasonal patterns in US data for the 1907-1974 period. They found that 
the average monthly returns in January were about 3.5%, while other months averaged 
about 0.5%. This was found using data on New York Stock Exchange prices with an 
equal-weighting. As well as the January effect there also appears to be a number of 
day-of-the-week effects. French (1980) examines two alternative models of the process 
generating stock returns: the calendar time hypothesis and the trading time hypothesis. 
Under the calendar time hypothesis the expected return for Monday is three times that of 
the other days of the week, whereas under the trading time hypothesis the expected return 
is the same for each day of the week. French uses daily returns to the Standard and Poor’s 
composite portfolio for the 1953-1977 period. He finds that the results are inconsistent 
with both models and documents significantly negative returns on Mondays. French also 
tests whether the systematically negative returns occur only on Monday or after any day 
that the market is closed. The results indicate that the persistently negative returns for 
Monday are caused by some weekend effect, rather than by a general closed-market effect.
Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) test for the existence of persistent seasonal patterns in 
the rates of return using 90 years of daily data on the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
from 1897-1986. They find that high returns in January are not observed, and that none 
of the months have returns different from the average. Because this index is composed 
of only large firms, and an equal weighted index gives small firms greater weight than 
their share of market value, this suggests that the January effect may be a small firm 
phenomenon. Lakonishok and Smidt also study the weekend effect, holiday returns, end-
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of-December returns as well as turn-of-the-month returns. For the weekend effect their 
results are consistent with French (1980) as they reject the null hypothesis that all days 
of the week have the same rate of return, and that there are negative returns on Monday. 
They also find that there are larger positive rates of return on the last trading day of the 
week. The results for holiday returns shows that the average pre-holiday rate of return is 
0.22%, which is 23 times larger than the regular daily rate of return (0.0094%), and that 
holidays account for about 50% of the price increase in the DJIA. This rate of return is 
2-5 times larger than pre-weekend rates of return. The rate of return after holidays is 
found to be negative, but not significantly different from zero. For the end-of-December 
returns they find that the price increase from the last trading day before Christmas to the 
end of the year is over 1.5%. Analysing turn-of-the-month returns the authors find that 
there is a strong turn-of-the-month effect. The cumulative rate of increase over the four 
days around the turn of the month is 0.473% compared to 0.0612% for an average four 
day period. This price increase is shown to be greater than the average monthly price 
increase, which is 0.349%.
Seasonal patterns have also been studied for other countries. Gultekin and Gultekin 
(1983) used data from sixteen major industrialised countries to try and find seasonal 
patterns. They used data from 1959-1979 (except for Singapore where they used data 
from 1970-1979). Their test shows that seasonality exists in most of the markets, as they 
reject the null hypothesis that stock returns are time invariant for 12 countries. They also 
test whether the seasonality is attributed to tax-loss selling which predicts that returns 
will be higher in the first month of the tax year. They find that for all countries with 
a January-December tax year, mean January returns were exceptionally large. The UK 
and Australia do not have January-December tax years, and they find that for the UK 
mean April returns are larger than all other months except for January, but for Australia 
they would expect returns in July to be larger than other months, but find that this is 
not the case. The authors conclude that they find evidence of a seasonal pattern in stock
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returns for most of the major industrial countries, and find that for most countries large 
returns occur in January.
Research has also been carried out on the predictability of future stock returns. It is 
claimed that the dividend yield or the price-earning ratio of the stock market as a whole 
have considerable predictive power. Campbell and Shiller (1988) use annual Standard 
and Poor Composite Stock Price Index data from 1871-1986. They regress stock returns 
on some explanatory variables that are known in advance. They find that the dividend- 
price ratio has a striking ability to predict returns for various horizons. For one-period 
returns they find that 3.9% of the variance of returns is explained by the dividend-price 
ratio. Though this is a small percentage, it is still statistically significant. As the horizon 
increases they find that the fraction of variance explained also increases, and find that at 
the 10-year horizon the dividend-price ratio can predict 26.6% of the variance of future 
returns for the stock market.
Other financial statistics have been found to have some amount of predictive power for 
stock returns. For example, Fama and Schwert (1977) found that in postwar US data there 
is a reliable negative relationship between the level of expected returns on common stocks 
and the level of the treasury bill, and that the risk premium on stocks is inversely related 
to the interest rate. Campbell (1987) found that using monthly US data for 1959-1979 
and 1979-1983 the term structure of interest rates spreads contained useful information 
for forecasting stock returns, saying that the evidence for predictability of stock returns 
is very strong.
4.1.2 P eso  P rob lem s
The peso problem is a situation where the potential for discrete shifts in the distribution of 
future shocks to the economy effects the rational expectations held by market participants. 
One common feature of asset pricing models is that current asset prices incorporate market 
participants’ expectations of future economic variables. A peso problem arises when there
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is a small positive probability of an important event, and investors take this probability 
into account when calculating their expectations.
Although the precise origins of the term peso problem are unknown, a number of 
economists attribute its first use to Milton Friedman in the examinations of the Mexican 
peso market during the early 1970s. The peso problem hypothesis has often been ad­
vocated in the financial literature to explain the historically puzzlingly high premium of 
stock returns.
A number of papers have argued that the high risk premium of stock returns may be 
due to a peso problem situation. Rietz (1988) specifies the Mehra and Prescott model 
to include a low-probability, depression like, third state, where output falls by 50 (or 25) 
percent of its value with a probability of 0.4% (or 1.4%). He says that this can explain 
both high equity risk premia and low risk-free returns. Reitz says that the motivation for 
the third state is that risk-averse equity owners demand a high return to compensate for 
the extreme losses they may incur during an unlikely, but severe, market crash. Equity 
owners have been compensated for the crashes that have not occurred, leading to high 
equity returns. Rietz goes on to say that incorporating the third state in Mehra and 
Prescott’s model not only captures the effects of these crashes, it also solves their puzzle, 
as he generates ex ante equity premiums consistent with those observed in the US and 
risk aversion of five (or ten).
In a paper related to Rietz (1988), Danthine and Donaldson (1999) study how the small 
probability of a depression state modifies the macrodynamic and financial characteristics 
of a standard equilibrium business cycle model. They find that the effects are most 
dramatic when the feared ‘disaster state’ isn’t actually present.
A similar idea to the peso problem is that of survival. Brown, Goetzmann and Ross 
(1995) investigate the ex-post statistical behaviour of the time series of returns that have 
“survived” for a sample period. Where a market is said to “survive” if the price does 
not hit an absorbing lower bound. Under these assumptions they show th a t if the price
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series did not hit the lower bound, the implied time series of returns should display many 
features actually observed in US data series, including puzzling risk premia and mean 
reversion.
Goetzmann and Jorion (1999) show that markets tend to emerge, submerge, and 
re-emerge through time, and argue that many of today’s emerging markets are actually 
re-emerging markets. Various political, economic and institutional reasons cause investors 
to lose interest in some markets, which then submerge, only to re-emerge recently. They 
conclude by saying that market contractions, banking failures, and expropriation have 
occurred in the past, and are likely to occur in the future.
Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) say that unusual events with a low probability of occur­
rence but severe effects on prices, such as wars and nationalisations, are not likely to be 
well represented in samples and may be totally omitted from survived series. They find 
that from 24 markets for which they have data in 1931, seven experienced no interruption, 
seven experienced temporary suspension of trading, and ten suffered long-term closure. 
This indicates that market failures are not a remote possibility. They say that under the 
assumption that market risks are priced individually, rather than under the assumption 
of integration, the frequency of failure would provide clear justification for a peso problem 
explanation. They conclude that major disruptions have afflicted nearly all the markets 
in their sample, with the exception of a few, including the US, and say that the fact that 
the US market survived explains their finding that the real capital appreciation return on 
US stocks is a lot higher than other markets. With real capital appreciation return on US 
stocks being 4.3% compared with a median return of only 0.8% for the other markets.
One approach economists have used to model peso problems is to suppose that the 
economy goes through changes in regime. Where the regimes may represent periods of high 
or low inflation, rising or falling exchange rates or economic recessions and expansions. In 
one regime the disturbances to the economy are different from another regime, which has 
different affects on economic variables. So the behaviour of variables such as inflation,
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interest rates or real output growth could be different in the different regimes. One popular 
parameterisation is the Markov switching model of Hamilton (1989).
4.1 .3  M arkov Sw itch ing
Markov switching models have become increasingly popular in economic studies of stock 
prices. Markov switching models are often adopted by researchers wishing to account 
for specific features of economics time series such as the fat tails, volatility clustering 
and mean reversion of stock prices. These models are able to generate a wide range of 
coefficients for skewness, kurtosis and serial correlation even when based on a very small 
number of underlying states. There is a large body of empirical evidence suggesting that 
returns on stocks and other financial assets can be captured by this class of models because 
of their ability to capture outliers, fat tails and skew.
Turner, Startz and Nelson (1989) use a Markov switching model to model the variance 
of excess returns. They estimate two models one in which the state is known to the 
economic agent, and one in which agents are uncertain of the state. In both models the 
market is assumed to switch between two states. Using monthly data from Standard and 
Poor’s composite index for the 1946-1987 period they find that the variance for the high- 
variance state is more than four times that of the low-variance state. Using a likelihood 
ratio test they reject the hypothesis that the variances are equal. They also find that the 
low-variance state will dominate, with the unconditional probabilities being 0.929 and 
0.071 for the low- and high-variance states respectively. The median duration of the low- 
variance state is approximately 43 months, compared to 3 months for the high-variance 
state, showing that the low-variance state is more persistent. Comparing the two models 
they find that the model where agents know the state does not support an increasing risk 
premium, whereas when agents are uncertain of the state the model provides support for 
a risk premium rising as the anticipated level of risk rises. Also, when the stock market 
unexpectedly moves into a high-variance state the market will fall (though this fall is
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generally recovered in the next period), but when it is expected to be in a high-variance 
state it does not fall. The authors conclude by saying that they have shown that an 
adequate model of the excess return from the stock market may be constructed with a 
mixture of normal densities with different means and variances.
The Markov switching model was shown by Ryd6n, TerSsvirta, and Asbrink (1998) 
to be well suited to explaining the temporal and distributional properties of stock re­
turns. Using daily S&P 500 US stock price series from 1928-1991, they split the series 
into ten subsets of equal length, and then find the best fitting Markov switching model 
and test whether it is capable of characterising the stylized facts. They compare the 
mean/standard deviation ratio, skewness and kurtosis of the models with that of the orig­
inal data. They find that the mean/ standard deviation ratio is reproduced rather well, 
and for the skewness and kurtosis a clear tendency emerges. If the values are relatively 
small in the data, the models also yield small estimates, and are when the values are 
relatively large in the data, the models values are also large.
Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1990) combine an economic model of asset prices with a 
Markov switching model for the exogenous forcing process driving the economic funda­
mentals using annual data from the Standard and Poor’s index from 1871-1985 to account 
for the mean reversion in asset prices. The Markov switching model is used because it 
allows them to model both the negative skewness and excess kurtosis that is present in 
the raw data. They test for mean reversion by using both the variance ratio statistics 
used by Poterba and Summers (1988) as well as the long-horizon regression coefficients 
used by Fama and French (1988). They also report the distributional characteristics for 
the Markov switching process, and find that the population values of the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness, kurtosis and first-order autocorrelation and find that the values lie 
within two standard deviations of the sample values. So they conclude that the Markov 
switching model can produce both the degree of negative skewness and the amount of 
kurtosis that are found in the data.
159
A Markov switching model is used to capture the nonlinear dynamics in the stock 
market and business cycle by Hamilton and Lin (1996). They use monthly US data from 
1965-1993 and investigate the joint time series behaviour of monthly stock returns and 
growth in industrial production, where the state variable determines both the mean of 
industrial production growth and the scale of stock volatility. They find that a model 
that provides a reasonable description of the co-movement of stock returns and economic 
activity is one in which the shift in regime affects stock returns one month before it 
affects industrial production. They find that using this model, industrial production 
falls by 0.75% per month when the economy is in regime 1, and that the unforecastable 
component of stock returns has a variance that is over ten times as large in regime 1 
as it is in regime 2. Regime 1 tends to last on average for 9 months, whereas regime 
2 is more persistent and typically lasts for 4 years. This model suggests that economic 
recessions are a very important cause of stock volatility, and that the index of industrial 
production should be quite useful in forecasting stock volatility. They also say that this 
model offers substantially better forecasts of stock volatility than that of the univariate 
ARCH-type models they considered. The authors also find that this model implies that 
stock volatility may be useful for forecasting the direction of aggregate economic activity, 
since they find that stocks are a leading indicator of the state of the business cycle. They 
conclude by saying that economic recessions are the single largest factor in explaining 
why stock markets are more volatile at some times that others, and economic recessions 
account for over 60% of the variance of stock returns, and that their model is useful 
for both forecasting stock volatility and for identifying and forecasting economic turning 
points.
The differences in stock returns for small and large firms is considered by Perez- 
Quiros and Timmermann (2000). They use a flexible econometric framework that allows 
the conditional distribution of stock returns to vary with the state of the economy, and 
document the systematic differences in variations over the economic cycle in small and
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large firms’ stock returns. They use monthly excess returns on size-sorted decile portfolios 
for the 1954-1997 and a Markov switching model that allows for two possible states 
which are determined by the data. Their results suggest that the two regimes relate to 
recession and expansion states, and that stock return volatility is highest during economic 
recessions. Theory suggests that small firms will be adversely affected by lower liquidity 
and higher short-term interest rates, and the authors find that, consistent with the theory, 
small firms display the highest degree of asymmetry in their conditional return distribution 
across recession and expansion states. They find that there is a close relationship between 
firm size and return volatility, with small firms being most strongly affected by a recession.
A different approach is applied by Whitelaw (2001) who uses a model where the fun­
damental economic process (consumption) is modelled in a regime-shift framework and 
asset returns are derived using rational expectations. This model also provides evidence 
of persistent regimes in stock market returns. Using monthly data for 1959-1996 the 
author uses a two-regime model that is capable of identifying the expansionary and con­
tractionary phases of the business cycle. This relatively simple model is also capable of 
generating results that are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence. He finds that 
the mean consumption growth for the regimes are 0.323% and 0.146% for the expan­
sionary and contractionary regimes with regime half-lives of 92 months and 36 months, 
respectively. The model also generates a negative unconditional relationship between ex­
pected returns and volatility. The author concludes that the model demonstrates not 
only that a negative and time-varying relation between expected returns and volatility 
is consistent with rational expectations, but also that such a relation is consistent with 
aggregate consumption data in a representative agent framework.
Ang and Bekaert (2002), estimate regime switching models on US, UK and German 
equity and find evidence of a high-volatility, high-correlation regimes, and lower condi­
tional mean which tends to coincide with a bear market, and a normal regime with low 
correlations and low volatility. Though the evidence on higher volatility is much stronger
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than the evidence on higher correlation and lower means.
Guidolin and Timmermann (2005) study strategic asset allocation and consumption 
choice in the presence of regime switching in asset returns and find evidence that four 
separate regimes are required to capture the joint distribution of stock and bond returns. 
The regimes are characterised as crash, slow growth, bull and recovery states. The crash 
state has low persistence and large negative mean excess returns and high volatility. The 
low growth regime is far more persistent and has low volatility and small positive mean 
excess returns, while the bull state is the most persistent and is characterised by rapid 
growth of stock prices. The recovery state is again not very persistent, and has strong 
market rallies and high volatility for small stocks and bonds. The authors conclude that 
their model not only captures predictability in the conditional mean of returns, but also 
in the full (joint) return distribution, including the volatility, skew and kurtosis. Also, 
because there were two transitory states and two persistent states, the model captures 
both the short-term and long-term variations in investment opportunites.
4.2 Introduction
The authors above have in various ways found that they can mimic the movements of stock 
markets using Markov switching models (as in the peso problem) of some driving process. 
This is an idea we have also adopted here in order to carry out a test of efficiency. For a 
stock market to be efficient it must reflect the behaviour of the ‘fundamental’ efficiently. 
This fundamental must come from the actual data on profits or dividends which are being 
valued by the market. In other words the ‘driving process’ used in the models must be 
consistent with the actual processes at work in the data for efficiency to be established. 
It is not sufficient for there to be ‘some process’ if its implied behaviour is at variance 
with that of the data — if the implied moments of the process were different, then there 
would be inefficiency in the sense of Campbell and Shiller, with ‘excess’ or ‘inadequate’
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variation compared with the fundamental.
The test we propose here takes these ideas forward by searching for a regime switching 
process in a fundamental whose behaviour matches the data for that fundamental and 
for which the stock market it implies also mimics the data on stock prices. We ask the 
question here: is there some latent model of a fundamental in an efficient market that can 
link the data on the fundamental to the data on stock prices, accounting for the behaviour 
of both simultaneously? If so then one cannot reject the ‘null hypothesis’ that the market 
is efficient.
Tests of efficiency based on various forms of regression are beset with problems of 
interpretation — Minford and Peel (2002, ch. 14) — including the possibility of variable 
risk-premia, peso problems and rational bubbles. Tests based on whether a rule could be 
found that would ‘beat the market’ also have problems of statistical assessment raised by 
Timmermann and others: how often, particularly with the aid of data-mining, might one 
not be able to find such a rule in any given set of data and even in a hold-out sample, 
especially again if the latter is subject, even subconsciously, to data-snooping.
In this paper we follow a procedure inspired partly by the RBC literature. We ask 
whether a world governed entirely by efficiency could generate a series like the FTSE. Any 
given sample is a drawing from some true model; therefore if the true model were one of 
efficiency then a period of history for the FTSE could not be statistically distinguished 
from other sample drawings from that model. We can classify the properties of the 
distributions from our model world and compare them with the sample properties of 
the FTSE; we can then test whether at say the 95% level of confidence we can reject 
the proposition that the FTSE sample has the same properties. The advantage of this 
approach is that we can, for the specified null hypothesis, generate exactly the implied 
statistical distributions, and so test the null with complete rigour.
We create a regime switching model with four regimes (where the regimes represent 
high, normal and low growth, as well as a crash) with the probability of each regime
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constant over time, which generates a profits series. The rational expectation of the 
future profits is used to create the present discounted value which we use as our FTSE 
series. Because there is a constant probability of each future regime the variance around 
future returns is fixed, as are any risk-premium terms, so we have an efficient market world 
of rational agents. As our profits regime is a latent process it cannot be bootstrapped as 
the true errors are not observed. We use stochastic simulations to see if the model can 
statistically match the data. In the model with a crash we couldn’t match the profits 
series exactly. This is to be expected because in the sample we used there wasn’t a crash. 
As we cannot match profits exactly we are trying to match two series, one input (profits) 
and one output (FTSE).
4.3 The W orking H ypothesis
There has been a certain amount of work in this line before. What it has shown is that 
straightforwardly interpretable error processes for news cannot generate the properties of 
the FTSE, with its booms, crashes and apparent ‘bubbles’ — or described more technically 
in terms of its univariate time-series properties, its tendencies to display ARCH, unit roots, 
and fat tails. However a promising framework has appeared to be one suggested by the 
‘Peso problem’: where the fundamental switches in a Markov process between several 
regimes.
We can think of an economy (the UK in this case) where the capital stock generates 
the profits or dividends that are valued as equities (the FTSE). The profits are mainly 
driven by productivity shocks since variations in labour inputs mainly change wages while 
changes in the capital stock mainly dilute the equity base. So we shall assume that the 
fundamental, profits per share, can be identified with productivity (a more elaborate 
specification would involve a complete RBC model; but to minimise complexity we use 
this approximative assumption.)
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RBC models take the behaviour of productivity as exogenous, usually modelling it via 
some sort of univariate time-series. The empirical success of these models in matching the 
macroeconomic facts has been limited however. Their strength has been in supplying an 
explanation for certain salient macroeconomic correlations and cross-correlations; however 
most macroeconomic modellers today rely instead on some source of substantial nominal 
rigidity to generate persistence in inflation and output.
Here we suggest that the recognition of several regimes for productivity growth could 
be a helpful generalisation of the time-series process governing it. Thus for example one 
might identify periods of poor productivity growth — during wartime or poorly-adapted 
institutions (union power in the UK during the 1970s); also periods of rapid productivity 
associated with surges of innovation (the industrial revolution, the computer revolution 
etc); and finally periods of normal growth, when innovation is being digested undisturbed 
by wars or dysfunctional institutions.
Each of these productivity regimes we represent by an ARIMA (1,1, 0) process with 
drift. The unit root represents the idea that productivity changes are in principle irre­
versible; the serial correlation the idea that once a change occurs it will be followed by 
further similar changes. The drift represents the mean growth of the regime. Each period 
the economy chooses one of the regimes with fixed probabilities — but the lagged effects 
of the previous regimes still are present. Thus if a war occurs, even when it is over its 
effects persist until they gradually disappear from the economy; meanwhile other shocks 
overlay them.
Plainly we have no good theory of productivity growth and hence even RBC models for 
which it is central treat it as exogenous. However, the discussion above seems a plausible 
improvement on the bald univariate processes generally assumed in RBC models. One 
gap in our study to this point is that we do not look at actual UK productivity growth 
in choosing this regime switching model — ideally we would wish the output from our 
regime switching process to match the facts of productivity (or strictly of dividends) but
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at this stage we have not investigated this matching. This gap is in the same spirit as 
the fact that we have not checked the implicit RBC model for its fit to the other facts of 
the economy — but this particular check is closer to the specific issue of explaining the 
FTSE.
However, we identify profits with productivity and treat profits as the fundamental 
underlying valuation of the FTSE. We test our hypothesis about the regime-switching 
profits regime not merely against the FTSE but also against the profits fundamental. 
Thus our profits regimes must generate profits samples from which our actual profits 
sample cannot be distinguished statistically just as it must also generate FTSE samples 
under efficiency from which the actual FTSE sample cannot be distinguished statistically. 
Since the regime-switching profits regime is a latent process its true errors cannot be 
observed and so it cannot be bootstrapped; however the parameters of the latent process 
cannot be arbitrarily chosen to generate the FTSE’s behaviour; they must also ‘match’ 
(in the statistical sense we have described) the observed profits process.
4.4 Our Procedure
Initially we take the three regimes (low, normal and high growth) and assign the same 
iid normal-error to each. Each period the rational expectation of the future profits level 
is calculated and used to create the present discounted value (with a constant discount 
factor) which is the assumed FTSE. Notice that the conditional variance of profits around 
the future expectation is constant at all times since there is a constant probability of each 
future regime and hence of all future possible innovations; hence the variance surrounding 
future returns is equally fixed and with it any risk-premium terms attaching to FTSE 
valuation. Thus our set-up embodies all the standard assumptions of an efficient market 
world of rational agents.
At the next stage we search to find the best calibration of this model to the profits
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and FTSE data. Using the powerful method of grid search we choose th e  combination 
of parameters for the 3 ARIMA processes that minimises the distance betrween a linear 
combination of the moments of the simulated FTSE and the actual F T S E  and those of 
the simulated profits process from those of the actual process.1
Using the best set of parameters the composite process is then simulated stochastically 
in 10000 runs of 150 periods. With these stochastic simulations we then carry out the 
tests described at the start of this paper. We wish to know whether t h e  FTSE data 
can be regarded as a sample drawing from this model. We look first at the FTSE sample 
moments; do they lie outside the 95% confidence limits of the null hypothesis distributions 
(found from the 10000 generated samples)? Secondly, we look at the FTSE ARCH process 
describing the FTSE’s dynamics; do its parameters lie outside the 95% confidence limits 
for the ARCH processes of the 10000 generated samples?
4.5 M ethodology
The three regimes each have their own mean (ci, C2, C3) and equal s tan d a rd  deviation 
(cTfj). The low growth and high growth regimes have probability of occuring 7Ti,7T3 and 
therefore 7r2 =  1 — 7Ti — ^3. For each period we choose the regime at random  and the 
corresponding growth (ct), and then choose a random number 77 ~  7V(0, cr^). These are 
then used to calculate our generated FTSE as follows.
Starting with intial values of w\ = =  1 we generate a 152 x 150 m a trix  in which
each column will contain the values that we discount to generate our series.
^ h e  method we use here is similar to Simulated Method of Moments, though we Ho not vary the 
weights on the moments in the critical value.
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where
w t =  u>*_ i +  joAwt_ i +  rjt +  Ci
=  w t +  pAw* +  7TiCi +  7r2c2 +  7r3c3
E tWt + 2 =  E tw t+ 1 +  /5(Etiy<+1 -  W t ) +  7 T iC i  +  7 T2 C2  +  7 T3 C3
EtWt+3 =  EtWt+2 +  p(EtWt+2 ~  E tW t+ i)  +  71*1 C i +  7T2 C2  +  7T3 C3
Here % is a random number, c* is the growth, and 7r< is the probability of the regime, 
where i = 1,2 or 3 depending on which regime is chosen. Each period of our series is then 
given by
At = exp(wt — 1) + @ exp(Etwt+i — 1) + P2 exp(Etwt+2 — 1) +  ...  for t = 3,152
(4.1)
Where ft = 0.99. We then take the difference in logs of this series and calculate the 
moments of our simulated FTSE (GFT):
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GFT =  A\og(At) (4.2)
We want to find which combination of parameters gives a GFT that is the best match 
of the the actual FTSE. To do this we use a grid search. For the grid search procedure 
we first ran the following regression on profits:
A log(PROFt) =  f t  +  f tA  log(PROFt. x) + (4.3)
from this regression we get f t  = 0.006414, f t  — -0.111544. We use f t  as the normal 
growth rate and f t  818 our serial correlation, so we set c2 =  0.006414 and p = —0.111544.
The next step is to solve the following equations:
E u  =  7 T i ( C i  -  C2 y  + 7r3(c3 -  C2 ) + (4.4)
^  +  (4.5)
av
7 T i ( C i  -  C2 ) 4  +  7r3 ( c 3  -  C2 ) 4  , 0  4Ecu =  -----------------  h 3a (4.6)a 4 V
where Eu>2 = 0.002982, Ecu3 = —0.02807 and EujA = 1.3246 are the variance, skewness 
and kurtosis of A log (PROF). So we have 3 equations but 5 unknowns (7Ti, 7t3, ci, c3, a^) 
as c2 is known. To solve this problem we do a grid search over 7Ti G [0.01,0.10]and 
773 G [0.01,0.10] (using a step size of 0.01) and solve for Ci,C3,cr .^ These parameters are 
then used to generate our simulated FTSE using the method described above and see 
which set mimizes the following critical value
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crit = ((M O M Iftse ~ M O M Igft)/ M O M Igft)2 
+((M O M2ftse ~ M OM 2qft)/M O M 2qft)2 
+ ((M 0M 3 ftse ~ M0M2>gft)/M O M Igft)2 
+((MOMAftse — MOM 4gft)/MOMAgft)2 (4.7)
where MO M l, MO M2, MO M3, M OM  A are the moments.
Using the set of parameters that minimised the critical value we then run 10000 sim­
ulations, and calculate the moments of our generated series for each run, and also run 
the regression G FT = with a ARCH(l) representation on the residuals of this re­
gression and draw histograms to compare the coefficients of our series with the actual 
FTSE and see if the actual FTSE lies between the 2.5% tails. We initially estimated 
A log (F T SE ) = (3l -f /?2A log(FTSE-i) with a GARCH(1,1) representation but found 
that the and GARCH parameter weren’t statistically significant.
4.6 R esults
As a base case we wanted to see if we could match the properties of the FTSE using a 
simple model without the regime switching. To do this we generated 10000 bootstraps 
using our original model but with 7Ti =  7r3 =  0 using the errors from the regression of 
A log (PROF) instead of a normal distribution. We then compared the 10000 bootstraps 
with the actual FTSE. The results of the base case can be seen in Table 4.1. The table 
reports the values for the 2.5% tails and the values from the A log (FTSE) series.
From Table 4.1 you can see that this model does not match the variance, kurtosis, 
the ARCH constant or the ARCH parameter. Since this model does not match all the 
properties of the FTSE we now go on to use our model with regime switching.
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Table 4.1: Results for the base model
Lower 2.5% Limit Upper 2.5% Limit Actual
Mean -0.005021 0.016074 0.004356
Variance 0.001417 0.003413 0.007137
Skewness -0.994640 0.395325 -0.579837
Kurtosis 2.522443 5.500468 5.715775
-0.005055 0.016241 0.008181
ARCH Constant 0.001335 0.003081 0.003327
ARCH 0.000000 0.230410 0.455670
The results of the grid search resulted in the combination of 7Ti =  0.08 and 7:3 = 0.01 
minimising the critical value. Solving equations (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) for these values of 
7Tiand 7t3 yields the following parameters:
p = -0.111544 
Cl =  -0.068896251 
c2 =  0.006414 
c3 = 0.152291442 
7Ti = 0.08 
7T3 =  0.01 
av = 0.002315467
The model using these parameters is unable to match the ARCH process, so to try 
and match the ARCH process we changed the model so that each regime has a different 
p. The values of the p’s are calculated so that the average p is still equal to the estimated 
value. We chose to use p1 = -0.2, and p3 = 0.3 which results in p2 = -0.1062292. The 
results from this model are in Table 4.2.
Again, this model did not generate a FTSE that matched up with the actual FTSE, 
not matching the variance or the skewness. Though this model did do better than the base 
case as it matches the ARCH parameters. To see if we could match the properties of the 
FTSE we adjusted the parameters to see if we could improve on them. The parameters 
we used were
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Table 4.2: Results for the markov switching model
Lower 2.5% Limit Upper 2.5% Limit Actual
Mean -0.008786 0.011325 0.004356
Variance 0.001727 0.004771 0.007137
Skewness -0.565648 2.090995 -0.579837
Kurtosis 2.518592 17.563532 5.715775
-0.009128 0.011935 0.008181
ARCH Constant 0.001552 0.004086 0.003327
ARCH 0.000000 0.600408 0.455670
Pi =  - 0 - 2  
P2 = 0-2 
P3 = 0-3
Ci =  —0.2
c2 =  0.006414 
c3 =  0.2 
7T1 =  0.08 
7t3 =  0.02
0  ^ = 0.0007
Substituting these values in to equations (4), (5) and (6) gives:
E^j2 = 0.004858 
EZj3 = -30.154837 
E uA =  353.704206
These values are not consistent with the facts for this period, which are 0.00298, -0.0281, 
and 1.325.
For the tests of the moments we find that the FTSE moments lie comfortably inside 
these 95% limits, and for the second test of the ARCH parameters we find that all the
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parameter also lies inside the 95% limits. Table 4.3 below shows the results.
Table 4.3: Results for the tweaked markov switching model
Lower 2.5% Limit Upper 2.5% Limit Actual
Mean -0.021701 0.006399 0.004356
Variance 0.003196 0.007325 0.007137
Skewness -1.787721 0.528254 -0.579837
Kurtosis 5.042048 10.550043 5.715775
0 . -0.021652 0.016983 0.008181
ARCH Constant 0.001336 0.007136 0.003327
ARCH 0.000000 0.999998 0.45567
Using the model above with 3 regimes we can either match the properties of the profits 
series, which results in not matching the FTSE, or match the properties of the FTSE, 
which results in not matching the profits series. To try and improve on this model we 
introduce the idea of a ‘Peso problem’. This involves including a fourth regime which can 
be interpreted as a crash, with a low probability of occuring. To calculate the probability 
of a crash occuring we used share price index data for 38 countries and calculated how 
many times the indices showed a quarterly growth rate of less than —0.6. Out of 4367 
observations this occured once, giving a probability of a crash equal to 0.023%. We think 
this is a small enough probability of a crash to be reasonable. After introducing this 
fourth regime equations (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) now become:
EbJ =  7Ti(Ci — C2 ) 2  +  7T3(C3 — C2)2 -f" 7T4(c4 — C2 ) 2  +  <7^  (4-4’)
=  7Ti(ci ~  C2)3 +  7T3(C3 ~  C2 f  +  7T4(c4 ~  C2)2 ^  ^
CT3V
_  7Ti(Ci -  C2)4 +  7r3(c3 ~  C2 ) 4 +  7T4(c4 -  C2)2 +  ^ 4  ^  ^
Where n4 is the probability of a crash, and c4 is the growth rate when there is a crash. 
W ith 7t4 =  0.00023 and -1 .0  < c4 <  -0 .3  there isn’t a solution to equations (4.4’), (4.5’) 
and (4.6’) so we can’t use the methodology used for the 3 regime model. To overcome
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this problem we run the model through a search algorithm to see which combination of 
parameters (7Ti, 7T3, 7r4, ci, C3, C4 }av) minimise the critical value. The search algorithm takes 
some initial values for the parameters, and in the first iteration increases and decreases one 
parameter at a time by a set step size, then calculates the critical value. The combination 
of parameters that minimises the critical value are then used as the starting values for 
the next iteration. When the algorithm fails to improve on the starting values it then 
decreases the step size and searches again until it minimises the critical value again. This 
process is repeated until the step size is sufficiently small.
We impose the following restrictions when implimenting the search algorithm
C l < 0.006414
0.01 < c3 < 0.1
c4 < -0.3
TTl > 0.01
7T3 > 0.01
7T4 =: 0.0002
With 7r4 =  0.0002 we increased the number of simulations to 50000 to ensure that a 
crash will happen a sufficient amount of times.
As we cannot strictly match equations (4.4’), (4.5’) and (4.6’) we cannot use the exact 
profits moments to fix the model. As a result of this we are now trying to match two series 
which involves a search over the match between both profits and FTSE. So, as well as 
seeing if our generated FTSE can match the moments of the actual FTSE, we also want to 
see if our generated profits series (GPROF) can match the properties of the actual profits 
series. To see if we can match the properties of the profits series we run the regression 
A log (GPROF) =  /?i +  /32Alog(OPPOF_i) and compare coefficients of the regression
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and the moments of the residuals of this regression. As we are trying to match both the 
FTSE and profits, the critical value becomes:
crit = ^M O  M \ppsp  — MO M \gft)/ MO M \gft)2 
+ ((M 0M 2 ftse — MO M2gft) /  M OM2gft)2 
+ ((M 0M 3 ftse — MOM Sgft) /M O M 3gft)2 
+((MOMAftse — MOMAgft) /M OM Agft)2 
+((MOM2pROF — M OM 2gprof)/M O M 2grof)2 
+((M OM 3prof — M OM 3gprof)/M O M 3grof)2 
+((M OM 4prof — M OM 4gprof)/MOMAgrof)2 (3-7’)
The combination of parameters from the search algorithm that minimised the critical 
value were
ci =  -0.063978 
c2 =  0.006414 
c3 =  0.1 
C4  =  —0.3 
7r 1 =  0.07828 
tt2  =  0.91172 
7T 3  =  0.01 
7t4 =  0.0002 
a v =  0.003267
Using asymmetric p  parameters for the different regimes with p l =  -0 .2 , p 2 =  
-0.1086834, p 3 =  0.3, p ^ b  =  0.9 which gives an average p  =  -0.111544 which is equal 
to the p  estimated earlier. Raising the p  parameter for a crash increases the importance
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of the FTSE in our model.
The results for this model are in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Results for the markov switching model with a crash
Lower 2.5% Limit Upper 2.5% Limit Actual
FTSE
Mean -0.009916 0.013217 0.004356
Variance 0.002323 0.012068 0.007137
Skewness -1.278085 1.356789 -0.579837
Kurtosis 2.503174 41.085846 5.715775
FTSE R egression
0i -0.011192 0.014199 0.008181
ARCH constant 0.002103 0.005427 0.003327
ARCH 0.000000 0.456564 0.455670
A log (Profits) R egression
0i -0.011207 0.014974 0.006414
02 -0.272949 0.046430 -0.111544
A log (Profits) Regression Residuals
Mean
00705Oxr1 4.08e-18 —4.08e“ 19
Variance 0.002679 0.004964 0.002714
Skewness -0.650569 0.477425 -0.390942
Kurtosis 2.309765 4.920717 3.991456
As you can see from Table 4.4, the model with regime switching including a crash 
matches all the properties of both the FTSE and the profits series. Figure 4.1 shows the 
histograms of the GFT parameters and Figure 4.2 shows the histograms of the GPROF 
parameters from the 50000 simulations. The black lines show the 2.5% limits and the 
red line is the actual value. Figure 3 shows the actual FTSE series along with a random 
selection of our generated FTSE series. Figure 4.3 shows that this model produces series 
that have the peaks and troughs associated with the actual FTSE series.
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Figure 4.1: Histograms of Generated FT Parameters
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Figure 4.2: Histograms of Generated Profits Parameters
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Figure 4.3: Actual FTSE and a Random Selection of Generated FTSE
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4.7 Conclusions
In this paper we asked whether a world governed entirely by efficiency could generate a 
series like the FTSE. Using profits as the fundamental underlying valuation of the FTSE 
we tested whether, at the 95% confidence level, we can reject the proposition that both 
the profits and the FTSE samples have the same properties as the series generated from 
our model. As a base case we tried to match the properties of the FTSE using a model 
without regime switching; here we took the actual profits series’ errors and bootstrapped 
them, so exactly matching the profits series. We found that this model was unable to 
generate a series that matched the properties of the FTSE; this result is in line with 
numerous previous studies. Building on the base case we created a regime switching 
model with 3 regimes (high, normal and low growth). This model was an improvement, 
getting closer to matching the properties of the FTSE than the base case, but we found 
that it could not simultaneoulsy match the properties of both series. Next we added a 
fourth (crash) regime, with a very small probability of occurrence derived from experience 
over a large sample of countries. With this four-regime model we find that we are able to 
match the properties of both profits and the FTSE, in the sense that we cannot reject at 
the 95% level of confidence the proposition that both the profits and the FTSE samples 
were generated by our model.
Finally we should recall the widely-held view, notably by proponents of ‘behavioural 
finance’, that it is impossible to account for the facts of financial market in terms of 
efficient-market models.. We have shown here that this is not the case — that indeed the 
hypothesis of efficiency, if constructed to incorporate the possibility of extreme events, 
can explain the facts of financial markets. It is of course possible that alternative hy­
potheses can also explain these facts; but that issue and whether such explanations can 
be considered better ones, is an issue that must be deferred to further research.
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Chapter 5
Overfill Conclusions
Macro economic outcomes have tended to exhibit serious instability from time to time. 
One policy reaction to this has been to suggest interventionist rules for monetary and 
regulatory policy. Examples of these have been the idea that the UK should join the euro 
as a substitute for a domestic monetary policy that has led to macro instability; that 
monetary policy should stabilise rates of growth of nominal variables rather than their 
levels as a way of stabilising unemployment; and that financial markets need regulation 
to avoid inefficiency and ‘bubbles’. These three examples are what are addressed in this 
thesis.
In the first part I looked at the proposal to join the euro; plainly such a proposal 
might look attractive if domestic monetary policy is poorly constructed. However equally 
plainly it must be possible for a government to decide on good monetary policy. I ex­
amined the euro proposal within that context. Using the Liverpool model with both a 
floating exchange rate and a fixed exchange rate (EMU) I find that the variances of four 
key variables — output around its trend, inflation, unemployment and real short-term 
interest rates — are considerably higher under EMU than under floating. The variance 
of output around its trend is nearly a quarter higher; that of unemployment nearly a 
fifth higher; real interest rates a multiple of over four times; and that of inflation under
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EMU is approximately twenty times that under floating. The EMU environment is one 
in which ECB nominal interest rates are moving a fair amount for euro-zone-wide reasons 
and yet because they are poorly addressed to UK shocks the UK economy experiences 
considerably worse output, employment and above all inflation swings. When assessing 
the welfare under both cases I find that welfare under EMU is 45% of that under floating 
— equivalently the EMU welfare cost is 2.21 times that of floating.
I also checked the results for sensitivity by examining the differences between floating 
and EMU if our assumptions about both regimes were wrong due to an ‘exogenous’ 
mistake in the parameter values. Whilst some of the changes decreased the gap between 
floating and EMU, some of them worsened the relative position of EMU. But in no case 
does the relative position of EMU become reversed, nor does it even come close to that. 
Whatever one does to the structure of the British economy, it remains the case the EMU 
makes it much more unstable.
Overall I find that joining EMU would more than double the variability of the UK 
economy. One quarter of this extra cost comes from the loss of stabilising powers of 
independent UK monetary policy; the other three quarters comes from the instability 
of the euro-zone’s own interest rates and exchange rates. This increased cost is largely 
insensitive to the sort of changes that euro advocates have put forward. Greater UK 
labour market flexibility helps; so does smaller UK responsiveness to interest rates. But 
the extent is limited; the big differences remain. Only if the highly optimistic assumption 
is made that both these parameter changes will come about solely as a result of joining 
EMU does output variability fall under EMU; even then variability in inflation and real 
interest rates is undiminished and the overall macro variability compared with floating is 
only halved.
In the second part I looked more narrowly at domestic monetary policy and asked 
whether one could envisage less emphasis on output stabilisation and move from the 
existing practice of targeting the growth rates of nominal variables to targeting their
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levels. This would bring monetary policy closer to the classical norms of the gold standard 
and avoid the problem of existing practices that the variance of the nominal price level 
becomes infinite as the time horizon of prediction stretches into the future. I looked at 
the operation of monetary rules both within a calibrated model and within a forecasting 
model of the UK (the Liverpool model). The main current targeting choice of central 
banks is inflation targeting; I therefore make this the benchmark regime against which to 
measure alternatives.
I find that when comparing inflation and price-level targeting using the calibrated 
model the variances of both consumption and unemployment fall as we move to price- 
level targeting, once allowance is made for the endogenous response of indexation. If 
indexation does not respond then unemployment variance actually increases while con­
sumption variance falls on the move to price targeting. This result is very much in line 
with the usual views of macroeconomists under the usual assumption that indexation is 
constant: that targeting the price level would destabilise employment and output, even 
if the stability of prices would indeed yield benefits to those with long term, nominal, or 
partly nominal, contracts, as here exemplified by workers with wage contracts that are not 
fully indexed. When comparing inflation and money targeting I find that money targeting 
is not helpful to real wage smoothing, but it does reduce the variance of unemployment 
even when there is no response of indexation.
Looking at the price and money targeting from the viewpoint of average welfare, I 
find that money targeting is superior before indexation has adjusted — confirming the 
majority macroeconomist viewpoint that price targeting is too rigid in driving prices 
back to their target track. Money targeting is however flexible enough to deliver some 
benefit overall compared with inflation targeting; it slightly destabilises consumption but 
markedly stabilises employment. After indexation has adjusted, it turns out that the two 
policies deliver rather similar improvements in general welfare.
The results with the Liverpool model are about as favourable to price-level targeting
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as in the calibrated model. Again, they show that under inflation-targeting there is a high 
degree of indexation and this would drop to nil under price-level targeting. Similarly, too, 
they show that if indexation is assumed endogenous, welfare will rise significantly if price- 
level targeting is introduced. In the Liverpool model the variance of consumption falls 
more and that of unemployment falls less than in the representative-agent model but both 
fall significantly. Turning to a comparison of money targeting and price targeting, I find 
that money targeting relatively stabilises nominal and real interest rates, real investment 
and total wealth, but it relatively destabilises prices and inflation and hence the real 
value of financial wealth. The variance of unemployment and output rise as we switch 
from price- to money-targeting while that of consumption falls. Aggregate welfare under 
price- and money-targeting are roughly the same.
I also distinguish between two groups of agents, the employed and the unemployed. 
The aim was to see how for allowing for such heterogeneity both in models and in groups 
could matter for the choice of monetary regime. I found that heterogeneity did matter, 
in the sense that certain model-policy combinations could cause harm particularly to the 
unskilled group and therefore would prudently be avoided either from a welfare or political 
viewpoint. I concluded that targeting the level of the money supply within an operating 
system of money-supply-control is the dominant monetary regime. It is both the only 
regime that strictly avoids a disaster to any group and it is also the one that delivers the 
highest average welfare across both models and groups.
In the third part I considered the need for financial market intervention or regulation, 
revisiting the question of financial market efficiency to investigate whether a model of 
complete market efficiency could explain the FTSE. Using profits as the fundamental 
underlying valuation of the FTSE I tested whether, at the 95% confidence level, one 
can reject the proposition that the FTSE sample has the same properties as the series 
generated from the model. Initially I used a model without regime switching to try to 
match the properties of the FTSE, but found that this model was unable to generate a
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series that matched the properties of the FTSE. Building on this model I created a regime 
switching model with three regimes. This model was an improvement, but still did not 
match the properties of the FTSE to a sufficient level. Next, I included a fourth regime 
which represents a crash, with a very small probability of occurrence. Using this model 
I am able to match the properties of both profits and the FTSE to an acceptable level, 
matching all of the properties I tested. The model was able to generate the booms and 
crashes associated with the FTSE as well as the tendency to display ARCH and fat tails. 
I find that one cannot reject the proposition that the FTSE has the same properties as 
the series generated from our model.
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Summary
Macro economic outcomes have tended to exhibit serious instability from time to time. 
One policy reaction to this has been to suggest interventionist rules for monetary and 
regulatory policy. Examples o f  these have been the idea that the UK should join the euro 
as a substitute for a domestic monetary policy that has led to macro instability; that 
monetary policy should stabilise rates o f growth o f  nominal variables rather than their 
levels as a way o f  stabilising unemployment; and that financial markets need regulation 
to avoid inefficiency and ‘bubbles’. These three examples are what are addressed in this 
thesis.
In the first part I look at the proposal to join the euro; plainly such a proposal might look 
attractive if  domestic monetary policy is poorly constructed. However equally plainly it 
must be possible for a government to decide on good monetary policy. I examine the euro 
proposal within that context.
In the second part I look more narrowly at domestic monetary policy and ask whether one 
could envisage less emphasis on output stabilisation and move from the existing practice 
o f targeting the growth rates o f  nominal variables to targeting their levels.
In the third part I consider the need for financial market intervention or regulation, 
revisiting the question o f  financial market efficiency to investigate whether a model o f  
complete market efficiency could explain the FTSE. This question is highly complicated 
by the possibility o f  multiple regimes for profit and hence productivity growth —  which 
creates a ‘peso problem’ in evaluating the FTSE’s behaviour. To allow for this problem I 
take the Montecarlo approach o f constructing the working or null hypothesis o f efficiency 
under multiple regimes and asking whether draws from the error distributions o f  these 
regimes could account for the joint behaviour o f  profits (the market ‘fundamental’) and 
the FTSE.
